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INTRODUCTION
In recent years a sizeable volume of litigation' arising from the
default of public works contractors has focused upon the relative
priority positions of surety companies and commercial banks. With
the continued growth of expenditures for federal public works'—the
4' A.B., Brown University, 1966; LL.B., Yale University, 1969; Associate Professor of
Law, University of Southern California Law Center. The author is much indebted to Mr.
Jonah Levin of Toledo, Ohio, and to Mr. Richard Harvey of Pasadena, California, who
have served as research associates and have made valuable contributions to this paper.
Funds to support this research were provided in part by the Universities of Michigan,
Toledo and Southern California.
1
 A discussion of recent cases appears in the text at notes 103-05, 134-40 infra.
2 Contract amounts for the construction of publicly owned projects (i.e., owned by
federal, state, or municipal entities) have increased fivefold since 1950. The valuation, in
millions of dollars, is: 1950—$4,409; 1960—$12,587; 1970—$23,188. Department of Com-
merce, Business Statistics 51 (1971 ed.).
943
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
context in which most of the disputes arise—a satisfactory resolution
of this problem becomes increasingly important.
In terms of legal theory alone the issues are exceedingly complex
and subtle. They have generated a good deal of academic commentary.'
But perhaps because of their complexity, they have not yet been ade-
quately analyzed in an empirical framework. There has been little
research "in the field." Consequently we know little about the rela-
tionship between the theoretical and the real—specifically, about how
well or poorly the developing law on this issue is responding to its
commonly stated policy goals. The research reported in this paper has
been undertaken both to explore that relationship, and to offer further
critical commentary on matters of legal doctrine. Initially, however,
we must look at the factual setting out of which the conflict arises.
As a condition to his being awarded a contract to construct, alter,
or repair a federal public work, a successful bidder is required by the
terms of the Miller Act to secure both performance and payment
bonds from an acceptable surety.' The performance bond, which runs
directly to the United States, obligates the surety to complete the
project or respond in damages if the contractor fails to perform satis-
factorily.' The United States is the nominal beneficiary of the payment
The most recent figures show public construction to be in excess of 25% of the
total construction in the United States (figures are $ millions):
1970 1971 1972 (Jan.-Feb.)
Total Construction $68,160 $80,590 $11,841
Publicly Owned 21,977 22,626 3,771
See 52 Survey of Current Business 5-10 (No. 4, April 1972).
Federal expenditures for civil public works alone have nearly doubled since 1960,
from $5.01 billion to $10.01 billion in 1971. Of this, direct federal construction was $3.46
billion in 1960, and $4.6 billion in 1971. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of
the United States 1971, at 660.
A sampling would include: Speidel, "Stakeholder" Payments Under Federal Con-
struction Contracts: Payment Bond Surety vs. Assignee, 47 Va. L. Rev. 640 (1961) ; Note,
71 Yale L.J. 1274 (1962); Comment, 31 Fordham L. Rev. 161 (1962); Rudolph, Financing
on Construction Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 5 B.C. Ind. & Com. L.
Rev. 245 (1964); Cushman, The Surety's Right of Equitable Priority to Contract Balances
in Relation to the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 Temp. L.Q. 239 (1966); Brady, Bonds
on Federal Government Construction Contracts: The Surety's View, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
262 (1971) ; Withers, Surety vs. Lender: Priority of Claims to Contract Funds, 10 Wash-
burn L.J. 356 (1971); 2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property §§ 36.1-.8
(1965). It should be noted that most of these authors reach or advocate a pro-surety view.
4 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-d (1970). Projects of less than $2000 in amount need not be
bonded, although the contracting officer may require bonding even in these excepted
cases. 40 U.S.C. § 270a(c) (1970). Similarly, the bonding requirement may be waived in
cases of military or maritime construction, 40 U.S.C. §§ 270e, f (1970).
5 Standard Form 25: Performance Bond, 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-25 (1972). The surety's
options include paying damages, hiring another contractor to complete the project, having
the government contract for completion directly, or—and least likely—financing the
original contractor to completion. See Brady, supra note 3, at 263-65.
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bond as well, although the surety's obligation on this is to satisfy the
claims of any laborers and materialmen whom the contractor may
have failed to pay.° Unlike their counterparts in the private sector,
who can rely upon materialmen's liens as a means of securing payment
to themselves,' these laborers and materialmen are unable to acquire
a lien on public works,8 and have no other legal rights against the
Government as "owner" of the project.°
Consequently, any serious default by a bonded contractor can
expose his surety to potentially sizeable claims against either one or
both of the bonds. The surety who actually suffers such a loss will in
turn seek indemnification from its assured, the contractor.'° It often
happens—not surprisingly, given that he has already defaulted in
some respect—that the contractor is unable to indemnify the surety
from its own assets. In such a case the only substantial fund that may
be available to the surety is the amount the Government owes but has
not yet paid under the contract. This fund typically includes contract
retainages, a percentage (usually 10%) of the contract amount re-
tained as security for full performance, and often includes earned but
unpaid progress payments as well." The zeal with which the surety
will pursue these withheld funds, however, is matched or exceeded by
that of the commercial lender, typically a bank, which has also made
cash advances on the contractor's behalf and taken as security an
assignment in the same funds.
A contracting firm which has involved itself in the burgeoning
business of federal works construction often undertakes projects
whose gross costs may exceed the firm's net capitalization by several
orders of magnitude. 12
 To procure the equipment, labor and materials
6
 Standard Form 25-A: Payment Bond, 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-25A (1972). See
United States v. Magna Bldg. Corp., 305 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (D. Ga. 1969): "The purpose
of the Miller Act . . . is to protect materialmen and laborers . . . ." See also United
States v. Williams, 240 F.2d 561, 564 (10th Cir. 1957).
The laborers and materialmen who provided services to the project, but who were
under contract not to the prime but to a first-tier subcontractor, may nevertheless take
advantage of the prime contractor's payment bond. 40 U.S.C. § flab (1970). It is for this
reason that a general contractor will often require his subcontractors to procure bonds,
with the prime contractor as beneficiary.
7 See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. §* 2A:44-71 et seq. (1952) ; Shore Block Corp. v. Lake-
view Apartments, 377 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1967).
8 United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 241 (1947).
9 Id.
10 The contract between the surety and the principal obligor inevitably contains a
general indemnity agreement. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund American, Form 360124-11.65 § 2.
11 Progress payments are normally made monthly by the contracting agency in-
volved. Ten percent of each payment is withheld until final completion, or until the dis-
pensing officer elects to make full progress payments, usually after a substantial amount
of the work has been completed. See Standard Form 23-A: General Provisions (Con-
struction Contract) § 7(c), 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-23A (1972).
12 While precise figures are elusive, and at present not available, some indication of
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necessary to start the job, the contractor often requires significant
outside financing. Since the contractor's largest (and potentially most
liquid) source of collateral is the Government's obligation to pay the
contract price, it is this "contract right" which he generally assigns
to the bank from which he obtains the loan." Consequently, if the
contractor defaults on one or both of its bonds and, as is likely, on its
financing loan as well, it will leave the surety and the secured lender
looking to the same fund for reimbursement. The determination of
which party will be victorious depends, in a word, on priority. And
although the surety, like the bank, may have taken an assignment of
the contract rights for security, the problem is something more than
the pedestrian issue of status among competing assignees. It repre-
sents, rather, a peculiarly murky intersection of the legal rights of the
holders of otherwise unrelated legal statuses: assignee banks, and
subrogee sureties. Moreover, little of the legal structure of either
status has been concerned with the interactive effects one theory could
have on the other. Thus while a plethora of distinctions and criteria
have been suggested by the courts to deal with these problems, they
have failed to coalesce into a comprehensive decisional framework.
In the pages to follow I shall attempt to develop the judicial re-
actions to this complex problem and critically examine these decisions
from two dimensions: first, from a strictly doctrinal point of view, and
then by reference to the impact these decisions have had on matters
of policy. The discussion will reveal, first, that the courts have developed
a line of decisional law favoring the surety. The doctrinal analysis which
follows, however, will conclude that these decisions stand on weak
foundations, and that, from a doctrinal viewpoint, the opposite result
can be validly attained. The third section of the article will then ex-
amine the policy embodied in federal legislation and conclude that its
goals—the vitality of small business contractors and a competitive
public contracting market—can be pursued more adequately through
this can be seen in the ratios of revenue to working capital of typical contracting firms. This
ratio is the gross annual revenue divided by the excess of total current assets over current
liabilities. Robert Morris Associates, Annual Statement Studies vii (1972 ed.). The ratio
for a sample of general building contractors is 11.6:1; 9.8:1 for non-highway heavy con-
struction; and 9.5:1 for highway and street contractors. Id. at 146-47. "A low ratio may
indicate unprofitable use of working capital while a very high ratio often signifies over-
trading—a vulnerable condition for creditors." Id. at
13 This "contract right" has become a significant element in construction financing
since the enactment of the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1970),
amended by 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1951). The purpose of the Act was to remove the ban on
assignments of claims against the United States which had previously existed, and by
making such assignments to financial institutions "valid for all purposes," to facilitate the
entry of larger numbers of firms into the public construction market. See House Comm. on
the Judiciary, Permitting Assignment of Claims Under Public Contracts, H.R. Rep. No.
2925, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) ; see also discussion of the legislative history in text at
notes 210-16 infra.
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a reversal of the pro-surety line of cases. Section four consists of the
results of a study conducted by this author directed toward an empiri-
cal determination of the effect of the present pro-surety status of the
law regarding the financing of public works contractors, with particu-
lar emphasis placed on the federal policies noted above. Finally, I will
offer a suggestion for a legal change which may correct this persisting
empirical infelicity, and will point out some avenues worthy of further
research.
I. DOCTRINAL RESPONSES: COURTS AND COMMENTATORS
A. The Miller Act Priority Cases to 1950
The theoretical—to say nothing of the practical—issues in this
dispute which have been faced, or generated, by the federal courts
have led even as astute a commentator as Grant Gilmore to remark
in 1965 that "[d]espite more than sixty years of judicial analysis, the
bank-surety priority problem may today be further than ever from a
generally accepted solution." 14 Gilmore's lament could stand correc-
tion in but one respect: as of today, the pot has been bubbling for
seventy-seven years. The tale begins in 1896, with a victory for the
surety.
In 1888 Charles Sundborg and Company had contracted with the
United States to build a customhouse. When Sundborg defaulted on
the project, his surety undertook to complete it, and spent consider-
able sums before learning that Sundborg had another creditor lurking
about. That other was the commercial bank which had extended Sund-
borg an enabling loan. Because the United States was still in posses-
sion of the retained percentages, the race was on. The Court of
Claims granted the fund to the surety,'3 and in Prairie State Bank v.
United States" the Supreme Court affirmed. Justice White's opinion
did more than decide the outcome of a private dispute: it gave rise to
a host of later difficulties.17
The bank in Prairie State had obtained its interest in the periodic
disbursements of the contract proceeds through a power of attorney. 18
Conceding that an assignment was not effective as such against the
14
 2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 36.1, at 949 (1965).
16
 Hitchcock v. United States, 27 Ct. CI. 185 (1892).
16 164 U.S. 227 (1896).
17 The opinion pointed out, for example, that the Court of Claims did not find that
the bank's loans were in fact applied to the project in question. Id. at 229. But the opinion
failed to state the relevance of that non-finding. Its importance was, if anything, denied by
the more explicit rationale of the decision.
18
 As to the contractor this "interest" was an assignment, but as to the United States
the assignment was impermissible. Therefore, a power of attorney was used to collect the
proceeds,
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United States, the bank asserted an equitable lien against the retained
percentages. The surety did likewise, but further argued that its lien
on the fund had arisen when the bond was given, and accordingly was
prior in time and therefore prior in right. Justice White, however, did
not choose the simpler path of judging the competing priorities be-
tween assignees, but found instead that the surety might occupy an
entirely different legal status: that of subrogee.
He then applied the suretyship doctrine that one who pays a debt
due to a third party—here, the United States—other than as a volun-
teer is subrogated to that third party's rights as against a creditor.
Specifically, in a case such as this the effect of the surety's subrogation
would be to grant it the right to withhold funds from the debtor (con-
tractor), and by hypothesis, from the debtor's assignee or attorney-for-
collection. The surety, being obligated by its bond to pay, was not a
mere volunteer. The bank, though, was." The Court was thus faced
with the question of "whether the equitable lien, which the bank claims
it has . is paramount to the right of subrogation which unquestionably
exists in favor of [the surety]."" The issue turned on the date on
which the surety's rights arose. That date, the court held, was the date
the bond was given, and so the surety was first in right.
Because the surety is subrogated to the rights of the United
States, including the Government's right to retain ten percent of the
contract amount as security for full performance, this "timing" con-
clusion was necessary to give the subrogation practical effect. For ex-
ample, if the subrogation were held to have dated from the time of the
surety's payment on its bond, and if that payment removed the right
of the United States to continue holding the retainages, there would
be no useful right to which the surety could ever be subrogated.'
Furthermore, if the surety's rights existed at the time of the assign-
ment to the bank, the bank could receive no greater interest in the
security fund than the contractor had, i.e., the bank would be subject
to the surety's claim.
Prairie State thus established several principles which were to be-
come both influential and troublesome in later years: (1) the surety is
subrogated to the rights of the United States—specifically in this case,
the right to withhold payment to the contractor upon default; (2) its
19 164 U.S. at 231. On the assumption that the bond and the loan were both given in
normal course, this distinction seems tenuous. Certainly the bank's loan was voluntary.
But so was the giving of the bond. The court's distinction was probably good textbook law,
ascribing the element of voluntariness to the act of payment rather than to the act of
promising to pay later. But one might question whether such an artificial definition should
ever be related to potentially consequence-producing legal statuses: subrogee or lienor.
20 Id. at 232.
21 This circularity became manifest in Munsey Trust, discussed in text at notes 65-
74 infra.
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rights arise at the time the bond is given; (3) a bank which later takes
an assignment takes subject to those rights; and (4) the retained per-
centages exist for the security of the United States and the surety. It
should also be noted that the bond obligation involved in Prairie State
was for performance and not for the payment of laborers and suppliers,
and the funds in question were retainages, not progress payments.
These additional factors were not to go unnoticed in the later cases.
Finally, the question of the actual use or misuse of the loan proceeds
in furthering a defaulted project was considered by the Supreme Court
to be a factor worthy of mention, but unfortunately not worthy of
much discussion. This distinction, briefly alluded to in Prairie State,
later became determinative in the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the
problem."
The first important application of Prairie State came in 1906
when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Henningsen v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co." The facts of Henningsen dif-
fered from those in Prairie State in two respects. First, the contractor's
default in Henningsen was his failure to pay materialmen and laborers,
not—as in Prairie State—failure to complete the project. And second,
the fund in question had been "earned"24 by the contractor. The opin-
ion does not indicate whether the fund was earned-but-unpaid progress
payments, or whether it was retained percentages "earned" by full
performance. The more interesting point is that the court apparently
did not consider the distinction important.
Citing Prairie State, Judge Ross upheld the distinction between
lenders and sureties so far as subrogation was concerned. The bank,
being a mere volunteer "and under no obligation to loan its money,"
was not entitled to assert the equitable doctrine of subrogation;" the
surety, on the other hand, by paying the laborers and materialmen was
subrogated to their rights against the contractor. That subrogation
again related back to the date of the bond, making the surety prior in
right to the bank, to whom the contractor had made an assignment
after the bond had been issued. However, despite the fact that Judge
Ross noted when the surety's rights arose, he left only to implication
what might appear to be the next step in reaching his holding, i.e.,
that the decision as to priority actually turns on the relative timing of
the competing interests. Furthermore, in the course of his opinion
Ross mentioned what could well have been an independent basis for
deciding the case: it had not been shown that the loan proceeds were
22 See discussion in text at notes 76-77 infra.
23 143 F. 810 (9th Cir. 1906).
24 Id. at 812.
25 Id, at 813.
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actually applied to the instant project." But this observation too was
left in the air. Thus, a banker reading the Henningsen opinion would
be unable to say whether or not he could attain the superior right re-
gardless of the timing of his loan vis-à-vis the issuance of the surety
bond by "policing" his loan disbursements, or whether, conversely,
he could attain priority by making a loan prior to the date of the bond
regardless of how the contractor then used the funds.
Judge Ross can be forgiven, at least in part, for his less than
syllogistic style, for he had a troublesome theoretical difficulty which
he may have felt constrained to avoid. Assume, as the judge appar-
ently did, that "timing" is a determinative issue. If the surety is
subrogated to the materialmen as of the date of its bond, then as of
that date the surety is a creditor of the contractor. But he is a general
creditor only. Since the materialmen have no legal right to the contract
proceeds as distinguished from the other assets of the contractor, the
surety by its subrogation succeeds only to their "generalized" rights.
In contrast, as assignee of the contractor's contract rights against the
Government the bank had an equitable interest in a particular fund
and therefore was not a mere general creditor. Thus if timing is the
key, so that the bank takes the contractor's interest subject to the
already existing rights of the surety, the case for the surety's priority
can be made certain only if the surety's rights attach to that particular
fund or if the lender's rights were also "generalized." The clearest
way to generalize the lender's interest is to find that the proceeds of
the loan were not used solely for the project from which the disputed
fund was generated. Although Judge Ross pointed out that it had not
been shown that the funds were so used, he did not articulate this
problem. Thus the decision left open for future courts the task of de-
ciding whether in payment bond cases timing alone is determinative
or whether the nature of the bank's right as generalized or particular
—depending upon whether its loan was utilized in construction or
not—is also in issue.
Not surprisingly the bank in Henningsen appealed; and in 1908
the Supreme Court, citing Prairie State as controlling, affirmed the
surety's victory." Justice Brewer's opinion clarified nothing.28 Instead,
26 Certainly the bank cannot be justly said to have any sort of equity to the
entire sum of $5,041.29, for it is not pretended that in making its loans to Hen-
ningsen it was understood that he was to use all of the money so loaned in the
performance of the contract in question.
Id. at 813.
27 Henningsen v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 208 U.S. 404 (1908). The
opinion of the Court was written by Mr. Justice Brewer.
28 ,qt seems unnecessary to again review the authorities. It is sufficient to say that
we agree with the views of the Circuit Court of Appeals, expressed in its opinion, in the
present case [that only the surety was entitled to subrogation]." Id. at 411.
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it added to the haze the gratuitous dictum that the United States had
an "equitable obligation to see that the laborers and supplymen were
paid."" The dictum was out of place in Henningsen, but was a har-
binger of bright days for the surety companies.
At this point we can skip to 1940, and a banker's victory in a
case decided just before the passage of the Assignment of Claims Act
in that year. In Town of River Junction v. Maryland Casualty Co."
the factual distinctions were sliced in yet another way. Here, as in
Prairie State, the surety had made payment under its performance
bond and was subrogated to the rights of the United States. The fund
in question comprised both retained percentages and, unlike that in
Prairie State, progress payments earned before the contractor's de-
fault. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Prairie State was
controlling with respect to the retainages, which exist for the protec-
tion of both the United States and the surety.81
 Progress payments,
however, were a different matter." So long as the contractor was not
in default, he was entitled to use the progress payments as he wished,
including assigning them to a commercial bank as collateral for a
loan.88
 The distinction was premised on the general proposition that
the surety has a beneficial interest in all collateral pledged to the
creditor by the general debtor, that is, in the retained percentages re-
served to the United States by the contractor, but (by implication)
that he has no such interest in the debtor's other assets, that is, in
progress payments made prior to default. Distinguishing the retained
percentages from progress payments in this way not only made doc-
trinal sense but, in the court's view, made practical sense as well:
without some such guarantee "banks cannot safely lend. . . ." Also,
"Mlle whole matter of public contracts will be seriously affected.""
After the denial of certiorari" in River Junction it appeared that
at least some degree of predictability had been inserted into the fi-
nancing of Government projects. But the querulous could still point
to a few problems. First of all, in River Junction the Fifth Circuit
had indicated that the surety "probably" had a right to insist that the
proceeds not be diverted from the job it had bonded." Yet at the same
29 Id. at 410.
80 110 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 634 (1940).
81 Id. at 281. The court added, however, that the timing of the competing interests
is again crucial: "In these retained percentages the contractor can give no one a right
superior to that of the surety, for the surety's right dates from the making of the con-
tract which pledged them." Id.
82 In a strong dissent, judge Hutcheson read the prior cases as making no such
distinction. Id. at 285-86.
se Id. at 281.
84 Id.
85 310 U.S. 634 (1940).
88 110 F.2d at 281.
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time the court had said: "The surety cannot object [to an assignment
of a particular progress payment] on the ground that the contractor
might divert the money, for he has agreed to trust the contractor until
he defaults.' Secondly, the notion that the retained percentages
existed for the surety's benefit might no longer stand up in a situation
involving payment bonds.
Prairie State had determined that the surety succeeded to the
United States' rights against the contractor, and so also against the
contractor's assignee. Because the United States has a right to withold
job funds if a default in performance occurs, according to Prairie
State the surety's rights would exceed those of the financing bank.
However, since the United States does not have a legal obligation to
pay materialmen and laborers this conclusion does not necessarily fol-
low where payment bonds are concerned. To obtain priority in a pay-
ment bond situation, the surety would have to rely on the dictum in
Henningsen that the Government does have an "equitable obligation"
to pay the materialmen and laborers." Only if this "equitable obli-
gation" dictum is interpreted to mean that the United States has the
right to withhold funds if the contractor fails to pay his bills, can the
surety have the same priority position after responding on its payment
bond as it did on the performance bond.
A third problem arises from the fact that River Junction was a
town. The bank's claim in the federal cases had been based on its
equitable lien rather than on its assignee's rights only because assign-
ments of debts owed by the United States were invalid. As against a
town, in other words in municipal public works cases, assignments of
funds owed by the governing body might well be valid. Finally, in
River Junction the payments had already been made to the bank; the
town was not (as the United States in prior cases had been) holding
the funds as stakeholder. In short, the bank's victory in River Junc-
tion was probably not sufficient cause for bacchanalian revelries
among commercial lenders everywhere 8° But a statute passed in 1940
was good for at least a small party.
87 Id,
88 See text at note 29 supra.
89 The same cause reappeared before the Fifth Circuit in 1943, Town of River
Junction v. Maryland Cas. Co., 133 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1943). Following the 1940 opinion,
the case was remanded for trial. The lower court found that the progress payment had
not been earned, because not all of the contractor's obligations had been satisfied. The
lower court had also found that the loan proceeds had not been used exclusively for this
project, and thus entered judgment for the surety. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the first
finding but disagreed with the result. Even if the assignment was ineffective because it had
not yet been fully "earned," the bank's payments had gone to pay laborers and material
suppliers, and to that extent the bank had relieved the surety of potential claims against
its bonds. The surety, having chosen an equitable remedy (subrogation), will not be al-
lowed to force the bank to disgorge payments it has received in return for its relieving
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With the threat of war rapidly increasing in 1940, the United
States began to consider its national defense. Defense construction
and material would have to be contracted for with private industry;
that in turn meant that some method of financing defense contractors
had to be found. Direct Government participation was out of the ques-
tion; administrative efficiency dictated that private capital be mobi-
lized. It was Congress' idea that passage of a statute removing the
ban on assignments of claims against the United States would facili-
tate the private financing of national defense contracts by allowing
lending institutions some degree of safe collateral security.° In the
words of Representative Hobbs: "Nor will any bank in the United
States take any risk on making a loan under the terms of this bill. The
assignments permitted by the bill we are talking about will be good
security; they can be safely accepted."" The bill Hobbs was referring
to became the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940; 42 in form it was an
amendment to an act of 1846 which had forbidden assignments of un-
matured contract rights against the United States 4° After passage of
the Act, assignments of claims against the United States of $1000 or
more, made to banks or other financing institutions, were "valid .. .
for all purposes" 44
 if certain minimal requisites were satisfied; these
included a requirement that the bond sureties be notified by the as-
signee that the claim had been transferred."' On the face of the stat-
ute, a bankers' victory over the sureties seemed assured. Not only
would a bank no longer have to rely on its rights as an equitable lienor
as it had in Prairie State and Henningsen, but it could now lay claim
to the only valid assignment—an assignment "valid for all purposes."
Consequently, a bank might allege, the surety's priority through sub-
rogation has been displaced by the bank's statutory right to its assign-
ment.
the surety. Id. at 59. The case was commented on unfavorably. See Comment, 56 Harv.
L. Rev. 1168 (1943).
40 House Comm. on the Judiciary, Permitting Assignment of Claims Under Public
Contracts, H.R. Rep. No. 2925, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1940).
41 86 Cong. Rec. 13135 (1940). As will be more fully argued later, see text at notes
211-12 infra, Congress was concerned with "small" contractors. See, e.g., the dialogue
between Representatives Sumners and Youngdahl, id. at 12557.
42 Act of Oct. 9, 1940, 54 Stat. 1029 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1970)).
48 Act of July 29, 1846, 9 Stat. 41 (codified at 31 U.S.C. 203 (1970)),
44 31 U.S.C. 203 (1970).
48 The limitations after October 9, 1940 were few:
(a) a government agency could still prohibit assignment by including an appro-
priate clause in its contract;
(b) a claim could be assigned to only one party, and could not be further as-
signed;
(c) in addition to notifying the bond surety, notice must be given to both the
contracting officer and the disbursing officer.
See 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1970).
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The first major case to test this bankers' hope was brought to the
Fifth Circuit, the same court that five years earlier had given a victory
to the bank financing a municipal public work." The case was Coco-
nut Grove Exchange Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.; 41 the facts
were paradigmatic. In Coconut Grove the surety had paid supplymen
and laborers under a payment bond, and had been awarded the unpaid
progress payments by the district court." Basing its decision on the
Assignment of Claims Act of 1940, the Fifth Circuit reversed, and held
that the bank was entitled to the funds, which, incidentally had already
been paid over to it by the disbursing agency.
Only the bank, the court held, was a "bank, trust company, or
other financing institution" under the 1940 Act, and so only the bank
could claim a valid assignment. Furthermore, the effect of the Act was
to grant the bank a priority over other claimants; why else would the
statute require notice to the surety? And unless the language "valid for
all purposes" speaks to the issue of rights as against third parties, that
clause too would become mere surplusage." Of course "validity" and
"priority" are not the same concept." But in the absence of discussion
of priority in the statute, reading "valid for all purposes" as meaning
"prior to competing claims" is not at all outrageous; it is, arguably,
consistent with the legislative purpose of providing safe collateral to
financing banks." As to the surety's claim of priority through its rights
of equitable subrogation, the court quite correctly held that to acquire
an equity superior to the assignee's legal rights the surety must show
injury, not benefit from its competitor." In other words the bonding
" See discussion of River Junction in text at notes 30-37 supra.
47
 149 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1945).
48 Id. at 75. The lower court had also considered and rejected an assertion that the
bank's claim was within the protection of the surety's bond. Similar claims were made
both before and after Coconut Grove, and have been similarly rejected. See First Nat'l Bank
v. American Sur. Co., 53 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1931) (private construction contract); Bank
of Auburn v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 295 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1961); Boka
Elec. Constr. Co. v. W.M. Chappell, Inc., 262 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1958); and cases col-
lected in Annot., 127 A.L.R. 974 (1940), and Annot., 164 A.L.R. 782 (1946). This result
obtains even if the bank can establish that its loan funds went to pay the claims of sup-
pliers who would have rights under the surety's bond. First Nat'l Bank v. American Sur.
Co., supra at 748-49.
49
 149 F.2d at 77.
150 Although not in effect at the time of this decision, the current state of the law
with respect to the assignment of contract rights clearly separates validity from priority.
See U,C.C. § 9-201 ("General Validity of Security Agreement"), 9-312 (on priorities).
51 See text at note 40 supra.
82 149 F.2d at 78-79. In his dissent Judge Sibley did not disagree in principle; rather,
he would have remanded the cause for further findings on two issues: (1) the bank, to
attain the equity accorded the bank in River Junction, would have to prove the use of
its loan; and (2) the bank would also have to show that the progress payment now in
question was actually earned by the contractor, and not earned by the surety's payments
under its bond. Id. at 80-81 (dissenting opinion).
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companies would have no superior equity unless they could show that
the contractor had diverted the proceeds of the bank's loan away from
the projec0°
Coconut Grove, however, did not provide a firm resolution of any
of the manifold problems arising from the central priority issue. In
addition two other Supreme Court cases, decided at about the same time
as Coconut Grove, muddied the waters." Not since Henningsen had the
Court spoken directly to the issue of bank-surety priorities, but a
dictum that the Court dropped in the first of these two cases was to
become of great interest to the rival claimants even though the surety
was not a party to that action.
In McKenzie v. Irving Trust CO.," the competing parties were a
financing bank and the contractor's trustee in bankruptcy. The con-
tractor had assigned and then paid over to the bank certain progress
payments, alleged by the trustee to have been unlawful preferences,
and thus voidable under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act." The dis-
pute was properly decided on the narrow holding that the payments in
question had not been made within four months before bankruptcy
and thus were not within section 60's preference period. Pointing out
that the surety did not appear to be a creditor," and in addition, was
not a party to this suit, Justice Stone went on to add, in dictum, that
even if the surety were a creditor, it did not appear that its lien would
be prior to the bank's. First, the surety had not perfected its assign-
ment as against a trustee in bankruptcy of the contractor;" and sec-
ond, the bank had received the proceeds before receiving notice of the
58 If the bank's funds had actually gone into the project, it would have reduced the
surety's maximum risk by roughly that amount. The surety would thus have been bene-
fited by the bank's presence. Equity should not then aid the surety in defeating the legal
rights of the bank. Subrogation, an equitable doctrine, Is therefore inappropriate to the
extent that it favors the surety at the bank's expense.
ti4 United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947), rev'g 67 F. Supp. 976
(Ct. Cl. 1946) ; McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365 (1945).
55 Id.
58 Under § 60, "a preference is a transfer 	 • on account of an antecedent debt, made
or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing [of
bankruptcy] . . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1) (1970). Any such preferential transfer can be
set aside by the trustee, and the payment recouped for the benefit of the bankrupt's
estate. 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1970).
57 323 U.S. at 372. Justice Stone's answer is not free from doubt. 11 U.S.C. § 96(1970), unlike § 110(e), does not require the actual existence of a competing creditor. The
transfer (payment) is complete when it is so far perfected that no creditor could acquire
a lien. It is an issue of law, not of fact; the non-existence of such a creditor is unimportant.
11 U.S.C. 11§ 96(a) (2), (3) (1970). And see § 96(a) (3): "The provisions of paragraph (2)
. shall apply whether or not there are or were creditors who might have obtained such
liens
08 Nor could it have. The surety was not protected by the Assignment of Claims Act
of 1940, since it was not a "bank, trust company, or other financing institution . ." 31
U.S.C. § 203 (1970).
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prior assignment to the surety. Justice Stone thus applied the basic
rule governing priorities of successive assignees: since the surety and
the bank are successive assignees, their rights are governed by the
usual rules of priority. Receiving the proceeds of an assignment with-
out notice of the competing assignee's claim gives the first recipient
the higher equity." However, Stone's dictum is obviously inadequate.
It failed to consider the surety's peculiarly equitable claim to subroga-
tion, and ignored the reasoning of both Prairie State and Henningsen.
It treated the surety as an assignee with an invalid assignment, rather
than as a subrogee, and by inference, without discussion, allowed the
Act of 1940 to undo the mess that the courts had taken some forty-nine
years to create. But if taken seriously, this unfortunate lapse of cere-
bration could create a problem as extensive as the one it seemed to
resolve; the whole matter of priority might be decided on the fortuitous
basis of the location of the disputed fund, for the bank would be pro-
tected by Justice Stone's dictum only if it had received the payments
prior to receiving notice of the surety's claim.
With the "whole matter of public contracts" at stake," the phys-
ical locus of the cash seems to be a signally ill-founded basis for deci-
sion. But exactly such a result was being caused by developments in
another quarter. Under federal law the Court of Claims has juris-
diction in those cases in which the payments have not yet been paid
over to any party, leaving the United States holding the funds as stake-
holder." Less than a year before the Coconut Grove decision the Court
of Claims, in Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, had firmly
placed itself in the surety's camp.' This decision, like McKenzie, did
not directly concern a bank-surety conflict but rather awarded a dis-
puted fund to the surety as against the United States' attempt to set
off unpaid taxes of the defaulting contractor. The Court of Claims felt
that although the surety had undertaken the risk that the contractor
would mismanage the funds, it had not undertaken the risk that it
would be required to pay the "contractor's taxes or unrelated debts to
the Government."" This and other like cases" made it very clear that
sureties had friends in the Court of Claims, at about the same time
Coconut Grove did the same for the banks in the circuit courts. Since
59 For this rule Justice Stone relied on Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance
Co., 264 U.S. 182 (1924), which was not a public contracts case. It was a dispute between
two assignees of one fund. According to Salem Trust; "If equities are equal, the first in
time is best in right." Id. at 199.
ee See text at note 34 supra.
61 Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. H 1491, 1346(a) (2) (1970).
02 53 F. Supp. 436 (Ct. Cl. 1944).
es Id. at 440.
'4 See especially Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
956
MILLER ACT PRIORITIES
the choice of forum depends upon the location of the fund at the time
of suit, it was this factor which, in effect, determined the result.
Shortly after Coconut Grove the Supreme Court again stepped
into the fray, and by dictum created another relevant factual distinc-
tion: that the surety's priority position might well be limited to per-
formance bond situations. In United States v. Munsey Trust Co. 6' the
surety had made good on its payment bond obligation, and sought
reimbursement from the retained percentages held by the United
States." The contractor, however, had breached another contract it
had entered into with the United States, and the Government attempted
to set off this amount against the retained percentages. Consistently
with its prior holdings," the Court of Claims held for the surety." The
Supreme Court reversed." The surety in Munsey Trust, perhaps con-
ceding that the United States had the right of set-off as against the
contractor, argued that it was by its payments subrogated both to the
laborers and materialmen whom it paid and to the United States."
Justice Jackson answered for the Court that laborers and materialmen
do not have enforceable rights against the United States. Even if
laborers and materialmen do have some equitable right, such as a lien
on the retained percentages, the surety cannot win: if they have not
been paid by the contractor the United States may retain the fund to
continue to secure their payment as part of the contractor's perfor-
mance of the contract. "In that case, how may the laborers and material-
men have a lien upon money which the United States may legally
keep?'"If they are paid, even if by the surety, their equitable right in
any fund, including the retainages, evaporates, and so again the surety's
subrogation to their rights yields the surety a fistful of dreams." As to
the surety's subrogation to the rights of the United States, the Court
noted that the retainages are kept only to insure completion of the
work and not to secure the payment of the laborers and materialmen,
a debt for which the United States is not liable. Since the security
fund was not held to insure payment, the surety was not entitled to
indemnification from that fund when it made good on the payment
332 U.S. 234 (1947), rev'g 67 F. Supp. 976 (Ct. CL 1946).
(se Recall that even Coconut Grove had allowed the surety the higher priority in
retainages, as opposed to progress payments, in a ease involving a payment bond. See
text at notes 47-50 supra.
07 See Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 53 F, Supp. 436 (Ct. Cl. 1944).
69 67 F. Supp. 976 (Ct. Cl. 1946).
69 332 U.S. 234 (1947).
79 Id. at 240.
71 Id. at 241.
72 Id. at 242,
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bond." This last conclusion appears unnecessary, especially in view
of the Court's more direct holding that the bonds are required for the
materialmen's benefit, not for the Government's detriment: "It is the
surety who is required to take risk [sic]. We have no warrant to in-
crease risks of the government."" Thus, unlike the surety whose rights
inure on fulfillment of a performance bond, the payment bond surety
has no rights of the United States to which it can be subrogated.
Anyone trying to understand the state of the law prior to 1950,
and apply that law to a given set of facts, would have to keep a num-
ber of balls in the air all at once:
a) Does the case involve a payment bond, or a perfor-
mance bond?
b) Does the disputed fund consist of retained percent-
ages, or of earned progress payments?
c) Were the loan proceeds used to further the contract,
or were they dissipated?
d) Has the fund been paid over to the bank, or is the
United States still a stakeholder?
e) Did either the bank or the surety have notice of the
other's interest at the time it received a payment?
Each of these variables had been used, if not relied upon, in one or more
of the reported cases. But even being able to provide answers to the
five questions would not produce any sure result. Some cases which
considered one of the issues important ignored the others, and some of
the issues were the products of ill-considered Supreme Court dicta, the
future of which is always shaky."
Some of these uncertainties jelled in two cases reported in 1950,
at least enough for us to see where the battle lines would ultimately be
drawn. In that year the Fifth Circuit, in General Casualty Co. of
America v. Second National Bank," reaffirmed its prior position ex-
pressed in Coconut Grove, that so far as progress payments were con-
cerned the bank has the higher priority. The court explicitly relied, in
this later case, on the fact that all of the loan proceeds had indeed been
used in the project; however, it ignored the question of the sort of bond
involved." In the same year the Court of Claims reiterated its posi-
tion, as firmly pro-surety as the Fifth Circuit's was pro-bank, in what
78 Id. at 243.
74 Id. at 244.
78 A more important criticism, to which detailed attention is paid in the text at note
379 infra, is that none of these variables can be demonstrated to have any real relation-
ship to what the results ought to be.
78 178 F.2d 679 (Sth Cir. 1949).
77 According to the opinion, the surety apparently made payment under both bonds.
Id. at 09.
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was to become something of a landmark opinion: Royal Indemnity Co.
v. United States."
Royal Indemnity involved a payment bond surety and an assignee
bank squabbling over a retained percentage still in the hands of the
United States. The Court of Claims held for the surety, noting that
there was no evidence of the proper or improper use of the loans, and
that because the bank is held to be aware of the Miller Act it had notice
of the surety's interest under the bond contract. The bank cited the
Assignment of Claims Act and its application in Coconut Grove, but
without success. The Act, the court held, speaks only of validity, not
of priority. Before the Act was passed in 1940 any assignment of an
unliquidated claim against the United States was held to b6 null and
void. The Act provided that a contract claim against the United States
could be assigned before maturity for the purpose of securing credit.
However, the long-standing principle that an assignee with notice of a
prior assignment takes subject to it "was not legislated away by the
1940 Act."'" Arguing further, the bank cited the Munsey Trust dictum
that laborers and materialmen had no legal rights against the Govern-
ment or in the job funds in the Government's hands, but again to no
avail. The court concluded that the surety's priority awarded to it in
both Prairie State and Henningsen was too firm to be overturned by a
mere dictum. Munsey was explained away on its facts: there the Gov-
ernment had its own rights to assert when attempting the set-off; here
the Government is a mere stakeholder in a case involving bank-surety
priorities.
The Court of Claims was thus squarely in conflict with the federal
courts, most notably with the Fifth Circuit." The conflict was a more
or less natural result of the peripatetic development the earlier cases
had fostered: there were so many ways to slice the facts that it was
almost inevitable that some courts would decide their cases by criteria
thought unimportant by other courts. Despite the variety of approaches
to the problem, however, the principal head-on collision that had oc-
curred by 1950 was that involving the correct reading of the phrase
"valid for all purposes" in the 1940 statute—the Fifth Circuit seeing
in it a statement about priorities, and the Court of Claims seeing only
a provision validating assignments of unliquidated claims against the
United States, which assignments had theretofore been invalid. The
78 93 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. CL 1950).
70 Id, at 895.
so Speidel has attempted a recondliation of Royal Indemnity and Coconut Grove, and
has done so brilliantly. I must, however, dissent from his conclusion, largely because of my
own retracing of the steps which led to the conflict. See Speidei, "Stakeholder" Payments
Under Federal Construction Contracts: Payment Bond Surety vs. Assignee, 47 Va. L. Rev.
640, 651-54 (1961).
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other conflicts were less clear-cut. Indeed, it is fair to sum up the
situation in 1950 by saying that there were still enough viable theories
to provide almost anyone with a plausible argument for almost any set
of facts. In 1951, however, Congress again enmeshed itself in the public
contracts area by passing an amendment to the 1940 Act. This amend-
ment was the focal point around which the next round of litigation
arose.
B. The 1951 Amendments to the Assignment of Claims Act,
and Cases Since 1951
With the onset of the Korean conflict, national defense again
became a pressing need, and concomitantly, so did the need for
financing government contractors. A number of obstacles had to be
removed if the need were to be met. In 1949 and 1950 the Comptroller
General of the United States had ruled that amounts due the United
States for a contractor's unpaid taxes or other debts could be set off
against the progress payments even if the payments had been validly
assigned to the financing bank. 8' Congress found that the value of the
contract rights as collateral security was thereby severely reduced, de-
tering banks and other financing institutions from making loans to
government contractors. 82 The cure Congress provided was the 1951
Amendment to the Assignment of Claims Act, which provided that an
assignee who bad received a payment would be immune from making
refund, restitution or repayment if the source of the assignor's liability
was extrinsic to the particular contract in question."
The effect of this amendment was to support the district and cir-
81
 No. B-79413, 29 Comp. Gen. 40, 42-46 (1949); No. B-95362, 30 Comp. Gen. 98,
99-101 (1950).
82
 House Comm. on the Judiciary, Amending the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940,
H.R. Rep. No. 376, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1951). See also Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, Assignment of Claims Act, S. Rep. No. 217, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
88
 Act of May 15, 1951, 65 Stat. 41 (codified at 31 U.S.C. 203 (1970); 41 U.S.C.
15 (1970)). The bill was first proposed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. In the Board's view,
Many defense contractors—especially the smaller manufacturers and pro-
ducers—are presently unable to obtain necessary financing for the performance
of their defense contracts because of the widespread reluctance of banks to make
loans to them on the security of assignments of proceeds under their Government
contracts. The reluctance of banks to provide such financing arises from the fact
that certain recent rulings of the Comptroller General of the United States under
the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940 have made it hazardous for private financ-
ing institutions to accept assigned contracts as collateral for loans. This situation
has created a serious impediment to the success of the current V-loan program,
authorized by the Defense Production Act of 1950, for the guaranteeing of loans
by banks to defense contractors.
In order to meet this problem, the Board believes that the Assignment of
Claims Act of 1940 should be amended to the extent necessary to remove the
existing deterrent to participation by banks in the financing of defense contractors.
Letter of Transmittal, reprinted at U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. Service 1414, 1416 (1951).
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cult courts in a position that they had long held. In American Fidelity
Co. v. Nat'l City Bank, decided in 1959, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that an assignee who had received progress
payments in liquidation of its loan to the contractor would not be re-
quired to disgorge those sums to the performance bond surety." By
virtue of the 1951 amendment the United States could not recoup;
consequently neither could the surety, who was subrogated to the
United States' rights. As to payment bonds, the surety might still be
subrogated to the rights of the supplymen, but they too had no right to
recoupment from the funds actually paid to the assignee.
Predictably, the Court of Claims disagreed with this pro-banker
holding." The assignee is entitled under the amended 1940 Act only
to money "due" under the contract. Since only those funds earned
under the contract and not committed to payment for labor and ma-
terials could "become due," any payment to the assignee in excess of
this amount is a payment made under "mistake of law," and the 1951
amendment does not cover such payrnents. 8° Thus, in the Court of
Claims the timing of the payment determined the decision. If progress
payments were turned over to the bank prior to the time that any de-
fault by the contractor occurred, the assignee could retain the funds,"
but probably only if the proceeds of the assignee's loan had in fact
been used by the contractor to reduce the surety's exposure, i.e., had
been applied to the project in question." But as to funds not earned
and paid prior to default (such as the retainages) the Court of Claims
with great constancy awarded the surety priority, regardless of which
bond was called on." With respect to payment bonds, the circuit courts
seemed to disagree with the Court of Claims. Relying sometimes on
the amended 1940 Act, and sometimes on the strange reasoning of
Munsey Trust, they failed to see how by subrogation to the rights of
the supplymen—who under Munsey Trust had no rights—the surety
could come up with anything resembling a solid claim." The time was
ripe for one final interjection by the Supreme Court."
84 266 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
88 Newark Ins. Co, v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 246 (Ct. CL 1960),
80 Id. at 248.
87 National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 304 F.2d 465 (Ct. CI. 1962).
88 Id. at 468.
89 See, e.g., National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
88 See Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Earle, 218 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1955) (surety vs. Internal
Revenue Service) ; American Sur. Co. v. Hinds, 260 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1958) (surety vs.
contractor's trustee in bankruptcy) ; and American Fidelity Co. v. National City Bank,
266 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
91 The importance of the issue could hardly be ignored, at least if the volume of
litigation is indicative of importance. The surety companies, for example, were being
barraged with claims by materialmen and suppliers, The number of cases (not claims) in
which they were involved was tabulated in 1956 by Stickells as follows:
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Pearlman v. Reliance Insurance Co. 92 was an appeal to the
Second Circuit by the trustee in bankruptcy of a government con-
tractor. The lower court had held," and the Second Circuit agreed,
that the surety, by subrogation to the rights of the laborers and ma-
terialmen whom it had paid, had acquired a preference to the earned
contract funds. In so holding, the Second Circuit had knowingly de-
viated from the interpretation of Munsey Trust then current in the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits," and, if we can extrapolate from Coconut
Grove, in the Fifth Circuit as well." Munsey Trust, it was held, was
limited to cases in which the United States asserted its own rights to
the retained funds: "It is inconceivable to us that the Supreme Court
intended in Munsey to overrule sub silentio the rules of priority and
subrogation . ." 90
Perhaps more to clarify its own prior meanderings than to resolve
a conflict among the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.97
Justice Black, writing the majority opinion, cited Prairie State for the
proposition that the surety was entitled to the same rights the United
States had in the contract retainages—namely, to hold them as security
for full performance." Black also recognized that the instant case con-
TABLE No. 1.
CIVIL CASES COMMENCED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS DURING THE
FISCAL. YEARS 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954 AND 1955 BY BASIS of
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF SUIT
Year 86 Districts D.C.
Alaska, Canal	 Removed
Zone, Guam and from State
Virgin Islands	 Courts Total
1951 113 3 1 0 117
1952 243 0 2 0 245
1953 259	 . 3 7 0 269
1954 419 8 13 2 440
1955 332 6 24 0 362
— _ —
—
1,366 1,433Totals: 20 47 2
Stickells, Bonds of Contractors on Federal Public Works—The Miller Act, 36 B.U.L. Rev.
499, 546 (1956). Stickells' discussion focused on the Miller Act. For contemporaneous
general discussions of the Assignment of Claims Act, see Note, 68 Yale L.J. 515 (1959);
Shnitzer, Assignment of Claims Arising Out of Government Contracts, 16 Fed. B.J. 376
(1956) ; and Nichols, Assignment of Claims Act of 1940—A Decade Later, 12 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 538 (1951).
92
 298 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1962). The case name before it reached the Supreme Court
was In Re Dutcher Construction Corp.
98 197 F. Supp. 441 (W.D.N.Y. 1961).
94 See note 90 supra.
98 Coconut Grove was decided before Munsey Trust, but confirmed after, in General
Cas. Co. of America v. Second Nat'l Bank, 178 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1950).
0 298 F.2d at 659.
97 369 U.S. 847 (1962).
98 371 U.S. 132, 138 (1962).
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cerned a payment, not a performance bond. As to that, Henningsen,
wherein a result similar to Prairie State was reached, is decisive.
Munsey Trust was characterized as a case wherein the Court had de-
cided only the question of set-off; the dictum, which did not even cite
Henningsen, certainly did not casually overrule such a venerable prin-
ciple as the sureties' right to the supplymen's rights to the retained
funds. It would seem, however, that Black's rereading of Munsey
Trust is unconvincing, especially in view of the narrow holding of the
case.
Notwithstanding the obscurity which the opinion may have cast
on earlier issues, the holding was perfectly clear:
that the Government had a right to use the retained fund to
pay laborers and materialmen; that the laborers and material-
men had a right to be paid out of the fund; that the contrac-
tor, had be completed his job and paid his laborers and
materialmen, would have become entitled to the fund; and
that the surety, having paid the laborers and materialmen, is
entitled to the benefit of all these rights to the extent neces-
sary to reimburse it °D
Even though Pearlman did not concern itself with the more par-
ticular issue of sureties versus financing banks, its impact on that
problem is unmistakeable.'" At least for retained percentages, the
surety is subrogated to valuable rights, now under its payment bond
as well as its performance bond. Presumably, Pearlman said nothing to
the issue of earned progress payments paid to the assignee before de-
fault. On that item the Court of Claims and the federal courts
agreed,101 so that too should be laid to rest. But other things to which
Pearlman did not address itself, because no claim by an assignee was
before it, were yet to be worked out. For one thing, would the surety's
post-Pearlman rights attach also to earned but unpaid progress pay-
99 Id. at 141. Justices Clark, Douglas and Brennan concurred in the result, but argued
that the basis of the holding should have been the contractor's assignment of the fund (in
the bond contract) to the surety, citing Justice Cardozo's opinion in Martin v. National
Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 588 (1937). Id. at 143-44 (concurring opinion).
On the issue of surety vs. assignee bank, Martin is obviously of no importance, espe-
cially after 1940 when only the bank could claim a valid assignment, If Clark's opinion
had been the majority, and Black's the concurrence, Pearlman too would have been
irrelevant on the priority issue. We can only speculate on the possibility that Black was
aware of the effect his analysis would have on cases not then before him.
Imo Pearlman and Dutcher have been frequently commented upon. See, e.g., Note,
61 Mich. L. Rev. 402 (1962) ; Note, 9 N.Y.L.F. 226 (1963) ; Note, 24 Mont. L. Rev. 161
(1963) ; see also Note, 17 Rutgers L. Rev. 814, 821-22 (1963), noting that the majority
opinion in Pearlman, unlike the concurrence, is so broad that it does not foreclose further
development of the surety versus assignee bank situation.
101 See text at note 87 supra.
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ments? If so, will the surety have a prior status over a perfected as-
signment? And if a bank is ever to win, must it prove that its loan
proceeds were used to reduce the potential exposure of the surety?
Finally, cutting across all of this, is the difference between payment
and performance bonds to be continued for cases not involving retained
percentages?
Clearly the pro-surety tendencies of the Court of Claims gained
momentum, if not citable authority, from the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Pearlman. It continued to hold that the Assignment of Claims
Act governs only validity against the United States, not priority among
rival claimants. 102 To date, the surety has not lost a case in the Court
of Claims.' For retained percentages, it is irrelevant that the loan
funds were used in furthering the contract; nor does it matter what
sort of a bond was involved.'" The case is the same for progress pay-
ments not yet paid over, even if earned before default." Thus, at
this point in time, the Court of Claims will permit the assignee bank
to retain only progress payments earned and paid over prior to default
—and that position hardly connotes magnanimity on the part of the
Court of Claims, since if the fund has been paid to the bank by the
Government, the Court of Claims will not even have jurisdiction over
the bank-surety dispute." The case will, instead, be decided by the
district courts and the circuit courts of appeal.
Moreover, although Pearlman did not speak directly to the priority
issue, it has had its effect on those courts too, for recently the surety
hasn't lost in the district"' or circuit courts either. The Second Circuit,
called upon to decide Pearlman a second time, in In Re Dutcher
Construction Corp."' held that the reasoning of Pearlman should not
1°2 United Pacific Ins. Co. v. United States, 358 F.2d 966, 970 (Ct. CL 1966), citing
Royal Indemnity.
108
 Home Indem. Co. v. United States, 433 F.2d 764 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co. v. United States, 421 F.2d 706 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United
States, 393 F.2d 834 (Ct. Cl. 1968) ; Home Indem. Co. v. United States, 376 F.2d 890 (Ct.
Cl. 1967); Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 371 F.2d 462 (Ct. Cl. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 833 (1967).
104 Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 371 F.2d 462, 464 (Ct. CL 1967).
108
 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 834 (Ct. CL 1968).
1°6 The court's jurisdiction derives fom the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491 (1970),
giving jurisdiction so long as the United States is a stakeholder, but not over what (after
payment) is entirely a private dispute.
1°7 Compafiia General de Seguros, S.A. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 306 F. Supp. 1361
(D. Balboa, C.Z. 1969); National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 290 F.
Supp. 664 (D. Mass. 1968). The surety is not, however, always successful as to assets
of the contractor other than the contract funds. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. J. F.
Brunken & Son, Inc., Civil No. 72.4036 (D.S.D., April 23, 1973), abstracted in 41
U.S.L.W. 2610 (D.S.D., May 15, 1973).
108 378 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1967).
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be restricted to retained percentages."° Thereafter—although Dutcher
did not directly involve a financing bank—its rule that the surety
succeeded to the laborers' and materialmen's equitable rights to be paid
from all earned funds remaining in the hands of the United States, had
an echo in a case which did."° Under such a rule, application of the
loan proceeds to the contract becomes irrelevant,'" as does Coconut
Grove and its analysis of the Assignment of Claims Act, 112
 for if the
United States may withhold any sums from the contractor, it may do
so from the contractor's assignee as well. Since Pearlman, then, the
United States has been found to have an obligation to do just that
whenever the materialmen and laborers are left unpaid, even though
the fund in question may otherwise have been "earned" prior to the
default.'" The surety, its subrogation reaffirmed by Pearlman, succeeds
to these rights of the United States, and so has a higher claim than that
of the contractor's assignee.'
The Supreme Court, while not squarely facing the bank-surety
priority problem since 1906—when commercial financing and govern-
ment contracting may have been far different from what they are
today—has by dictum and tangential decision apparently limited the
banks' victories to one narrow and unsatisfying case: when the bank
has received and digested a progress payment actually earned, it may
keep it. Otherwise, the collateral security seemingly guaranteed to it
by the Assignment of Claims Acts of 1940 and 1951 isn't worth a
nickel in a priority race against the contractor's surety. The path
which led to this state of affairs has been tortuous. It has been plagued
102 Id. at 870.
110 National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 290 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass.
1968). See also Industrial Bank v. United States, 424 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
111 290 F. Supp. at 665 n.l.
112 424 F.2d at 934-35.
118 In several cases the surety has successfully made claims against the government,
which had paid sums over to the contractor or its assignee after being notified that material-
men or laborers were being unpaid. Hanover Ins. Co. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 851
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; Home Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 45, 48 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
114 I have found but one case which tends to the contrary. In New Amsterdam Cas.
Co. v. Manufacturer's & Trader's Trust Co., 330 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1964), the bank had
failed to notify the surety of its assignment under 31 U.S.C. § 203, as required. The surety
sued the bank for some $300,000 in paid-over progress payments. The district court dis-
missed the claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) and the circuit court reversed: "Plaintiff
should have an opportunity to prove, if it can, that it was prejudiced by lack of notice."
330 F.2d at 576. What the court may have had in mind in uttering this statement is quite
impossible to tell. However, the court did indicate that the notice provisions of the
Assignment of Claims Act should not be entirely ignored, especially when the possibility of
"prejudice" is present. If "prejudice," then, is a key determinant, it may be only a short
further step to preferring the lender when the facts show that the bank's loan was of
benefit, not prejudice to the surety. Unfortunately, the case has not been reheard at the
appellate level; thus, only speculation can remain about the potential impact of this
opinion.
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with uncertainty, contradictions, and subtle distinctions of the first
order. But what is far worse is that it may also be affected with com-
mercial irrelevance: if there is some purpose to be served, or some
debility to be avoided by granting either bankers or surety companies
safe haven, why should that purpose be furthered or retarded by the
fortuitous circumstance of the timing of the Government's payments?
What we may well have here is the creation of social policy through
the ailment of default. As shall be seen, this ailment was not limited
to the federal courts. The state courts were quick to contract it.
C. Developments in the States—and the Uniform Commercial Code
Today, every state requires contractors on public works to furnish
bonds for the protection of laborers and materialmen, 11" for as is the
case with federal projects, most states disallow liens against public
works."' Because these state acts serve the same purpose as the
Miller Act, there has been a strong tendency in the several states to
follow closely the decisions of the federal courts in working out the
priority problems.'" In fact, at times the "tendency" has been an ab-
dication of state law to the rules generated by the Supreme Court for
federal cases.'" Given the close affinity of the state and federal bond-
118 E. Cushman et al., Bonds on Public Works (1972), reprinted from National
Association of Credit Management, Credit Manual of Commercial Laws 1972, at 652
(1971), and citations to statutes therein contained. For a listing of the bond amounts,
coverages and other requirements by State, see R. L. Ager, Summary of Problems under
State and Local Public Works Bonding Statutes, Proceedings of the ABA Section of
Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law 261, 270-71 (1963).
116 G. Ashe, Law of Public Improvement Contractors' Bonds II (1966).
117 E.g., Broward County, Florida Commits f/b/o General Elec. Co. v. Continental
Cas. Co., 243 F. Supp. 118 (S.D. Fla. 1965) (surety vs. assignee bank, state construction
project) ; Home Indem. Co. v. United States, 433 F.2d 764 (Ct. Cl. 1970) ; Southern Sur.
Co. v. Merchants' & Farmers' Bank, 176 N.B. 846 (Ind. 1931) (surety vs. assignee bank,
state project) ; National Sur. Corp. v. State Nat'l Bank, 454 S.W.2d 354 (Ky. 1970) ; First
Nat'l Bank v. McHasco Elec., Inc., 141 N.W.2d 491 (Minn. 1966) (surety vs. assignee bank,
municipal project) ; and see Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 216 N.E.2d 857
(Ind. 1966) ; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Perrotta, 62 Misc. 2d 252, 308 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sup.
Ct. 1970). But cf. earlier cases, Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Brooks, 362 F.2d 486 (4th Cir.
1966) (state project, surety vs. contractor's trustee in bankruptcy; the court cited Pearlman
as controlling, inferring that the Ohio Supreme Court would agree, id. at 490) ; State v.
A. D. Ingalls, Inc., 105 N.H. 244, 197 A.2d 214 (1964) (bankruptcy case, relying on
Pearlman) ; State Bank v. Danbar Contracting Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 416, 212
N.Y.S.2d 386 (1961), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 804, 187 N.E.2d 19, 235 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1962) ; Levin-
son v. Linderman, 51 Wash. 2d 855, 312 P.2d 863 (1958) (municipal contract, surety vs.
assignee bank), distinguished in Guthrie Investments, Inc. v. Bennett, 63 Wash. 2d 697,
388 P.2d 955 (1964). But compare two cases contra, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Eastern Trust
& Banking Co., 156 Me. 87, 161 A.2d 843 (1960) (a rare instance of a state court applying
state law in a Miller Act dispute); and Reliance Ins. Co. v. First Mississippi Nat'l Bank,
263 So. 2d 555 (Miss. 1972) (granting priority to the bank over the surety on a municipal
project, and not citing any of the federal cases). These last two cases really are the excep-
tions which prove the rule.
118 Butler v. Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1967) (state project, surety
966
MILLER ACT PRIORITIES
ing statutes, such a development is quite natural and, so far as uni-
formity is concerned, it is probably desirable. It rests, however, on the
assumption that the federal decisions are "right."'"
Private contracts, however, are quite another thing. Owners of
contemplated construction projects may, and very often do, require
bonds that run in their favor, so that they too may have a completed,
lien-free project after the dust has settled. The important distinction
is that with respect to privately owned projects most state statutes
provide that the subcontractors, materialmen and laborers can acquire
liens to secure their rights to payment.12° If they choose instead to rely
upon their rights under a surety bond, 12' the relationships are con-
tractual, not statutory. For example, it would be possible to argue that
a private owner who had required a supplymen's bond from his prime
contractor, and who presumably paid for that bond through a higher
contract cost, has no further obligation to see that the supplymen are
paid; Although there are arguments that can be made to the contrar y,122
most reported opinions have not discussed them. What has happened
is that lawsuits between bankers and sureties have come, even in the
private construction cases, to be governed by a federal rule fashioned
to implement a federal policy which might or might not hold water in
a private case. 128
vs. contractor's trustee in bankruptcy; cites Pearlman as the correct application of Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. II 34-221, subset. A, par. 3 (Supp. 1972), id. at 520-21) ; Reliance Ins. Co.
v. Alaska State Housing Authority, 323 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Alas. 1971) (state project, surety
vs. assignee bank; cites Prairie State, Henningsen, and Pearlman as controlling, id. at
1372) ; Philadelphia Indus. Corp. v. Upper Dublin Twp., 169 F. Supp. 725 (E.D. Pa. 1959)
(municipal project, surety vs. assignee; holding premised on Prairie State and Henningsen,
id. at 729).
119 I reject this assumption. See text at note 218 infra.
120 An excellent review of the statutes in every jurisdiction is given in National
Association of Credit Management, Credit Manual of Commercial Laws 1972, at 288-349
(1971).
121 This can be done either by formal written waiver of lien, or by failing to file
timely notice, or otherwise.
122 One such argument may be that the rights in question apply to the cost the owner
has already agreed to pay, not to the completed project itself. It is only through the device
of subrogation that the former rights may be related to the latter.
123 Canter v. Schiager, — Mass. —, 267 N.E.2d 492 (1971) ; see also United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. First State sank, 208 Kan. 738, 494 P.2d 1149 (1972). The case
dealt squarely with the surety-bank conflict, with the fought-over funds held by a private
party. In holding for the surety the court cited Pearlman, noting "[t]his holding [Pearl-
man] is squarely applicable here ...." Id. at 744, 494 Pad at 1154. The discussion in the
case centered about the retelling of Prairie State, Pearlman, Henningsen and Munsey
Trust, id. at 741-46, 494 P.2d at 1152-55. About these the court said: "From our examina-
tion of the numerous authorities cited to us we are convinced that the foregoing represents
the general rule, accepted overwhelmingly if not universally throughout the various juris-
dictions in this country." Id. at 745, 494 P.2d at 1154. All of the prior Kansas cases were
then methodically distinguished away. Id. at 745-49, 494 P.2d at 1155-58.
One case of equally recent vintage did recognize and discuss the possibility of disparate
policy referents between public and private works. It was resolved, however, that there
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This notion of a "private dispute" obviously appealed to the com-
mercial banking community, just as the creeping federalism of Pearl-
man in the state courts appealed to the sureties. When the Uniform
Commercial Code (hereinafter U.C.C.) became widely enacted in the
early 1960's, a fresh store of ammunition came to the banks, or so
they thought. The bankers had scored an early victory in the drafting
process of the U.C.C. Section 9-312(5) as it appeared in the 1950
Draft of the Code read as follows:
[I]f the obligation secured by the earlier perfected security
interest is a surety's . . . such security interest is subordinate
to a later perfected security interest given to a secured lender
who ... enable[s] the debtor to perform the obligation for
which the earlier secured lender is liable secondarily as surety
or otherwise 124
Presumably to ensure that the salt was rubbed well into the
suretys' wounds, the comment superfluously added: "The lender who
enables the construction work to proceed is by subsection (5) given
priority over the claim of a surety who claims security for his con-
tingent claim."'"
This section appeared in the 1952 text as 9-312(7), and the com-
ment was expanded: "Although prior law on this point was obscure,
this provision is in accordance with commercial understanding among
the parties involved. . . . Subsection (7) adopts the principle of Coco-
nut Grove . . . and rejects the contrary holding in Royal Indem-
nity .... 7128
 We can now only guess what prompted this move. Perhaps
the draftsmen felt that state law should be conformed to their view
of the "real" meaning of the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940 (i.e.,
that adopted in Coconut Grove); or perhaps they felt that the federal
rule itself should be based on state law principles." 7 Whichever it was,
it didn't matter, for the entire section was dropped from the next draft
at the insistance of the Association of Casualty and Surety Com-
panies.128
 The official position of the U.C.C. Editorial Board in 1953
was that the existing case law "should not be disturbed." 129 While
were none. Framingham Trust Co. v. Gould-National Batteries, Inc., 427 F.2d 856 (1st
Cir. 1970).
124 U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1950 draft).
125
 U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 7 (1950 draft).
126 U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 9 (1952 version).
121 A third possibility exists: the draftsmen may have thought that they were drafting
federal law. See, e.g., the introductory language in § 2 -318 of the Official Text: "CM this
Act is introduced in the Congress of the United States ...." At some point, evidently, there
was the thought that the Code as a whole might become a federal statute.
128 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for Changes in the Text and Comments
of the Uniform Commercial Code 25 (June 1, 1953).
129 Id.
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some commentators have concluded that after this deletion the U.C.C.
became totally irrelevant to the issue,'" others have suggested that
the Code's usual rule of priority"' will govern the banker-surety claims
—i.e., the first to file gets the preference. 182
 Inevitably, that dispute
has become the focus of the most recent round of cases and com-
ments."'
Except for the first case to speak to the issue of the coverage of
Article 9,184
 the trend has been all downhill so far as the banks are
concerned."' The leading case is National Shawmut Bank of Boston v.
New Amsterdam Casualty Co.,'" a dispute between a surety and a bank
over progress payments due from a federal construction project. Even
admitting that the dispute should be governed by state law, and not
by a federal rule,'" the First Circuit awarded the fund to the surety on
the grounds of equitable subrogation. The U.C.C., the court felt, sim-
ply did not apply. From this conclusion there have been no exceptions
to date, whether the source of the funds be a federal,'" state,'" or
privately-owned"° project. The reasoning of Shawmut, which has been
echoed in most of the succeeding cases, was premised very largely on
the language and drafting history of the U.C.C. On that score there
133
 Withers, Surety vs. Lender: Priority of Claims to Contract Funds, 10 Washburn
L.J. 356, 365 (1971).
181 U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a).
182 See 2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 36.7 (1965).
133
 A sampling of the comments includes: Withers, supra note 130; Hoffman, The
U.C.C.: Has It Changed the Pre-Code Banker-Surety-Contractor Relationship?, 50 J. Corn.
Bank Lending 2 (Jan. 1968) ; Note, 69 Dick. L. Rev. 172 (1965) ; Cushman, The Surety's
Right of Equitable Priority to Contract Balances in Relation to the Uniform Commercial
Code, 39 Temp. L.Q. 239 (1966) ; and Note, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 927 (1965).
184 United States v. G.P. Fleetwood 8i Co., 165 F. Supp. 723 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
185 The very next case after Fleetwood also arose in Pennsylvania: Jacobs v. North-
eastern Corp., 416 Pa. 417, 206 A.2d 49 (1965). Although Jacobs made a passing attempt
to distinguish Fleetwood, the opinion clearly implied that Pearlman, not Fleetwood, con-
tained the governing principles. Id. at 53, 55 n.8, The most recent opinion on this issue
restricted the non-applicability of Article 9 to the contract funds, and required that with
respect to other assets of the contractor the usual filing requirements applied to the
surety as well as to the bank. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. J. F. Brunken & Son, Inc.,
Civil No. 72-4036 (D.S.D., April 23, 1973), abstracted in 41 U.S.L.W. 2610 (D.S.D.,
May 15, 1973).
130 290 F. Supp. 664 (D. Mass. 1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969).
137 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
133 National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 290 F. Supp. 664 (D.
Mass. 1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969) ; Home Indem. Co. v. United States, 433
F.2d 764 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
138 General Elec. Supply Co. v. Epco Constructors, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 112 (S.D. Tex.
1971); National Sur. Corp. v. State Nat'l Bank, 454 S.W.2d 354 (Ky. 1970) ; Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Perrotta, 62 Misc. 2d 252, 308 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Spec. T. 1970).
Ha Framingham Trust Co. v. Gould-National Batteries, Inc., 427 F.2d 856 (1st Cir.
1970) ; United States Fidelity & Guar. Co, v. First State Bank, 208 Kan. 738, 494 P.2d
1149 (1972).
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were several points to be made, some or all of which found expression
in Shawmut and its progeny.
First, the doctrinal development regarding the surety's rights to
equitable subrogation in Prairie State, Henningsen and Pearlman
demonstrates that those rights arise by operation of law; they are not
creatures of contract so as to fall within the limited scope of Article
9.141 Second, the deletion of section 9-312(7) from the 1952 Draft
clearly indicated that it was the draftsmen's intention to avoid disturb-
ing the developing case law. Third, section 1-103 of the Code provides
that "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the
principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement its provisions." 142
These "principles" of course are those developed by the Supreme
Court from Prairie State to Pearlman. They have become "too hardly
a plant to be uprooted by a Code which speaks around but not to the
issue."148
Very little hard thinking was done about whether the Code result
would have been a good one: 144 whether the "first to file" rule of section
9-312 (5) (a) would have a happier impact on the whole process of
financing contractors than would the near-complete victory now guar-
anteed to the surety. Judge Coffin's concluding remarks in Shawmut
characterize the historical development of the law of bank-surety
priorities:
Our analysis has centered on the interpretation of the
Code and of the doctrine of subrogation as developed by the
cases . . • .[I]t may well be—although we express no opinion
—that to subject sureties to the filing requirements of the
141 U.C.C. § 9-102(2): "This Article applies to security interests created by con-
tract . . . ."
142 U.C.C. § 1-103.
142 National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843, 849 (1st
Cir. 1969). Those courts which have found the U.C.C. inapplicable have in effect ignored
the fact that the "scope" provisions of Article 9 have not changed materially since 1952.
By at one point having § 9-312(7) in the Code the draftsmen must certainly have thought
that the surety would come within the purview of Article 9. Deleting § 9-312(7) from the
1952 Draft because, perhaps, it unfairly gave the banks a priority in every case regardless
of the relative timings or equities of the positions, therefore does not establish present in-
applicability. To the contrary, its one-time presence affirms it. Thus, Professor Rudolph's
difficulty with § 9-I04(f) evaporates, since at one point both §§ 9-104(f) and 9-312(7)
existed in the same draft. Consequently, § 9-104(f) could not have been meant to exclude
sureties. Rudolph, Financing on Construction Contracts Under the Uniform Commerdal
Code, 5 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 245, 246 (1963).
144 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Perrotta, 62 Misc. 2d 252, 308 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Spec. T.
1970), is more or less typical. The court was more concerned with the policy of the Code
and the legal characterization of the transaction within the Code definition of "security"
than with the question of sound result. Id. at 257, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 618. See also National
Shawmut's discussion of the U.C.C. § 1-201(37) definition of a security interest. 411 F.2d
at 845-46.
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Code would improve and rationalize the system of financing
public contracts.'"
II. CRITICISMS OF LEGAL THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
To the extent that it is symptomatic of a more general tradition of
judicial decision-making, Judge Coffin's comment is disturbing. The
fact that the Code was deemed "not compelling” 1" on its face, as to
its coverage of the law of bank-surety priorities, points up the major
flaw in the development of the law in this area: that traditional legal
analyses have been insufficiently informed by considerations of prac-
tical impact and the furtherance of social policy.
It is therefore appropriate to critique147 this seventy-seven year
process from two points of view. One will test the rules as they are
announced, by measuring them in terms of their effects on the real
world. The other is a more traditional review of the lines of analysis,
synthesis and exposition actually employed by the courts. The former
is treated in a later section;' the latter, here.
A. The Government's Obligation to Materialmen
Of central importance to the current pro-surety fabric of the law
are the propositions that (a) the laborers and materialmen have a right
to be paid by the Government, and (b) the Government has a right to
satisfy this obligation out of any funds not yet paid over to the con-
tractor.'" If either or both of these points is incorrect, then, at least
in the payment bond situation, the surety's claim to priority as ex-
plicated in the cases lacks a convincing basis in law, since it is only by
subrogation to these rights that the surety can support his claim to the
retained funds. There are two sources from which these propositions
could be derived. One source is the provisions in the Government's
construction and bond contracts. The other is the Miller Act and its
predecessor.
The clauses of a Government construction contract are standard
and are dictated by Federal Procurement Regulations."° Those di-
rectly relevant here are Standard Forms 23 (Construction Con-
tract),181 23-A (General Provisions—Construction Contract),'" 21
1411 411 F.2d at 848-49.
145 Id. at 845.
147 Not necessarily to criticize.
148 See parts III and IV of text infra.
140 See discussion and review of cases in text at note 113 supra.
180 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-16.900-.903 (1972).
151 Id. at § 1-16.901-23.
152 Id. at § 1-16.901-23A.
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(Bid Form—Construction Contract),'" and 19-A (Labor Standards
Provisions Applicable to Contracts in Excess of $2,000).'" It is in
these required clauses that the Government's right or duty to withhold
or set off payments must be found.
Form . 23-A provides, "In making . . . progress payments, there
shall be retained 10 percent of the estimated amount until final com-
pletion and acceptance of the contract work."'" The purpose of the
retainage is "for the protection of the government; "'" i.e., to com-
pensate for the contractor's refusal or failure to complete the work,'"
or to compensate the Government for rejected materials, poor work-
manship, or for breaches of warranty.'" "Final acceptance" by the
Government must be made as promptly as practicable after completion
of the work required by the contract,'" at which point the entire price
must be paid to the contractor."' The only mention of materialmen
and laborers in Form 23-A is a provision that if the surety becomes
unacceptable the Government may require additional security for the
supplymen's protection.101
 More specifically, these contract clauses do
not authorize the Government to withhold funds from the contractor
who has completed the work but has failed to pay the supplymen. How-
ever, Form 23 obligates the contractor to abide by the provisions of
Form-19A, one of which does permit the withholding of funds for the
purposes of paying the contractor's employees their full wages and
overtime.'" This clause, it should be noted, applies only to laborers,
not to materialmen.'" Thus, if the contractor's only default is his
failure to satisfy the claims of materialmen, the United States may
not withhold funds for their benefit. Ironically, it is materialmen who
are most frequently left unpaid by the defaulting contractor.
The contract does, however, require the bidder to provide a pay-
ment bond,'" which in turn obligates the surety to satisfy the material-
men if the contractor does not. While it is arguable that the terms of
158 Id. at § 1-16.901-21.
154 Id. at If 1-16.901-19A.
155
 Id. at If 1-16.901-23A, 11 7(c).
156
 Id.
15T Id. at If 1-16.901-23A, ¶ 5(a).
158
 Id. at If 1-16.901-23A,	 10(c), (f).
169 Id. at 11-16.901-23A, 110(f).
150 Id, at If 1-15.901-23A, if 7(e).
101 Id. at If 1-16.901-23A, 11 16.
102 Id. at If 1-16.901-19A, 11 6.
16a It should also be noted that this clause did not exist during the early development
of the law we have been discussing, but came into effect nearly three decades after the
decision in Henningsen. The wage and labor standards which the clause is designed to
enforce were enacted in 1935 by the Davis-Beacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a to a-5 (1970),
and in 1962 by the Contract Work Hours Standard Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 327-33 (1970).
154 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-21 (1972). The bond itself is prescribed. See id. at If 1-16.901-
25A.
972
MILLER ACT PRIORITIES
the bond are thus incorporated by reference into the contract, such an
argument does not carry us very far. The language is typical of penal
bonds: "If the principal shall promptly make payment . . . then the
above obligation [of the surety] shall be void and of no effect.'" In-
corporating such language into the primary agreement cannot obligate
the contractor where previously he had not been obligated. So with
the single exception of protecting the contractor's employees the Gov-
ernment does not have a right by contract to withhold payments
earned by performance!" Thus, the proposition that the Government
has an obligation to pay unsatisfied material suppliers cannot be de-
rived from the Government's contract terms. The only other source
for finding such an obligation is the statutory scheme as laid out in the
Miller Act.
As early as 1894, two years before the Prairie State decision, the
United States required its contractors to provide bonds for the pro-
tection of laborers and materialmen who would otherwise be without
remedy!" The original statute, known as the Heard Act, required a
165 Id. The Court of Claims has held that the terms of the bond are incorporated by
reference, and therefore the contractor's failure to pay materialmen is a breach of the
agreement between the contractor and the United States. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
United States, 421 F.2d 706, 708 (Ct. Cl. 1970). See also Continental Cas. Co. v. United
States, 169 F. Supp. 945, 946-47 (Ct. Cl. 1959). Such a view has been rejected. See, e.g.,
Comment, 31 Fordham L. Rev. 161, 162 (1962).
106
 This conclusion is buttressed by Federal Procurement Regulations 4 1-30.524, 41
C.F.R. 1-30.524 (1972): "The rights reserved . • . are for the purpose of protecting the
interests of the Government . . . ." The rights referred to do not include withholding for
non-payment of materialmen.
1 " "The problem always is that the contractor has absconded or is hopelessly in-
solvent; so unless the surety can be forced to pay, subcontractors and materialmen have
no hope of recovery." White, The Miller Act, No More Tears for the Second-Tiers, 74
Com. L.J. 41 (1969).
Wage-earners (laborers) have similarly scant protection, although they are granted a
priority position among other creditors if the contractor is in bankruptcy by 4 64(a) (2)
of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. 1 104(a). The priority is limited to $600 per claimant,
and can be asserted only for wages earned within three months preceding the commence-
ment of the bankruptcy proceedings. In re Sheik Products, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 463 (S.D.N.Y.
1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 833 (1957). This priority,
however, is almost always illusory, for the greatest number of business bankruptcies are
"no asset" cases:
1946 1950 1960 1969
No asset cases 72% 72% 75% 70%
Nominal asset cases 13 10 12 15
Asset cases 15 18 13 15
Even in those 25% of all cases in which there are assets, the priority creditors typically
receive about 35.5 cents to the dollar. Brookings Institution, Bankruptcy, Problem-
Process-Reform 20-21 (1971).
As to contractors working specifically on public projects, the risk of insolvency is
severe. "As most contracts , for public work are awarded on the basis of competitive bid-
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bond but did not in any way obligate the United States to make pay-
ment to the supplymen.168 So far as the legislative intent of the origi-
nal Act is concerned, there is no evidence that any obligation on the
part of the Government—equitable or otherwise—was contemplated.'
Neither did the later amendment to the Heard Act add anything to
that effect."' The Miller Act, which replaced the Heard Act in 1935,
is on its face similarly lacking in commentary on this issue.'" To the
extent that the purpose of the statutory requirements can be gleaned
from their legislative history, it is fair to conclude that little, if any,
thought was given to the equitable or legal obligations of the United
States.
The bond required by the Heard Act was unitary—it covered
both the payment and performance obligations of the contractor. Con-
sequently the statute required that all claims be brought in one action
not earlier than six months after the entire contract had been per-
formed or terminated. 172 Frequently the process of adjudicating the
claims took at least another six to twelve months. As a result, persons
who had supplied materials or subcontract services during the early
phases of construction would often have to wait for as long as two
years before being paid. In recognition of that hardship, a significant
number of contractors (and, some think, sureties as well) were able
to compromise claims at substantial discounts, often turning the la-
borers and materialmen's profitable contracts into stinging losses.'
ding and in most instances the prime contractor uses, and is required to use, the lowest
responsible bidder in each of the subtrades, public work is normally carried on at a low
profit margin . . . . [I]nsolvencies have [thus] not been infrequent." Burgess, A Com-
mentary on the Miller Act, 42 B.U.L. Rev. 282 (1962). This fact has often been recog-
nized by the building trades themselves. For an example of the level of interest credit
managers of national materials suppliers have had in the enactment of bonding statutes
in the several states, see Harms, Where Do We Stand on Construction Payment Bonds?,
74 Credit and Financial Management 18 (May 1972).
The United States needs protection only against default in performance, again be-
cause the suppliers have no possibility of acquiring mechanics' liens on public works. Prior
to the Heard Act, ch. 280, 28 Stat. 278 (1894), the United States had as a matter of course
required by contract that the contractor provide a penal bond going to performance. House
Comm. on the Judiciary, Protection of Persons Furnishing Material and Labor for the
Construction of Public Works, H.R. Rep. No. 97, 53d Cong., 1st Sess. (1893).
108
 Ch. 280, 28 Stat. 278 (1894), repealed by the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-d
(1970).
lee See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 97, supra note 167. Protection against an insolvent em-
ployer seemed "nothing more than just." Id. at 1.
17° Ch. 778, 33 Stat. 811 (1905).
171
 Actions against the surety are to be brought in the name of (not against) the
United States, although the United States is not liable for the costs and expenses of any
such suit. 40 U.S.C. § 270b(b) (1970).
172 Ch. 778, 33 Stat. 811 (1905).
178 .
 Letter from Acting Secretary of the Treasury Gibbons to Rep. J. M. Mead, Feb.
23, 1934. Hearings before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Bonds of Contractors on
Public Works, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39 (1935).
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By permitting suppliers to make their claims ninety days after
they have finished rather than six months after the project is com-
pleted, the Miller Act attempts to correct this evil. That this was the
purpose behind the Act's adoption is as readily demonstrated from its
legislative historyl" as is the complementary conclusion that it was
not the intention or perception of Congress that the United States, as
the owner of a construction project, had an obligation to pay laborers
and materialmen. 1" It was, rather, the intention of Congress that the
United States as a government should recognize and remedy a com-
mercial evil.
This separation of roles of the United States is important. In its
capacity as a government it had the responsibility to pass laws which
would preserve the orderly conduct of social affairs, regardless of who
the interacting parties may have been. In its role as builder, however,
it is acting with respect to contractors and their suppliers only as an
owner, and as a party to commercial agreements. It is therefore not
permissible to infer from the fact of passage of protective legislation
that the United States in its role as a contracting party was assuming
an obligation to further the protection it had in another capacity
granted. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that as
a party not involved in the contractor-materialmen transactions, the
United States is not even governed by the legislation it had enacted,
174
 House Comm. on the Judiciary, Bonds of Contractors on Public Works, H.R.
Rep. No. 1263, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1935) ; Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Bonds
to Accompany Contracts for Government Building Construction, S. Rep. No. 1238, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (adopting in toto H.R. Rep. No. 1263, supra); Hearings, supra
note 173; 79 Cong. Rec. 11702 (1935). Two excellent general discussions are Note, The
Application of the United States Arbitration Act to Miller Act Suits, 50 Va. L. Rev. 105,
122-26 (1964), and Stickells, Bonds of Contractors on Federal Public Works—The Miller
Act, 36 B.U.L. Rev. 499, 501-07 (1956).
There was one other difficulty under earlier law which the Miller Act was designed
to avoid. Under the Heard Act the materialmen could recover only for supplies "actually
consumed" in the project. Currently, delivery ("expected consumption") is generally suffi-
cient. Byrne & Costello, The Evolution of Coverage Under the Miller Act, 28 Fordham
L. Rev. 287, 290-94 (1959). For additional commentary on the problems of coverage of
the act, see Burgess, A Commentary on the Miller Act, 42 B.U.L. Rev. 282 (1962).
175 The sole indication to the contrary appeared during final consideration in the
Senate, 79 Cong. Rec. 13382 (1935):
Mr. WALSH. As I understand, the bill will require a contractor, in furnishing a
bond, not only to be liable for default by reason of his inability to complete the
contract or by reason of failing to meet the requirements and specifications as
to material, but will require him to meet the claims of workers and employees
who do not receive their compensation.
Mr. BURKE. That is the point exactly.
This exchange is in sharp contrast with the balance of the legislative history, and is
most probably the result of a hurried attempt at passage, and a quick response to an
obviously favorable inquiry. In spite of this exchange, it has been concluded elsewhere
that the "obligation" of the United States, laid down in Henningsen, is not dependent on
the Miller Act. Comment, 31 Fordham L. Rev. 161, 168 (1962). See also Note, 9 N.Y.L.F.
226, 228-29 (1963), citing the above portion of the Congressional Record.
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other than merely to require the contractor to provide the mandated
protection (the bond) to the suppliers.
In summary, neither the "equitable obligation" to satisfy the sup-
pliers and laborers, nor the right to withold contract funds when a
supplier is left unpaid, can be found in either the contracts into which
the United States enters, or in the statutes it has enacted. How, then,
did Henningsen find such an obligation, and Pearlman find such a
right? Neither case gives any clue.
Saying that a party who has received a benefit for which it agreed
to pay cannot retain the agreed price as against one who has conferred
the benefit, is not only satisfying to the equitable instincts, it is also
good law. If the disputes really were between the United States and
the subcontractors and materialmen, it would be easy to conclude that
if allowed to retain the fund, the United States would be unjustly en-
riched. Making restitution to the suppliers would then clearly be an
"equitable obligation" of the United States."' Such a principle, how-
ever, has no application to the instant problem. The disputes are not
between the United States and the unpaid materialmen.
The materialmen have in every relevant case been adequately
compensated by their rights against the payment bond. Thus as
against them, the United States is not unjustly enriched by retaining
the fund; consequently it has no obligation to pay. The United States
does, however, often retain a fund which should be paid to someone.
If both the surety (by payment under its bond) and the bank (by
application to the project of its loan proceeds) have made contribu-
tions to the project, then as against either or both of them, the United
States may have a duty to effect restitution. What this analysis does
not do, is to give any indication as to which of those two competitors
should have a prior right.
But this analysis does lead to two salient points. First, the "equi-
table obligation" to pay materialmen and suppliers upon which the
cases have ultimately come to rest cannot be demonstrated to have
any solid legal foundation. And second, the issue of application of the
loan proceeds—which some of the cases began to develop but which
is now considered irrelevant—can be shown to be a crucial threshhold
issue. If, for example, the bank has not seen to it that its loan was
used to further, or to free other funds to further, the instant project,
then it should be summarily disregarded as a claimant if "equitable
obligations" are deemed important. But if the bank has policed its
176 Restatement of Restitution § 1 (1937). However, see id, at § 110: "A person
who has conferred a benefit upon another as the performance of a contract with a third
person Is not entitled to restitution from the other merely because of the failure of per-
formance by the third person."
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customer's use of the loan in an appropriate way, then its claim to the
equitable obligation is equally meritorious with that of the surety.
Who should ultimately be favored in such a case cannot, it is sug-
gested, be determined on these grounds. To resolve it we must look
more directly at the surety's right to subrogation and the bank's
statutory right to its assignment.
B. The Theory of Subrogation
The surety's right to the retained percentages and unpaid progress
payments is predicated on its claim to subrogation. After Pearlman,
sureties can be subrogated to the rights of the contractor, the United
States, and the laborers and materialmen whom it has paid,'" and, as
has previously been indicated, the success of this equitable substitu-
tion could vary greatly, depending upon what claims have been satis-
fied under the bond.
If the contractor has failed to pay its employees or has defaulted
on the performance of the contract, the United States has the right
as against the contractor—and, arguably, against the contractor's
assignee—to withhold further progress payments. However, the Gov-
ernment does not have a contractual or statutory right to stop its pay-
ments if the only default has been a failure to satisfy the claims of
suppliers and subcontractors.'" Thus, in the latter case, the surety by
its subrogation to the United States should acquire no rights as against
the financing bank. Nor in any case will subrogation to the contractor's
rights to the fund be of any help to the surety, since the contractor
has typically assigned its claims to the surety's competitor, the assignee
bank.
The rights of the materialmen are only a bit more difficult to sort
out. While these parties certainly have contract claims against the
principal obligor, they do not have specific rights in the retained fund.
They are, consequently, general creditors of the contractor. As against
a party who has perfected a security interest in a particular asset, such
as the contract proceeds, their claims are of subordinate status,' The
surety who succeeds to these claims should thus also be subordinate
to a creditor with a perfected assignment.
177 See text at note 98 supra.
178 The government does now have a right to stop payment if laborers are unpaid.
179 U.C.C. § 9-201. The inapplicability of the U.C.C. to the surety's right of subro-
gation discussed in text at notes 134-40 supra, does not undercut the fact that state law
still governs the rights of the parties to the assignment and of the general creditors. The
non-applicability cases only held that the right of subrogation survived the enactment of
the U.C.C. and that U.C.C. § 9-312 did not govern the priority question. The cases did
not, however, disturb the fact that as state law, the Code nonetheless determines the nature
of the underlying rights to which the surety lays claim.
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This line of argument alone can provide little comfort to the fi-
nancing banks, since it would secure a priority to them only in the
instance of unpaid materialmen, but not for cases in which the surety
has paid the contractor's employees, or—more importantly—when the
surety has made good on its performance bond obligations. Thus, al-
though all of the recent cases have come to ignore it, doctrinally
speaking there is a distinct difference between the surety's status on
its payment bond and on its performance bond obligations. But even
with respect to defaults in performance, the surety's claims ultimately
rest upon its equitable rights of subrogation.'"
Although there can be little argument that a Miller Act surety
satisfies the usual criteria for entitlement to a right of subrogation,
there are certain limitations imposed by the law of suretyship which
should be pointed out. First, as an equitable remedy subrogation is
available only if there is no adequate legal. remedy. Second, subroga-
tion as a creature of equity may only be granted under circumstances
of conscience. And third, subrogation may be contraindicated when its
application would affect the equal or superior rights of third parties.
Each of these limitations merits exploration.
1. Adequacy of the Legal Remedy
The U.S. Supreme Court, both before and after its decisions in
Prairie State and Henningsen, affirmed the general requirement of
equity jurisdiction, that there be an "absence of a complete and ade-
quate remedy at law." 181 The existence of a legal remedy for the
Miller Act surety, and its "adequacy," are therefore crucial to the
instant problem.
In its contract with the obligor, the surety inevitably insists upon
the contractual right of indemnity, 182 and upon an assignment to it of
the contractor's interest in the proceeds from the contract.'" The
question, then, is whether by this assignment the surety has acquired
a right at law and, secondarily, whether that is "adequate." Before
1940, assignments of claims against the United States were unenforce-
able, except for claims which were fully matured and liquidated.'"
Thus by virtue of its indemnity contract the surety could as a prac-
180 For an excellent description of the consequences of this reliance on subrogation,
as well as some of the additional doctrinal difficulties it represents, see Note, 71 Yale
L.J. 1274 (1962).
181 Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1860). See also Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1961).
182 E.g., Fireman's Fund American, General Indemnity Agreement (Form No.
360124-11.65)	 2.
183 Id., ll 5. With this clause the surety takes an interest not only in the contract
rights, but in the contractor's machinery, tools, materials, and subcontracts.
184 See discussion in text at notes 43-44 supra.
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tical matter lay claim to the liquidated retainages. But even though
its right to subrogation related back to the date of its bond, the surety
could not acquire possession of the funds until it had satisfied the Gov-
ernment's demands. At that point the payment was matured, and the
surety could make application to the Government under its assign-
ment with the contractor.
The issue of existence of a "legal remedy" can be debated on
other grounds as well. As has been shown, a surety could not enforce
an assignment against an unliquidated contract obligation of the
United States. Since the surety is not a "bank, trust company or other
financing institution,' 185 the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940 did
not alter this disability, as it did for the assignee bank. The disability,
however, applied only to the United States; it did not affect the valid-
ity of the assignment between the surety and its assured:
[The anti-assignment Act] affords no protection to the
parties to the assignment; . . . [it] does not nullify the con-
tractual rights of the parties thereto . . . . neither party may
resort to the protection of the statute as against the other lee
The statute existed for the protection of the United States, and was
not designed to affect the rights of any other parties to the transac-
tion.' Clearly, then, the surety did have some quantum of legal
remedy; that of any assignee against its assignor for failure of the
assigned claim to materialize.
The only remaining question is whether it was "adequate." This
question, it is submitted, cannot be answered in the abstract. Certainly
as between surety and contractor adequacy is not a problem. The issue
becomes troublesome only if we ask about competitors, such as a fi-
nancing bank. If the surety's legal rights to the contract funds are
"inadequate" in a dispute with the financing bank, it can only be be-
cause it would otherwise be subordinated to that rival. That, in turn,
requires the finding that the surety should not be so subordinated.
Thus the threshhold question is one of policy: whether surety or as-
signee bank should be given the prior status.188 Until that question is
resolved the surety cannot make out a clear case for its own subroga-
tion. Those cases which have seen the issue in terms of the priority of
subrogation over assignment have therefore failed to perceive the
threshhold question.
186 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1970).
180
 In re Webber Motor Co., 52 F. Supp. 742, 744 (D.N.J. 1943). See also California
Bank v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 129 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1942).
187 Bank of California v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 428, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1943). The
United States could, therefore, waive the statute when its interests were not in peril. Id.
1138 See text at notes 232 et seq. Infra.
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This adequacy of legal remedy point is especially important be-
cause of the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code.'" Under
Article 9 the surety can acquire a legal interest in the contract rights,'"
even though recent cases have uniformly held that it need not rely on
that right alone when competing for a retained fund." 1 If the surety
did choose to rely on the Article 9 rights available to it, by the exer-
cise of a minimal degree of diligence it could easily acquire legal rights
superior to those of the financing bank. 102 The point is simply this:
if the adequacy of legal remedy can only be tested against the rights
the legal remedy grants to a surety as against competing parties, the
possibility of the surety's success under state law makes the legal
remedy not inadequate. Consequently, the equitable doctrine of sub-
rogation may not be available. Equity should not protect a party who
has voluntarily foregone a legal right."' In the words of one com-
mentator, "Since the Code has provided a legal remedy for sureties
. . . resort to the doctrine of equitable subrogation is superfluous and
should be abandoned." 19'
2. Demands of Justice
As an equitable remedy, subrogation can be invoked only in those
cases in which justice demands its application."' As between the
Miller Act surety and a commercial lender whose extension of credit
has actually gone to reduce the surety's exposure on its bonds, it is
difficult at best to argue that justice demands the application of sub-
rogation for the surety's benefit. Those cases which have held that
because of subrogation the surety must be preferred, have put the cart
before the horse.
189 Louisiana is the only state which has not enacted the U.C.C.
199 U.C.C. § 9-102. See 2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property f 36.7,
at 97 (1965).
191 See cases listed in notes 134-40 supra.
192 U.C.C. if 9-312(5), 9-401, 9-302.
193 Note, 69 Nev. L. Rev. 582, 593 (1969). Cf. Comment, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 927,
933 (1965); Hoffman, The UCC: Has It Changed the Pre-Code Banker-Surety-Contractor
Relationship?, 50 J. Com. Bank Lending 2, 12 (Jan, 1968).
194 Note, 69 Dick. L. Rev. 172, 177, 180 (1965). An example of an occasion when
subrogation should be available to the surety is that of a contractor who has gone into
bankruptcy, leaving wage earners to their rights against the band. In such a case the
surety's only possibility of adequate recoupment is its right to be subrogated to the em-
ployees' priority in bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970). See In re Bessemer Materials,
Inc., 225 F. Supp. 314 (ND. Ala. 1963) ; cf. Home Indem. Co. v. V.F.H. Donovan Painting
Co., 325 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1963); 6 H. Remington, Bankruptcy § 2802 (5th ed. 1952);
31 U.S.C. § 191, 193 (1970).
In the case of unpaid employees, this priority in bankruptcy adds to the proposition
that as against the financing bank the surety has a fair quantum of other rights avail-
able to it. For a general discussion, see Jordan, The Rights of a Surety Upon the Default
of its Contractor-Principal, 41 Ore. L. Rev. 1 (1961).
195 J. C. Boswell Co. v. W. D. Felder & Co., 103 Cal. App. 2d 767, 230 P.2d 386
(Dist. Ct. App. 1951). G. Harris, Law of Subrogation § 6, at 8 (1889).
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This "demands of justice" requirement is the rationale behind
another limiting feature of suretyship law: that one who pays the debt
of another as a volunteer cannot be subrogated to the creditor's
rights.'" There are three classes of nonvolunteers: those who act
under the necessity of self-protection; those who act at the request of
the debtor and whose payments are favored by the public; and those
who act in performance of a legal duty, arising either by express
agreement or by operation of law.1°7
Neither the surety nor the bank falls within the first class; both
fall equally within the second class; 1°8
 but the surety has the marginal
edge in the third class. As to that last point, it suggests a distinction
which has not been either raised or recognized in the reported cases. The
surety is obligated by its bond, even though the giving of the bond
was as voluntary as was the making of the bank's loan. Quaere, then,
whether a bank which extends a loan to cover payroll costs is not
doing exactly the same thing as is the surety which pays out on its
bond, if the bank is obligated to make such a loan under a mandatory
future advance clause.'" In short, the surety's edge on this score is
marginal.
3. Third Parties
The "demands of justice" point has yet another consequence.
Generally, subrogation can be applied for the benefit of one party only
when it can be done without disturbing the rights of others."° This
principle is of ancient vintage,' but of continued vitality."' Subro-
gation is thus unavailable if by its application the rights of parties of
equal or higher rank would be affected."' Thus, regardless of the
source of the right, it can be enforced only after the surety's claim is
balanced against the claim of the assignee bank.'"
In short, the surety's right to equitable subrogation as against an
assignee bank is not as solid a proposition as the surety-bank priority
196 Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227, 231-32 (1896).
197 5 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 2344, at 5184 (1919).
108 The legislative histories of the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940, and of the 1951
amendment, clearly indicate that the bank's loan is as much favored by the public as are
the surety's bonds.
199 Our survey reported herein established that many contractors have firm lines
of credit with their banks.
200
 Harris, supra note 195, § 6, at 8.
201 E.g., Appeal of D. E. Robeson, 117 Pa. 628, 12 A. 51 (1888).
202 "Subrogation will not be enforced to the prejudice of rights of equal or higher
rank." St. Johnsbury & Lamoille County R.R. v. Skeels & Weidman, Inc., 124 Vt. 25, 30,
196 A.2d 485, 488 (1963).
208
 Federal Ins. Co. v. Allen, 92 Cal. Rptr. 125, 13 Cal. App. 3d 648 (Ct. App. 1970) ;
Castleman Constr. Co. v. Pennington, 222 Term. 82, 432 S.W.2d 669, 676 (1968); Credit
Bureau Corp. v. Beckstead, 63 Wash. 2d 183, 385 P.2d 846 (1963).
2°4 Cf. Castleman Constr. Co. v. Pennington, 222 Tenn. 82, 432 S.W.2d 669 (1968).
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cases would have us believe. To the extent that this proposition can
be shown to be unfounded, the conclusions based on this proposition
can be shown to be equally unfounded.
Two points can be drawn from this discussion of equitable doc-
trines inherent in the law of suretyship. First, the discussion has not
proven that the surety is never entitled to subrogation. Rather, it
demonstrates that by reference to legal doctrine alone the subroga-
tion feature is not an irrevocable and compelling conclusion. It has
shown further that the right to subrogation should be awarded only
after the question of priorities has been examined in a policy frame-
work, not—as the courts have done—awarded as a premise from
which the priority issue can be deduced. Prairie State, which first
made this error, can at least be credited with having made one abso-
lutely correct decision. Although all but ignored by the most recent
cases, Prairie State was correct in saying that deciding the issue of
subrogation vel non does not per force decide the issue of priority.
For that, we must inquire into the arguments available to the assignee.
C. The Assignment of Claims Act
As previously noted, 206 until 1940 neither the financing bank nor
the surety could lay claim to an assignment that would be "valid"
against the United States. The purpose of this original anti-assignment
law was to protect the Government—specifically, to minimize two po-
tential difficulties: (1) the possible embroilment of the United States
in conflicting claims, with the resultant possibility of double payment;
and (2) the use of improper influence against agents of the United
States by parties who originally had no interest in the transaction. 206
Although avoiding embroilment in multiple claims is of primary
concern, that purpose of the anti-assignment law is not thwarted when
the United States' role is only that of a stakeholder for the rival claim-
ants. Peril to the United States' interest does not exist in such a case
since it is discharged from liability irrespective of the outcome of the
203 See
 discussion in text at notes 40-43 supra.
206
 Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 256 U.S. 655, 657 (1921). See also
Patterson v. United States, Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 354 F.2d 327, 329 (Ct. Cl. 1965);
United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 371 (1949) ; Martin v. National Sur.
Co., 300 U.S. 588, 594 (1937). More recent cases have supported this view, while express-
ing it somewhat differently: "The purposes of the Assignment of Claims Act were 1(1)]
to secure the Government against embroilment in multiple claims and subjection to possible
double liability; (2) to insure that the Government will be able to avail itself of rights
to setoff or cross-claims against the original claimants; and (3) to prevent persons of
influence from buying up claims against the United States, which might then be improp-
erly urged upon officers of the Government." United States v. Improved Premises, 204 F.
Supp. 868, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See also In re Goodson, 208 F. Supp. 837, 845-46 (S.D.
Cal. 1962).
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private dispute."' Consequently, the Government should be uncon-
cerned with the relative equities of the claimants 2 08 Thus, unless it
can be established that Congress saw some federal policy to be served
by regulating the priority issue there is no reason for the dispute to be
of federal concern.'" Twice in the past thirty-three years Congress
had the opportunity to examine the question. On both occasions—the
one in 1940, the other in 1951—the exigencies of national defense
prompted the legislative action.
The Assignment of Claims Act of 1940, 210 spawned in the en-
vironment of increasing defense expenditures, was unequivocally in-
tended by Congress to stimulate the use of private capital for the
financing of government contractors,2" particularly small business
contractors.212
 By changing the law to allow assignments of claims to
banks, trust companies and other financing institutions, Congress
hoped to facilitate the ability of these contractors to procure the fi-
nancing they would need in order to participate in public works.
As finally enacted, the statute said nothing with respect to the
issue of priorities among competing assignees or between an assignee
and other types of claimants such as subrogees. It simply provided
that the bank's assignment would be "valid . . . for all purposes. r;218
Standing alone, such a phrase is, and was, subject to two possible in-
terpretations.214
 First, one could agree with the Court of Claims that
validity and priority are not the same concepts, and that the bank's
"valid" assignment may nevertheless be subordinate to the surety's
207
 Precisely such a position was adopted by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Martin v.
National Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 588, 595 (1937).
208 Id. See also Note, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 857 (1960): "Thus, although the assignment
is not enforceable against the United States, the statute does not affect rights between
the parties to the assignment."
200 See text at notes 232 et seq. infra.
210
 31 U.S.C. $ 203 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 9, 1940, ch. 779, 54
Stat. 1029).
211 86 Cong. Rec. 12556, 12559 (1940) (remarks of Rep. Sumners) ; id. at 13135 (re-
marks of Rep. Hobbs). In 1940 there were some six billion dollars available for this pur-
pose in the reserves of private banks, which were "frozen" by the anti-assignment statutes
then in force. Id. at 12560 (remarks of Rep. Wolcott).
212
 This concern for small business contractors was expressed during both the House
and the Senate considerations. See 86 Cong. Rec. 12803 (1940) (remarks of Sen. Barkley):
"The object of the proposed legislation is to make it possible for smaller contractors to
go to a bank or trust company and put up their contract as collateral security and borrow
the money necessary to enable them to go on with the work." Rep. Hobbs remarked,
"It will put idle money to work and gives the little man a chance." Id. at 13122. This was,
in fact, the reason why the limit of $1000 was substituted for the $3000 figure originally
proposed in the bill. See id. at 12557-60, 12803.
212 31 U.S.C. * 203 (1970).
214 See Coconut Grove, discussed in text at notes 47-53 supra; cf, Royal Indemnity,
discussed in text at notes 78-80 supra. On the notice to surety point, see New Amsterdam
Cas. Co. v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 330 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1964).
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right of subrogation. On the other hand, the federal courts could point
to the fact that only the bank could be an assignee. Congress, pre-
sumably aware of the Miller Act, must have intended to validate the
bank's interest alone. Furthermore, the statute must have been directed
to the priority issue, if for no other reason than that it requires the
financing bank to notify the surety of the assignment to it. This latter
point finds scant, but some, support in the legislative history of the
1940 Act. During the debates in the House, Rep. Wolcott (then a
member of the House Banking and Currency Committee) confessed:
I do not see any particular reason why an assignee should
have to give notice to the contracting officer or head of his
department or agency. There may be some justification for
giving notice to the surety on the bonds which the contractor
has to put up.215
In Rep. Wolcott's view, the notice requirement was a matter of
"protection."'" What protection such notice would give to a surety
which had already issued the bond is unclear. It would be dubious
protection at best, possibly only reminding the surety that it should
be more attentive to its assured's affairs than it might otherwise be.
Aside from this one comment, the House and Senate debates are silent
on the priority issue. Thus, even though this one comment is not con-
vincing on the issue of priorities, it does minimally tend to support the
banker's interpretation.
The only additional piece of relevant information is the fact that
around the time when Congress was considering the legislation "Nil
allocation agreement was proposed and seriously considered for the
purpose of equitably distributing such funds between banks and
sureties but unhappily it never came to fruition."'" Without knowing
the now lost details of those discussions, we can only speculate as to
the expectations the bankers and sureties may have had at the time
the statute was first drawn.
In short, neither the statute's language nor its legislative history
can be considered conclusive as to the meaning of "valid for all pur-
poses." What was intended by Congress, however, was clear: commer-
cial banks should be encouraged to participate in defense contractor
financing. It would appear, therefore, that to argue the priority issue
on the basis of linguistics, as the courts have done, is to miss the point.
Since the language is ambiguous, the only rationale available is an
215 86 Cong. Rec. 12560 (1940) (remarks of Rep. Wolcott) (emphasis added).
216 Id.
217 Nichols, Assignment of Claims Act of 1940—A Decade Later, 12 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
538, 539 (1951).
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extrapolation from the declared policy. If validating assignments was
meant to encourage banks to lend, allowing those same banks only a
subordinate position in the assigned fund would most probably inter-
fere with the intended encouragement. Lenders care about collateral
only because of the possibility of the borrower's defaulting on the
loan. Otherwise, they look to repayment, not liquidation. It seems
likely that those contractors who have defaulted on their construction
work, so as to require the sureties to pay on their bonds, are the very
contractors who will with the greatest frequency also be in default on
their bank loans. Thus in the greatest number of problem cases a
surety will be a competitor in the very situation where the bank most
cares about its collateral security. Consequently, to hold that the bank
has a position subordinate to that of the surety is probably to inhibit
the very process Congress was trying to promote. Although this in-
hibiting factor is susceptible to factual verification or disproof, 218
 it is
nevertheless the question which should have been the crux of the post-
1940 priority cases. That it was indeed an inhibiting factor can be
established at least in part by the findings Congress made in 1951.
The 1951 Amendment to the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940 2"
was also born in a time of national emergency but was a reaction to a
more specific problem. In 1949 and 1950 the Comptroller General had
ruled that a bank which had received payments pursuant to its assign-
ment could be made to reimburse the Government if the assignor was
indebted to the United States for taxes or otherwise 2 20 The 1951
amendment was a direct response to these rulings. It provided that
for a limited class of contracts no set-off or recoupment would be
available to the Government, other than for debts or damages arising
from the contract that had been assigned.
Like the Act which it amended, the 1951 statute was, on its face,
inconclusive as to the priority of conflicting claims. Arguably, the
United States could still withhold any funds necessary to reimburse
itself for the contractor's failure of performance. 221
 The surety, by
being subrogated to those rights, was therefore not foreclosed from
participating in the fund by the language of the 1951 act, 222
 except
possibly for the case of earned progress payments actually delivered
to the assignee bank. 223
 On the other hand, the purpose for which the
218 See Section IV infra.
219 31 U.S.C. {1 203 (1970); 41. U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of
May 15, 1951, ch. 75, 65 Stat. 41).
220 See text at note 81 supra.
221
 This was the position taken by the Comptroller General. See No. B-125305, 35
Comp. Gen. 149 (1955).
222 See Comment, 31 Fordham L. Rev. 161, 173 (1962).
223 On this point the federal courts and the Court of Claims initially disagreed.
Compare American Fidelity Co. v. Nat'l City Bank, 266 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1959), and
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statute was drawn demonstrates the validity of the conclusion reached
about the proper construction of the 1940 act: that commercial banks
would be deterred from financing public works contractors unless their
rights to the contract fund were uninterrupted. Following the adverse
decisions of the Comptroller General in 1949 and 1950, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System found that the possibility
of set-off and recoupment had again inhibited commercial banks from
financing contractors, especially small businesses, who were working
on federal projects.224 Both houses of Congress, after holding hearings
on the bill, agreed."'
The purpose of the "no set-off" clause,226 then, and the problems
to which it was addressed, are beyond dispute. The encouragement
which Congress had intended to give to the commercial banks in 1940
had been frustrated by factors which had removed some of the safety
from government contract rights as collateral. Congress reacted in
1951 by reaffirming that encouragement through removing the impedi-
ments. On this clear purpose, however, two divergent arguments may
conceivably be founded. On the one hand, Congress did not expressly
disturb the pro-surety tendencies of the Court of Claims; in fact, it
did not even mention them. Thus the case law should be left intact.
On the other hand, Congress had restated its policy that financing was
to be encouraged and had expressly found that the impairment of
priority in the contract rights had an adverse effect on that purpose. 227
To the extent that the surety's priority would have a similar effect,
the pro-surety decisions of recent days are inconsistent with this es-
tablished federal policy.
Bank of Arizona v. Nat'l Sur. Corp., 237 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1956), with Newark Ins. Co. v.
United States, 181 F. Supp. 246 (Ct. CI. 1960). The Court of Claims has since decided
otherwise, see text at notes 105-06 supra, for progress payments earned and paid over
prior to default. The American Fidelity opinion, supra, was consistent with the general
proposition that "Damn assignee of a non-negotiable chose in action who, having paid
value therefor, has received payment from the obligor is under no duty to make restitu-
tion although the obligor had a defense thereto, if the transferee made no misrepresenta-
tion and did not have notice of the defense." Restatement of Restitution § 14(2) (1937).
The Newark case, supra, has been commented on unfavorably. See, e.g., Note, 46 Va, L.
Rev. 1014 (1960) ; Note, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 857 (1960).
224 Letter of Feb. 13, 1951, reprinted in Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
Assignment of Claims Act, S. Rep, No. 217, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1951).
225 House Comm. on the Judiciary, Amending the Assignment of Claims Act of
1940, H.R. Rep. No. 376, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) ; S. Rep. No. 217, supra note 224.
228 See generally Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 416 F.2d 1296 (Ct.
CI, 1970) ; Silberfield, The "No Set-Off Clause" and Its Impact on the Financing of Gov-
ernment Contracts, 52 J. Corn. Bank Lending 47 (Aug. 1970).
227 On the bank-surety issue specifically, Nichols reached a conclusion contrary to
the one being argued here: "In any event the Act is serving its purpose as intended by
Congress. It is not necessary to upset established and time-honored principles to carry
out this purpose." Nichols, supra note 217, at 567.
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D. Summary of Legal Criticisms
What the preceding doctrinal critique has attempted to establish
is that the leading bank vs. surety cases have virtually ignored sub-
stantial arguments and doctrinal responses which can be raised against
them. Of course this result is not so astonishing when one considers
the many fact-pattern variations which are possible. These variations
include: (1) payment bond vs. performance bond; (2) retained per-
centages vs. progress payments; (3) "policed" loan proceeds vs. dissi-
pated loan proceeds; (4) paid-over fund vs. stakeholder fund; and
(5) timing vs. notice. Since it would be almost impossible for one case
to present a complete "grid" of these variations, it is not surprising
that no really comprehensive judicial reasoning came about. An addi-
tional complication facing the courts was the fact that banks were not
the only competitors the sureties were litigating against. Pearlman, for
example, involved not a bank but a bankruptcy trustee. As against
such other rivals the surety could lay claim to quite different equities
than those it might have in opposition to a financing bank. 228
The basic flaw in the federal priorities cases, however, is that
they do not take into consideration the policy that Congress had in-
tended be carried out when they enacted the 1940 and 1951 Assign-
ment of Claims Acts. In those situations where there is no "clear and
substantial" interest of the federal government being impinged upon, 2"
or where there are no rights or duties of the United States at stake, 2"
a federal rule will govern only if the dispute is to be governed by the
interpretation of a federal statute or if a "clear [and] emphatic" fed-
eral policy is involved."' The priorities problem is such a situation.
Considering the fact that the Miller Act and the Assignment of Claims
Acts did not compel a result on the issue of priorities, the courts
should have examined the federal policy espoused by these Acts before
attempting to fashion a federal rule by which the priorities issue could
be resolved. Having committed themselves to the application of fed-
eral rather than state law, the courts could not then legitimately
choose to ignore the federal policy which justified that choice. Never-
theless, that is precisely what they did. This approach is at best incon-
228 See Pearlman's own discussion of Muusey Trust in text at notes 94-99 supra.
222 United States v. Yazd], 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966). See Wallis v. Pan American
Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966). On Miller Act disputes specifically, compare United
States v. Henke Constr. Co., 157 F.2d 13, 24 (8th Cir. 1946), with Liebman v. United
States, 153 F.2d 350, 352-53 (9th Cir. 1946).
232 Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 32-34 (1956). See also UAW v. Hoosier
Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
231 D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 462 (1942).
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sistent, for when the law does not compel a result, a clear articulation
of policy must.
III. FEDERAL POLICY AND PRIVATE FINANCE
A. Policy Goals
The existence and nature of the relevant federal policy goals can
be documented with little difficulty. In the broadest sense Congress
has been concerned with the free enterprise system as a whole:
The essence of the American economic system of private
enterprise is free competition. Only through full and free
competition can free markets, free entry into business, and
opportunities for the expression and growth of personal ini-
tiative and individual judgment be assured. The preservation
and expansion of such competition is basic not only to the
economic well-being but to the security of this Nation. Such
security and well-being cannot be realized unless the actual
and potential capacity of small business is encouraged and
developed.232
This concern with the encouragement and vitality of small busi-
nesses233 has been repeated often in Congress, 234 in such disparate con-
texts as defense appropriations 235 and foreign assistance.2" Currently,
282 Small Business Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1970) (emphasis added).
233 "For the purposes of this chapter, a small-business concern shall be deemed to be
one which is independently owned and operated and which is not dominant in its field
of operation." 15 U.S.C. § 632 (1970). When not otherwise indicated, this definition is
what is meant by the use of "small business" throughout this paper. As a practical
matter, however, it is possible to define "small business contractor" somewhat more spe-
cifically, as a firm with less than $5 million in annual gross receipts. This $5 million
figure, used as one of the dividing lines in the survey described in section IV infra, can
be supported by reference to the actual operations of the Small Business Administration.
"Direct Basis" SBA financing is normally not available to contractors whose receipts
exceed that sum, according to Mr. Stuart Rawlins, Chief of the Financing Division, SBA
Los Angeles Regional Office. Five million dollars is also the high break-point for the
Bureau of the Census data discussed in text at notes 246-47 infra. (Mr. Rawlins was
extensively interviewed by the author in October, 1972. Information gathered from that
conversation will hereinafter be cited as Rawlins Interview.)
284 See, e.g., Armed Services Procurement Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2301 (1970): "It is the
policy of Congress that a fair proportion of the purchases and contracts made under this
chapter be placed with small business concerns." 41 U.S.C. § 252(b) (1970): "It is the
declared policy of the Congress that a fair proportion of the total purchases and con-
tracts for property and services for the Government shall be placed with small business
concerns." 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-1.702(a), (b) (1) (1972): "It is the policy of the Government
to aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as possible, the interests of small business con-
cerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise . . ."
233 Defense Appropriation Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-204, § 709, 85 Stat. 716: "Inso-
far as practicable, the Secretary of Defense shall assist American small business to par-
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with increased awareness of the need for minority group economic
development, the policy has become even more insistent."' Specifically
with respect to contractors, the federal government has become con-
cerned with the involvement of small business in federal procurement
and public works construction. 2 ' Furthermore, Congress has noted
the causal relationship between this policy and the ability of small
business contractors to procure financing. If adequate financial assis-
tance is not available, the desired participation of small business can-
not be successfully effectuated."" The legislative histories of both the
1940 and the 1951 assignment of claims statutes reflect this finding
while the statutes themselves attempt to further this concern. 24°
It is possible to discover in Congress' action two separate, but
intermingled goals. One, and the most obvious one, is to foster small
business enterprises for their own sake and for the sake of a competi-
tive economy generally. The other is to provide for the United States,
as a buyer of contracting services, a wide and competitive market of
able sellers. 2" If inadequately financed contractors are permitted to
ticipate equitably in the furnishing of commodities and services financed with funds
appropriated under this Act . . . ,"
2" Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, §1 602(a), (b), 75 Stat. 424,
as amended 22 U.S.C. § 2352 (1970).
237
 Exec. Order No. 11625, 36 Fed. Reg. 19967 (1971).
2" See notes 234-35 supra. See also 41' C.F.R. § 1.1.702(b)(1) (1972). "Small
business concerns ... shall be afforded an equitable opportunity to compete for all
contracts that they can perform." Armed Services Procurement Regulation [hereinafter
ASPRI § 1-702(b), 3 Gov't Cont. Rep. § 32,191 (1972).
239 Realistically, the Government cannot effectuate its policy of bolstering small-
business participation in defense procurement merely by ensuring that a fair
proportion of defense contracts is allocated to small business. Considering the
complexity and the unique risks of defense procurement, as well as the serious
economic consequences of a termination for default, financial assistance should be
made readily available to the small-business contractor from the date of bidding
for the contract to the time of final payment.
Speidel, Financial Inability and the Default Termination of Defense Supply Contracts:
A Small Business Case Study, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 1055, 1078 (1960). The Government,
apparently, agrees with Speidel: "Immediate and continuing attention must be given
to insure that constructive measures will be taken to facilitate and accelerate necessary
contract financing assistance to small business concerns." Federal Procurement Regulations
§ 1-30.204, 6 Gov't Cont. Rep. if 66,881 (1971), In certain cases progress payments are
handled differently for small business contractors. See ASPR App. E-504, 4 Gov't Cont.
Rep. f[ 35,693 (1972). Compare ASPR App. E-510.1 with ASPR App, E-510.2, id. at ill]
35,699-.05.
240 For the 1940 Art, see 86 Cong. Rec. 12557, 12559, 12803, 13122 (1940), demon-
strating concern for the "little fellow." For the 1951 amendment, see Sen. Comm. on
Banking and Currency, Assignment of Claims Act, S. Rep. No. 217, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1951): "[M]any of the smaller contractors having a large volume of Government con-
tracts but a small net worth are presently unable to obtain the financing necessary to
enable them to perform their contracts."
241 See, e.g., Commission on Government Procurement, Pub. L. No. 91-129, § 1,
83 Stat. 269 (1969): "[l]t is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to promote
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the procurement of goods, services and facilities
by and for the executive branch of the Federal Government. . . ."
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undertake federal construction projects, these two goals could very
easily become incompatible."' But if, on the other hand, financing is
provided at a level sufficient to support small business firms' ventures
into public works, it would serve to promote both goals: it would en-
courage the proliferation and growth of financially capable individual
enterprises, and would thus enlarge the market out of which the
United States must procure its services.
Both the bonding companies and the commercial banks can pre-
sent good cases for their involvement in the furtherance of these
goals."' Sureties argue that their screening processes weed out those
firms which would be incapable of providing satisfactory levels of
service. The banks respond with an allegation that their efforts alone
can provide the necessary financial support. Both claims have merit.
Before inquiring into their specifics, however, it is necessary to de-
scribe the state of the contracting industry as it now exists, and the
complementary state of the financing available from sources other
than private commercial banks 244 The rival claims can be adequately
assessed only against such a background.
The annual volume of public works construction in recent years
has grown to very near the $30 billion mark, or roughly thirty percent
of all new construction attempted.'" However, only a quarter of all
the construction firms in the United States participate in this enor-
mous market."' To envision what the competitive stature of the
242 "If the participation of small businesses in defense procurement is to be effec-
tively implemented, no small business should be awarded a contract until firm, adequate,
financial arrangements have been obtained. Only at this level of administrative respon-
sibility are the interests of both the Government and the small-business contractor ade-
quately protected." Speidel, supra note 239, at 1066.
248 See sections III-C, D infra.
244 On the latter point, see section III-B infra.
246 NEW CONSTRUCTION
(Millions of Dollars)
Period Total Private—% of Total Public—% of Total
1966 76,002 51,995 —68% 24,007 —32%
1967 77,503 51,967 —67% 25,536 —33%
1968 86,626 59,021 —68% 27,605 —32%
1969 93,368r 65,404r-70% 27,964r-30%
1970 94,030r 65,932r-70% 28,098r_30%
1971 109,399r 79,535r-73% 29,864r-27%
r revised.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Domestic Commerce, 18 Construction Review 12
(July 1972).
248 The following table shows the number of firms "With Payroll" and the source of
their gross revenues. Only 103,886 of the total 368,771 (or 28.2%) show any receipts from
public works.
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market may be requires extrapolation from the following data for the
construction industry as a whole, both public and private: 241
Size of
Establishment
by Total
Receipts
Number of
Establish-
month
% of Total
Establish-
month
Total
Receipts
(in thousands)
% of
Total
Receipts
$2,500,000 or more 5,328 .7% 38,263,333 37.6%
$1,000,000 to $2,499,999 10,809 1.3% 16,556,135 16.3%
$ 500,000 to $ 999,999 17,456 2.2% 12,411,518 12.2%
$ 250,000 to $ 499,999 30,129 3.8% 10,821,538 10.6%
$	 100,000 to $ 249,999 70,746 8.9% 11,270,344 11.1%
$	 50,000 to $	 99,999 80,429 10.1% 5,688,418 5.6%
$	 25,000 to $	 49,999 97,602 12.3% 3,447,434 3.4%
$	 10,000 to $	 24,999 130,592 16.4% 2,115,712 2.1%
Less than $10,000 351,747 44.3% 1,160,961 1.1%
Total 794,838 100% 101,735,392 100%
Over a third of the total revenues are earned by less than one
percent of the contracting firms. Less than five percent of the firms do
two-thirds of the business. On the other hand, the smallest outfits,
which make up 83.1% of the total number, have a market share barely
in excess of twelve percent. Unfortunately there is no mathematically
certain way to stratify these figures for private and public construc-
tion separately. An indication of what such an extract for federal work
alone would look like can, however, be seen from the results of the
Establishments with Receipts from Public Construction Only:
Number of firms: 18,789	 Receipts (in $1,000)
$8,933,285
Establishments with Receipts from Both Public and Private Construction:
Receipts (in $1,000)
Number of firms: 85,096	 Public $19,742,839
Private $24,571,461
Private Only:
Number of firms: 264,886	 $39,340,417
Totals
Number of firms: 368,771
	
Total Receipts $92,588,002
Public $28,676,124
Private $63,911,878
Bureau of the Census, Census of Construction Industries, 1967, in 1 Industry Statistics
and Special Reports 1B-13, Table B7 (1971). These "With Payroll" firms, however,
represent only 46.4% of the 794,838 construction firms in the country. The balance, of
course, are the much smaller firms "Without Payroll." Our survey has indicated (see
Appendix, Contractors' Questionnaire, Question 4, infra) that these smaller firms par-
ticipate in public works to a significantly lower extent than do their larger competitors.
As a result, if the table immediately above had included all firms, the proportion showing
some receipts from public works would be measurably lower than the 28.2% there indi-
cated, and in all probability below 25%.
247 These figures are derived from Bureau of the Census, supra note 246, at IA-3,
Table A2, The complementary data for "With Payroll" firms only are as follows:
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survey undertaken in connection with this article and discussed below.
Of those firms earning less than $250,000 per year in gross incomes,
59% reported to us that they did no federal work whatsoever. For
firms earning between $250,000 and $1 million, the ratio was 48%;
it drops to 34% for those in the $1-5 million range, and is only 27%
for firms grossing in excess of $5 million. 248
It is fairly safe to conclude that the intensity of competition
present in the federal construction market is far less than that pre-
vailing in the construction industry generally; and the latter is itself
not particularly good. Although the question of why this is the case
will be deferred for a moment, it is nevertheless important to be aware
of the phenomenon at this juncture. To the extent that federal con-
tracts are, or could be, a source of profits, or an opportunity for
market entry not requiring extensive good will and community repu-
tation, the noncompetitive features of the market run contrary to the
policy of furthering individual small business enterprise. If the diffi-
culty can be traced in part to some impediment to small business fi-
nancing, that impediment should be removed. And if that impediment
to financing is a function of the trend of judicial law-making in cases
dealing with surety-banker priorities, then those cases can well be
subjected to empirical criticism. Stated the other way around, if fed-
eral policy is to be a decisional criterion, then the courts simply must
SHARE OF THE MARKET FOR ESTABLISHMENT WITH PAYROLL
Size of Establishment
by Total Receipts
Number of
Establish-
ments
% of
Total
Establish-
ments
Total
Receipts
(in thousands)
% of
Total
Receipts
Total 368,771 100% $95,925,449 100%
$5,000,000 or more 2,033 .55% 26,825,796 28.0%
$2,500,000 to $4,999,999 3,282 .9% 11,382,491 11.9%
$1,000,000 to $2,499,999 10,692 2.9% 16,387,814 17.1%
$ 500,000 to $ 999,999 16,983 4.6% 12,093,307 12.6%
$ 250,000 to $ 499,999 28,600 7.75% 10,292,193 10.7%
$	 100,000 to $ 249,999 63,339 17.2% 10,149,144 10.6%
$	 50,000 to $	 99,999 68,490 18.6% 4,864,889 5.0%
$	 25,000 to $
	 49,999 73,541 19.9% 2,627,623 2.7%
$	 10,000 to $	 24,999 63,374 17.2% 1,100,726 1.1%
Less than $10,000 38,437 10.4% 201,467 .2%
Id.
248 The complete figures are shown in Appendix, Contractors' Questionnaire, Ques-
tion 4, infra. These results were cross-checked by a telephone interview with the Director
of the Design and Construction Department of the General Services Administration in
San Francisco, and by a persona! interview with the head of the Los Angeles Bid Collec-
tion Office. Both interviews confirmed the reported data, adding that a very small group
of contractors reappeared with great frequency on federal projects; the bidding firms were
a very closed group.
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make inquiry into what effects one decision or the other might have
on the participation of small businesses in the federal construction
market.
The first step, therefore, is to attempt to isolate the contributing
causes of this lopsided participation.
B. Financing for Contractors: Needs and Sources
Over half of the firms personally interviewed during the course
of the present study reported that with varying frequencies they had
occasion to procure outside financing. Because the sample from which
this ratio was drawn included a disproportionate number of larger
firms, it is reasonable to suggest that for small businesses in particular
the need for financial assistance is even greater than the "over-half"
result indicated 249 Obviously the sample does not include any firms
which may have withdrawn from the industry entirely because they
could not obtain the necessary financial help.'" To adopt a null hy-
240 Although the subjects were randomly selected, the responses were definitely
skewed in favor of the larger firms. Compare the distribution of firms by gross receipts
in the table in text at note 247 with the distribution reflected in our results:
In order to locate your firm's position within the Bureau of Census statistics,
would you categorize your firm's gross receipts into one of the following dollar
ranges:
Interview Questionnaire
Public
Works Total
0 0 0 0
0 2 0 2
0 2 0 2
2 18 2 22
5 21 3 29
21 22 4 47
10' 16 1 27
38 81 10 129
a. Under $ 10,000
b. $ 10,000-$ 24,999
c. $ 25,000-$ 49,999
d. $ 50,0004249,999
e. $250,000-$999,999
f. $1 million-$5 million
g. Over $5 million
Totals
In this table "Interview" refers to those contractors which were personally interviewed in
depth. "Questionnaire" includes those contractors responding to the mail survey who
answered this question. "Public Works" refers to those contractors which had been referred
to us as public works "repeaters" by the local office of the General Services Administration.
See note 248 supra.
The "over-half" figure reported in the text was drawn only from those in the "Inter-
view" and "Public Works" categories. Question 10 of the mail survey (see Appendix
Contractors' Questionnaire, infra) could not be scored, due to a severe misunderstanding
of its point on the part of some of the subjects, but more to the lack of constant quanti-
fiers allowed by the question. These two columns are even more heavily weighted with
larger firms than the total sample is; hence there is an even greater probability that "over-
half" is an underestimate of the frequency of financing for the industry as a whole, and
especially for the smaller firms.
250 Nor, of course, does the sample include those individuals who may not have been
able to enter the industry as independent operators, for lack of financial help. I have no
data from either of these groups. It is mentioned here only to indicate, again, that "over-
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pothesis approach, we should be able to rule out financing problems
as a contributing cause of competitive dislocations if we can establish
that financing is in fact adequately available. Other than commercial
banks, there are only a few places the small business contractor might
look for help.
For contractors working on National Defense projects, there is
a possibility of receiving "advance payments."2" There are, however,
some limitations: the advance payments can be made only when doing
so would be in the national interest, and only upon the authority of
the departments of national defense. 252 Also, this technique is used
only as a last resort for those cases in which private or federally guar-
anteed loans are unavailable."' The decision to grant advance pay-
ments is typically made on the basis of "comparative prices, urgency
of supply schedules, and the time and expense involved in arranging
other sources or in reletting contracts 7264—and then only after the
agency has done a complete feasibility and cash flow analysis."' The
paperwork alone seems to be an inhibiting factor."' Advance pay-
ments, as a practical matter, are hedged about with so many layers
of administrative limitation that their use as a financing tool is limited
half" is most probably a conservative estimate of the demand side of the financing equa-
tion.
As to business failures (i.e., insolvency, not including voluntary withdrawal from the
industry), contractors certainly have their share:
BUSINESS Famuns—CoNsramnos INnustra
1955	 1960	 1965	 1970
Size of	 Under $100,000:	 1239	 2171	 2025
	 1229
liability	 $100,000 and over:
	
165	 436	 488	 458
—	
— —
Total:	 1404	 2607	 2513	 1687
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States
476 (1971).
Insolvent contractors account for ten percent of all the business bankruptcies in the
United States. D. Stanley, M. Girth et al., Bankruptcy—Problem, Process, Reform 109,
Table 6-1 (1971). And of all business bankruptcies, 26% reported "insufficient capital" as
the underlying cause of failure. Id. at 111, Table 6-2. For a general description of certain
hazards of the contracting industry which make contractors so prone to financial collapse,
see Note, Mechanics' Liens and Surety Bonds in the Building Trades, 68 Yale L.J. 138,
138-41 (1958).
251
 10 U.S.C.	 2307 (1970).
252 I.e., the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, and NASA. 10
U.S.C. 2303 (1970). These departments are authorized to make advance payments only
when "the national defense will be facilitated thereby." Exec. Order No. 10,789, 3 C.F.R.
78 (1973). See also ASPR App. E-405(iv), 4 Gov't Cont. Rep. II 35,664 (1972).
253 See ASPR App. E-404, id. at 11 35,663; ASPR App. E-408, id. at 35,667.
254 ASPR App. E-409, id. at g 35,668. The contractor must also provide "adequate
security." See ASPR App. E-405(i), id. at Ii 35,664; ASPR App. E-413, id. at Q 35,672.
255 ASPR App. E-214.1, id. at l 35,616.05.
255 See, e.g., ASPR App. E-214, id. at 11 35,616; ASPR App. E-411, id. at Q 35,670.
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to cases of extraordinary circumstance and to contractors possessing
unusual bureaucratic skill and perseverance. Certainly this possibility
does nothing to stimulate additional participation by contractors in
public works.
Federally guaranteed "V"-loans, though highly successful during
the Korean War,257 are similarly dis functional today as a matter of
business encouragement. In recent years they have been little used.258
Regulation "V""°—authorizing governmental agencies to guarantee
loans to small business contractors, with the Federal Reserve Board
(FRB) acting as the agency's fiscal representative—was originally
issued pursuant to the Defense Production Act of 1950, 2" and has
since been extended by Executive Order."' Like the advance pay-
ments technique, V-loan guarantees are issued only when they would
serve the interests of the national defense. That factor alone substan-
tially limits the effectiveness of the program so far as civil public
works are concerned. There is, however, a more serious problem:
according to the Armed Services Procurement Regulations, "Contract
surety bonds, and guaranteed loans for financing bonded contracts are
regarded as fundamentally incompatible unless the interests of the
surety are subordinated in favor of the guaranteed loan."282 Conse-
quently, "applications for loan guarantees are approved only if the
surety . . . will subordinate . . . ."' Voluntary subordination by a
surety is a rare event in most cases where guaranteed financing would
be useful 204 Thus, so far as the present inquiry is concerned, the "V"-
loan program too can be disregarded as a practical source of fi-
nancing.2"
257 "Since [the] inception [of the V-loan program] in 1950, approximately $3.7
billion in loan guarantees have been issued by guaranteeing agencies. Approximately $3.1
billion of that total was authorized during the period September 1950 through December
31, 1958." Letter from Tynan Smith, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, to the author, Oct. 13, 1972.
258 The Federal Reserve Board authorized no new guarantee agreements in 1969 and
in 1970. In 1971 one agreement for $85,000 was issued. See Board of Governors, Federal
Reserve System, 56 Ann. Rep. 319 (1969); 57 Ann. Rep. 207 (1970); 58 Ann. Rep. 235
(1971). In a letter to 12th District Member Banks, dated Sept. 4, 1970, the Federal Re-
serve Bank of San Francisco advised that the maximum guarantees available under Regula-
tion V would thereafter be $20,000.
255 32A C.F.R. ch. XV (1972).
200 Pub. L. No. 774, 64 Stat. 798 (1950).
207 Exec. Order No. 10480, 18 Fed. Reg. 4939 (1953). See generally Bachman, De-
fense Department Contract Financing, 25 Geo. Wash. L. Rev, 228, 235 (1957).
202 ASPR App. E-312.2, 4 Gov't Cont. Rep. II 35,645 (1972).
203 ASPR App. E-312.3, id. (emphasis added).
204 This paint is verified by the Survey of Commercial Lenders, see Appendix infra;
by personal interviews with financing bank lending officers; and by information gained
in the Rawlins Interview, supra note 233: "The subordination is in our—the SBA's—
favor less than 10% of the time. Usually we have to give everything up to the surety."
205 There is a further reason for this conclusion, but one which is entirely anecdotal
in nature. During the course of this research I investigated the bureaucratic ease of applying
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Of somewhat greater utility are the programs run directly by the
Small Business Administration (SBA). The financing available to
small business contractors through the SBA is of three general types:
Direct Basis lending, loan guarantees and a recently begun program
involving a revocable line of credit. Under Direct Basis lending the
SBA itself extends a loan to the applicant. These loans, intended pri-
marily for capital input and not for project costs, are limited in
amount to $100,000. The more significant limitation, however, is im-
posed by the funding of the SBA. In the view of one SBA financing
officer, the loan amounts available "take care of about one percent of
the eligible applicants." 26°
The other ninety-nine percent have to be satisfied with SBA loan
guarantees. The SBA will guarantee an extension of credit made by a
private commercial lender up to a maximum of $350,000. Such a figure
should certainly be sufficient to finance the start-up costs of most
projects within the capability of small businesses. The extent to which
this guarantee has been used, however, is somewhat disappointing.'"
The reasons for that are not entirely clear. Some possibilities may be
the limitations placed on the bank which has extended the loan. The
guarantee only goes to ninety percent of the loaned amount, leaving
the bank with a potential exposure of 10% of the total credit. The
bank is also limited in its interest charges to 8% %, an amount which
may be a bit low in times of short money. Furthermore, the bank is
required to "police" the loan proceeds in a manner agreed to by it and
the SBA 288
 Our survey indicates that policing can be an expensive
item for a bank which has not routinized its contractors' lending op-
eration.26° Finally, the bank is left with the task of negotiating with
the sureties on projects requiring bonds.
Recently the SBA has instituted a pilot program which, in its in-
ception, was specifically designed for contractors. 27° It differs from
the usual loan guarantee program in that the bank issues only a
for a guaranteed loan. Contact was first made with the Office of the Small Business
Specialist, Department of Defense, Contract Administration Office, in Los Angeles,
California. In response to my inquiry about guaranteed loans I was told by the "small
business specialist" with whom I spoke that he was unaware of any department of defense
guarantees, and that I should get in touch with the Small Business Administration. The
second contact was made by letter, addressed to the Los Angeles Regional Office, Depart-
ment of Defense Contract Administration Services. In a reply dated September 12, 1972,
in response to my request for information concerning guaranteed loans for defense con-
tractors, I was advised to write directly to the Assistant Secretary of Defense. ( I)
266 Rawlins Interview, supra note 233.
267 See the results in Appendix, Commercial Lenders' Questionnaire, Question 29,
infra.
268 Rawlins Interview, supra note 233.
260 See the results in Appendix, Commercial Lenders' Questionnaire, Question 25, infra.
270 The program is described in Small Business Administration, Office of Public
Information, Fact Sheet No. 4 (April 1972).
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revocable line of credit against an assigned contract, with a maximum
duration of eighteen months. The program was designed by the SBA
in conjunction with one of the larger banks in California, 271 and has
been in operation since the early Spring of 1971. While it may be too
early to assess the impact this program will have on the availability
of financing to small contractors, the early returns are not very prom-
ising. In its first fifteen months of operation, only 18 contractors have
been funded—twelve in San Francisco and six in Los Angeles. In the
opinion of the SBA financing officer in charge of the program, "the
problem was still with the sureties."272 Unless a surety is willing to
subordinate its claim to the contract payments, the lending bank is
exposed to 10% of the credit amount. More significantly perhaps, the
SBA is exposed to as much as 90%. Since the guarantee fee is only
of 1%, this exposure may be burdensome to the SBA for contractors
whose financial status prior to the loan would be less than solid. 273
The operations of the SBA, unlike those of the FRB on the V-.
loan program and of the contracting agencies on their advance pay-
ments techniques, could be fairly said to be of measurable benefit to
small business contractors. However, it too has its limitations, and is
by no means taking up all of the slack.'" We could therefore conclude
271
 Rawlins Interview, supra note 233.
272
 Id. In the Rawlins Interview it was understandably difficult to pin down the
exact meaning of this statement. The risk of exposure which the sureties' refusal to sub-
ordinate caused was disturbing to either the bank or the SBA or both. In any event, it has
had some effect in deterring the fullest exploitation of this pilot program. See also note
274 infra.
273 The Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631 et seq. (1970), provides that "[sill
loans made under this subsection shall be of such sound value or so secured as reasonably to
assure repayment." 15 U.S.C. § 636(0(7).
274
 The loan guarantee program, which is the only one large enough to serve the
demand for credit, has not been greeted with much enthusiasm by the private lenders from
whom the funds must first come. Two items in the Commercial Lenders' Questionnaire
(see Appendix infra) went to this point; the results are as follows:
Question 28A: If the bank has had experience with guaranteed loans ("Am-loans,
or SBA guarantees) to small contractors, was the bank in those cases more willing
to make loans for public works construction?
Bank's Credit
Commitment to
Contractors Yes No
No
Response
Under $500,000 2 4 10
$500,000-2 Million 0 1 5
$2-6 Million 0 2 2
Over $6 Million 0 2 4
— —
Total 2 9 21
Question 28B: [Re: answer to 28A] Could you explain briefly why or why not?
Of the two banks which had answered 28A "Yes," one responded to 28B: "Because
exposure under S.B.A. is reduced by 90%." Of the nine banks which had answered 28A
"No," three responded to 28B:
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that the financing available to small businesses from the public agen-
cies is not at a level sufficient to rule out inadequate access to financing
as a contributing cause of the imperfection of the public contracts
market.
C. Functions and Views of the Surety
The relative inadequacy of public financing for small business
contractors leaves intact the possibility that some of the lack of com-
petition in the public works market has been caused by the unwilling-
ness of commercial banks to fill the breach. This unwillingness, the
banks might claim, stems in part from their subordinate priority posi-
tion vis-à-vis the Miller Act bond sureties. The sureties argue that
their cooperation is essential for the protection of the Government's
interest in public works,'" and that only through their priority right
of subrogation can their contribution be maintained at an appropriate
level.'" Such a position invites a closer look.
The functions performed by sureties who bond public works are,
by the sureties' own claim, both numerous and important. Moreover,
the functions serve both federal policies heretofore articulated: pro-
tection of the Government's interest as a purchaser of contract services,
and assisting small business firms in the contracting industry. As to
the former policy, there are four primary functions.
First, the surety protects the Government against unqualified and
irresponsible bidders by "screening" bond applicants carefully.'" If
a) SBA lien position is in conflict with insurance companies when extending
bonds.
b) Any contractor needing government insurance or SBA is usually not reliable.
c) Usually due to size of loan requests—relating to our maximum lending limita-
tions. [Note—the total deposits of this bank were less than $50 million, and its
credit commitment to the contracting industry as a whole was $100,000.]
275
 Surety Ass'n of America, The Unseen Services of a Contract Bond Surety 3-4
(mimeographed, 1971).
275
 One who is far more cynical than I might suggest that for both industries the real
nub of the matter is profits. Even if that is so, there is still good reason to analyze the
competing claims. If either party reacts to profit perturbations in a way which inhibits
established economic policy goals, then the profit issue becomes important to the problem's
ultimate resolution.
277
 Surety Ass'n of America, supra note 275, at 4:
To the surety, a minimal number of defaults and an absence of owner-contractor
litigation suggests that the surety has been successful in screening out incompetent
contractors from the bidding process. To the extent inadequately financed or
incompetent contractors are allowed to bid, particularly in our "lowest bidder"
award system, the number and cost of defaults will increase.
Pre-qualification of the contractor is the first step in the surety process; it is
an extremely important one and must be performed by a politically disinterested
body. For this reason, the screening of potential bidders for government work is
done by private surety companies rather than by governmental bureaus or
municipal agencies. Politically appointed or politically oriented individuals would
often be placed under strong pressures in favor of certain contractors. Govern-
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a problem should nevertheless begin to arise, the surety (to protect
his own interest) will apply pressure and provide assistance to the
contractor, to prevent the difficulty from maturing into a default. "The
goal of a surety . . . is to avoid default on a bonded job. To the extent
that the surety is successful, the existence of the problem may never
become known to the bond obligee . . . . "278 Second, the existence of a
payment bond gives assurance of payment to subcontractors and sup-
pliers, and thereby reduces net costs (through lower prices) to the
Government 27° Third, the surety's bonds provide protection to the
laborers and materiahnen—a matter which, if left to the Government
to provide directly, would be "costly and difficult." 28° Finally, the
mental bureaus would lack the depth of experience available in the private com-
panies. Both consistency and objectivity are provided by the corporate surety.
It is difficult to bring pressure, political or otherwise, on an entity whose own
money is at risk and whose future survival depends on the results it achieves in
qualifying for bond only those contractors who can do the work.
See also Comptroller General of the United States, Report to Congress, Survey of the
Application of the Government's Policy on Self-Insurance 57 (No. B-168106, June 14, 1972)
[hereinafter cited as Comptroller General's Report]. The report states that the heads of all
surveyed federal agencies agreed that the requirement of Miller Act bonds be retained
because, inter alia, the sureties screen out marginal contractors.
In a letter to GAO dated October 5, 1971, the Postmaster General stated that
the bid and performance bonds guaranteed maintenance of a standard of service,
protected against losses caused by default of the contractor, and acted as a policing
device to eliminate excessively low bids by unqualified bidders. He said that the
bond exercised a discipline over contractors and bidders that would not otherwise
be possible without high administrative costs and possible deterioration in the
quality of service.
Comptroller General's Report, supra at 50.
278 Letter from Mr. Quentin W. Lerch, Secretary of the Surety Association of
America, to the author, Sept, 20, 1972, at 2. The Association of General Contractors ex-
pressed it somewhat differently: "The use of bid bonds and surety bonds prevents many
of the undesirable bidders and contractors from muddying the water of the construction
industry." Comptroller General's Report, supra note 277, at 59.
270
 Cushman, Brief on Behalf of the Surety Industry, in Hearings before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, Bonds of Contractors on Public Works, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 32
(1935) ; Cushman, The Surety's Right of Equitable Priority to Contract Balances in Rela-
tion to the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 Temp. L.Q. 239, 250 (1966).
280 Comptroller General's Report, supra note 277, at 57, citing statements of agency
heads. The same report indicates that for this protection the United States pays $23-28
million annually in passed-on bond premiums for the $5.2 billion of civil and defense
public works, or approximately 0.5%. Id. at 51.
The Government Accounting Office was unable to determine whether or not the
Government got a bargain or a bath for its $23-28 million:
We obtained actual costs of bonds on selected contracts awarded in fiscal
years 1970 and 1971 to derive a basis for estimating such costs overall. Data on
contractor defaults was obtained where available to determine if bonding require-
ments have conferred economic or other benefits on the Government. We could
not generally obtain accurate information on the extent of the economic benefits to
the Government, however, because in most cases of default the surety takes over
and completes the construction project using a different contractor, and the surety's
records are not ordinarily available for GAO inspection.
Id. at 52.
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surety can arrange financing or expertise to assist the contractor in
completing the job, again to the benefit of the Government."'
Of course, as a result of these four functions the second federal
policy is also promoted: "Surety bonds enable many small businessmen
to compete for government contracts even though they lack sufficient
financial resources of their own to complete the contract." 282
One must question, however, whether the level of any of these
services would be retarded if the surety were in some cases effectively
denied its right of salvage by being subordinated to financing banks,
so far as retained contract funds are concerned. It has been estimated,
for example, that approximately one-third of the sums paid out by
surety companies on their bonds is recovered through "salvage," 28a
including the sums acquired by subrogation. After recoupment through
salvage or otherwise, the net losses incurred by sureties are a sub-
stantial portion of the total premiums received. 2" On federal construc-
tion contracts this loss ratio was 53.8% for the period 1958-1967, and
49.5% for 1960-1970. 285 It compares unfavorably with the loss
281 Surety Ass'n of America, supra note 275, at 7; case histories, id. at Appendix
Group III (cases 110-51).
282 Haas, The Corporate Surety and Public Construction Bonds, 25 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 206, 207 (1957).
283 J. Backman, Surety Rate-Making 34-35 (1948).
284 Dykehouse, Construction Surety Bonds: Their Adequacy and Availability, Supple-
ment to Department of Housing and Urban Development, Report on the Availability of
Crime Insurance and Surety Bonds in Urban Areas 181 (1970):
SURETY Loss EXPERIENCE: CONTRACT BONDS
Premiums	 Losses	 Loss
Written	 Incurred	 Ratio
Federal Contract $205,371,000 $110,458,000 53.8%
Other Contract $1,358,911,000 556,931,000 41.0%
Total $1,564,282,000 $677,389,000 43.3%
SURETY Loss EXPERIENCE: ALL OTHER Born*
Premiums	 Losses	 Loss
Written	 Incurred	 Ratio
Statutory public bonds, court &
fidelity, guarantee, license & per-
mit, misc. bonds	 $780,028,000
	
$71,281,000	 9.1%
285 From the following unpublished data supplied to the author by the Surety Asso-
ciation of America:
CONTRACT BOND Loss RATIos
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Federal Const. 85.3 52.9 29.9 75.3 57.0 58.0 44.6 29.8 23.9 43.1 44.8
Other	 Const. 68.3 47.2 40.5 48.3 45.6 36.7 37.2 28.2 34.3 31.3 40.0
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ratio for non-Miller Act construction bonds (41.6% during 1960-
1970), and for all other bonding activities (9.1%)."" Thus, while
contractor's bonds represented 66370 of the total premiums written,
they accounted for 91% of all net losses incurred."' When expenses
are added in, the loss and expense ratio is 99.5% of premiums, leaving
a ten year annual underwriting profit average of 0.5% . 288
 Under these
circumstances it is reasonable to expect that subordinating the surety
will provoke some sort of a reaction.
Most commentators agree that if such a legal change were to oc-
cur, the bond premiums would be increased 289 (thus increasing net
costs to the United States), or marginal contractors would have a more
difficult time securing the statutorily required bonds, 20° or both."' As-
suming for the moment that these predictions are valid, i.e. that revers-
ing the surety's priority status will result in either increased costs and/
or in increased selectivity of bonded contractors by the surety com-
panies, it seems clear that both federal construction objectives might
be endangered. The case for the sureties would accordingly be a strong
one. There are, however, a few observations that should be made.
First, the fact of increased premiums is neither conclusive nor
determinative. If costs increase, they will probably do so across the
board."' Thus small contractors will not be at a competitive disad-
286
 See notes 284-85 supra.
287
 Dykehouse, supra note 284, at 71.
288
 Id. at 7$. This addition and subtraction is not, however, the whole picture; it
omits the sums earned by the surety companies on the collected premiums.
280
 See, e.g., Note, 41 Texas L. Rev. 735, 736-37 (1963) ; Note, 71. Yale L.J. 1274,
1278-79 (1962). The basis for this statement is a judicial opinion. See id. at 1279 n.27.
200
 Note, 71 Yale L.J. 1274, 1279 (1962); Cushman, supra note 279, at 253.
201
 Note, 9 N.Y.L.F. 226, 230 (1963). This note, and those cited in note 289 supra,
are commentaries on Pearlman, and all agree with its conclusions. Other pro-surety articles
include Brady, Bonds on Federal Government Construction Contracts: The Surety's View,
46 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 262 (1971) ; and Creyke, Jr., Recent Developments in the Right of
Sureties in Defaulted Federal Construction Contracts, 5 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 139
(1963).
202
 The Surety Association of America would probably agree: "The surety's lee is
essentially a flat rate 'service' charge which is related more to averting or controlling loss
than it is to paying the ultimate loss." Surety Ass'n of America, supra note 275, at 2
(emphasis added). Dykehouse, supra note 284, at 170, indicates that premiums are a func-
tion of contract price, not of assessed risk:
FOR PERFORMANCE OR PERFORMANCE PUSS PAYMENT BOND(S):
BASIC RATE TABLE
Where time for completion as stipulated in the contract Is not over 24 months or
731 calendar days:
Contract Price	 Rate Per M
First $100,000 
	 $10.00
Next 2,400,000 	 6.50
Next 2,500,000 	 5.25
Next 2,500,000    5.00
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vantage vis-a-vis large contractors so far as bidding price is concerned.
The increased cost, however, will be passed on to the Government.'
If that is the case, and if it can be shown that not changing the pro-
surety legal climate defeats competition by affecting the lending pol-
icies of commercial banks, then the issue becomes one of deciding
whether the increased costs are worth the benefits that would be ob-
tained by occasionally subordinating a surety. To answer that ques-
tion it is necessary to be able to quantify the value of promoting
competition and supporting small businesses, and to be able to com-
pute what the likely cost increases would be. Both would be extremely
difficult. For this reason the possibility of increased bonding costs is
not determinative. Neither, in my opinion, is it conclusive.
Two recent surveys, one conducted by David J. Dykehouse and
the other by this author suggest that a change in the law will in fact
have no effect on premium costs 204 Both studies show that presently
there is little rate variation geared to risk variation. Dykehouse at-
tributes this to the fact that the sureties have, traditionally not done
risk-cost-accounting in a very sophisticated way. The surety companies
provide a better explanation: the fee paid to the surety companies is a
service charge, not an insurance premium."' Sureties do not operate
on the basis of the Law of Large Numbers."" Whatever the explana-
tion may be, the conclusion is the same: the priority position of the
surety vis-a-vis a financing bank in all probability will not affect the
Miller Act bond rate structure.
More serious, however, is the possibility that the surety companies
may react to increased risk by denying bonds to the smaller (in terms
of net worth) contracting firms. Dykehouse's study sheds some in-
teresting light on this possibility. He discovered that surety companies
generally seek to establish long term relationships with contractors
Contract Price	 Rate Per M
Over 7,500,000  	 4.70
Minimum—$10.00
Maximum—$50,00 per M on the aggregate penalty of Performance and Payment Bonds.
Our own survey is in accord. Of the fifty contractors personally interviewed, none indi-
cated any cost variations. These fifty were of various sizes, from just over $50,000 in an-
nual gross receipts to over $5 million. They also uniformly agreed that they would be
bonded without any difficulty if their bonded work in progress did not exceed ten times
their net worth, but beyond that ratio bonding was extremely difficult. The surety com-
panies operating in the Los Angeles area have thus apparently translated "risk" into "net
worth," and react to risk by curtailing the total bond amounts, not by adjusting prices.
293 See note 280 supra.
294 Dykehouse, supra note 284, at 151.
292 Letter to the author, supra note 278, at 1.
266 For an explanation of how the Law of Large Numbers differs from the less pre-
cise Law of Averages, see W. Wallis & H. Roberts, Statistics: A New Approach 121-23
(1956).
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who can provide profitable (no loss risk) business, principally to re-
duce their underwriting costs.'" This tendency, coupled with. the
competitive pressures of the industry,'" "tend to make the surety
companies quite flexible in their approach, in terms of underwriting,
to established contractors and quite inflexible in their approach to the
prospects of emerging contractors." 2"
For this reason, among others, "[t] he ease of entry into contract-
ing from the trades or elsewhere is simply not on the same threshhold
as previously, and the trend is towards higher threshholds."a" Partially
because of their internal rate-determination processes as well, surety
companies presently have a limited ability to respond to the needs of
the low asset enterprise."'
Our own survey supported this view. Of those contractors re-
sponding whose annual gross revenues were $250,000 or less, fifty per-
cent considered the difficulty of securing the required bonds to be a
"determinative" or "important" reason for their not bidding on federal
projects. Thirty percent of the contractors between $250,000 and $1
million in gross revenues reported this reason as "marginally im-
portant," compared to only four percent of those in the $1-5 million
range. Contractors grossing over $5 million were unanimous in stating
that the difficulty in securing bonds was "irrelevant" to their deci-
sion."' Those firms which had tried to get bonds reported similar
results, with the relative ease of bonding again varying inversely with
the firm's financial size 803
This artifact of surety risk-response may presently (but un-
wittingly) be serving the interests of the larger firms, and supporting
their anti-competitive position. For example, one of the groups most
avidly supporting the continued requirement of statutory bonds in
the public construction industry is, according to a report of the Comp-
troller General,'" the Associated General Contractors of America. This
group consists of only 9,100 of the nearly 800,000 contractors in the
United States. These 9,100, however, do 80% of all the construction
207 Dykehouse, supra note 284, at 43-44,
298 84% of all contract bonds were written by the top twenty surety companies; 56%
by the top ten; and 30% by the top five. Id. at 41.
209 Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
800 Id. at 86.
801 Cl. id. at 151.
892 See Contractors' Questionnaire, Question 5B (f), in Appendix infra.
sos See id., Question 7. To establish some level of validity on this point, we cross-
tabulated question 7B with question 5B (f). The results, shown in Appendix, infra, at
page 1039, demonstrate a high correlation., From such consistency of response we can infer
a good degree of accuracy in the reporting of these cross-checked questions.
804 Comptroller General's Report, supra note 277.
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work annually. 05
 Their reason for this support is a simple one:
‘`. . . surety companies perform [the function of] eliminating marginal
contractors."'"
The word "marginal" can mean either "small" in terms of capital,
or "shoddy" in terms of practices and quality of work. Eliminating the
latter is of course a worthwhile function. However, deterring the former
is not. Furthermore, there is no necessary relation between the two.
The present study yielded some interesting results here. "Marginal"
contractors in the financial sense were having bonding difficulties, rela-
tive to the larger firms."' However, contractors "marginal" in the
quality sense were nevertheless participating in the bidding process!'"
This description of the current bonding situation supports the
argument that a change in the bank-surety priority law will not have
any serious effect on the sureties' relationship with financially small
contractors. The hypothesized barriers to entry already exist; the rea-
sons for their existence do not lead to the conclusion that this particular
barrier will be raised in an entirely salutory way. It is at least as likely
that subordinating the surety will cause it to look more closely at
quality marginality than it is currently doing. In short, it is clear that
surety companies on the whole are performing important and valuable
services for the government contracts market. It is not clear that these
services will be inhibited in any substantial way by some changes in
the laws of equitable priority, especially if those changes are made in
consideration of the sureties' legitimate functions. However the sureties
react to such changes, they will still issue bonds to public works con-
tractors. Thus, the functions of lowering suppliers' costs,'" and of
protecting laborers and materialmen, will not be hampered. It is fair
to conclude, I believe, that the other functions will not be hampered
either.
808 Construction Methods & Equipment 17 (Aug. 1972).
8°6 Id. See also Engineering News Record 64 (Aug. 3, 1972) ; Comptroller General's
Report, supra note 277, at 59, reporting the views of the Association: "The use of bid
bonds and surety bonds prevents many of the undesirable bidders and contractors from
muddying the water of the construction industry."
807 See Contractors' Questionnaire, Question 7, in Appendix, infra.
8°8 See Comments on Contractors' Questionnaire, in Appendix, infra. This is in part
due to the fact that there is no statute forbidding "bid shopping" on federal projects, as
there is on state and municipal public works. See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code 63i 4100-08 (1972
Supp). These comments indicated the presence of "corner cutters" as well.
80° See text at note 279 supra. This function is itself subject to some question. To my
knowledge it has not been empirically verified. In fact, the leading pro-surety theoretician
himself failed to support the claim adequately. Cushman, supra note 279, at 250 n.43,
cited as authority for his claim, in 1966, that the existence of sureties reduces suppliers'
prices, three judicial decisions, the latest of which had been written fifty-two years earlier.
Aside from illustrating a patent flaw in traditional legal writing in general, it demonstrates
the weakness of the factual matter asserted.
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D. Dilemmas and Views of the Commercial Bank
From the point of view of the surety's legitimate functions, and
of their relation to the twin goals of federal contracting policy, it is
most probable that little of value would be lost if the pro-surety trend
of the law were to be partially reversed. The other side of the coin is,
what might be gained by such a reversal.
It is known that contractors in general have a need for outside
financing to enable them to begin substantial public works projects 310
It is also known that access to financing from the public sector is in-
adequate to meet this need."' It is therefore reasonable to conclude
that absent the assistance of private commercial lenders, contractors—
especially small business contractors—would face an unnecessary bar-
rier to entry into the public works market. If it were to exist, such a
barrier would be inimical to both policy goals—that of furthering the
growth of small businesses, and that of providing a broadly competitive
market for the United States as a purchaser of contractors' services.
The inquiry, then, must turn to the matter of commercial lending, and
to the question of whether the pro-surety priority decisions have in any
way inhibited the processes of private commercial finance.
As prospects for enabling loans, members of the contracting in-
dustry as a whole present a relatively unappealing picture. The fixed
price bidding system, coupled with the competition for business faced
by small firms, has required large segments of the industry to operate
on "extremely slender margins.7812 Profits as a function of net worth
typically vary from 7.14 to 12.39%; as a function of gross revenues,
they range from 1.14 to only 1.5%818 It is therefore not surprising that
the contracting industry has severe bankruptcy problems; it annually
accounts for ten percent of all business bankruptcies,' usually leav-
810 See notes 12, 240 and 249 supra, and text at notes 249-50 supra. The reasons for
business failures also demonstrate contractors' needs for working capital. Among all of the
various reasons for such failures is "heavy operating expenses." This cause was cited as
the reason for failure by 26.4% of all contracting firms, versus only 14.2% of all other
businesses.
The need for financing exists in both the private and public works markets. Referring
primarily to the former, Professor Hayes observed that "because the land development and
construction process is lengthy, substantial capital is required to carry work in process; as
a result, contractors usually require large borrowings in relation to their equity." D. Hayes,
Bank Lending Policies, Domestic and International 164 (1971). Professor Hayes' work is
the result of an empirical study of commercial banks' lending policies conducted by the
University of Michigan Bureau of Business Research.
311 Discussed supra, section III B.
312 Dykehouse, supra note 284, at 238.
313 Id. at 236.
814 See note 250 supra. The industry's recognition of this phenomenon and its
concern with it, is evidenced by thelf exultation over a 17% diminution in the fatality
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ing no assets to compensate the creditors who have supported it 813
Furthermore, because of the large dollar size of some projects
the gross revenue to working capital ratios of many contractors is rela-
tively high ale
 Such "overtrading" represents a "vulnerable condition
for creditors."317
In terms of security available to the lender, slightly more often
than not the public works contractor has little to offer but his rights
to payment from the job in progress.218 The contractor's equipment is
often already encumbered with purchase-money security interests,'
and his available cash is (compared to the typical loan credit) normally
quite small.' Thus contractors, not the best of risks in any event,
have little to encourage the participation of private lenders. The
surety's prior claim on what is often the only otherwise viable collateral
further dims the picture. Given the bank's legal position vis-à-vis
the surety, ". . the prudent lender . . . should begin by looking at the
credit as an unsecured one . . . .""t That, at least, is the crux of the
bankers' argument. Such an attitude on the part of the lender is, for
the small contractor especially, often fatal to the loan application. Un-
secured credit is normally restricted to high (financial) quality com-
panies.822 A small business in an industry as financially questionable
rate. See, e.g., Contractor Failures Drop 17% Below 1971's Mid-Year Mark, Engineering
News Record 43 (Aug. 24, 1972).
818 In bankruptcy generally "only 13% of the 	 cases are 'asset' cases in which
there is something for creditors." Countryman, The Bankruptcy Boom, 77 Ham. L. Rev.
1452, 1453 (1964). Countryman's figures Include, however, both business and personal
bankruptcies.
818 See note 12 supra.
017 Id.
818 In the Commercial Lenders' Questionnaire, in Appendix, infra, we asked the
banks to rate certain types of collateral in the order of availability. The results are as
follows:
1st 2d 3d 4th 5th
a. Capital assets
b. Lien or mortgage
in the project
8
17
10
5
7
4
3
1
2
2
c. Contract rights 5 15 8 1 —
(Progress payments
and retainages)
d.	 & e, (Other) — 2 6 4 1
Item "b" is not relevant to public works projects. Often, small contractors lease their
capital assets such as heavy equipment.
819 Hayes, supra note 310, at 165.
820 As to what bankers refer to as "compensating balances," Professor Hayes found
that normally only 15% of the individual credit commitment was covered by collected
balances for all commercial loans. Id. at 94-95. My own information indicates that, as a
nationwide figure, 15% is probably Iow.
821 Robert Morris Associates, Bank-Surety Relationships: An Impasse?, at 18 (RMA
Occasional Paper 1971) (emphasis added).
822 giannsecured loans are usually made to high quality companies where the senior
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as contracting is often unlikely to qualify as a "high quality" firm.
Loans such as these are:
sometimes classified in a high-risk category, since adequate
collateral is difficult to obtain because the performance bond-
ing company usually has a prior ',lien on the receivables, and
often the equipment is not entirely free of debt incurred on
purchase. Therefore unsecured loans may be the only prac-
tical expedient. Because the credit experience with many con-
tractors has been unfavorable, screening and servicing policies
are usually rigorous."'
These difficulties, inherent in the picture presented by contractors
to the commercial banking industry, are in themselves serious. They
become even more so when seen in the light of bank lending policies
in general. As not-most-favored prospects, contractors are particularly
vulnerable to overall changes in the commercial lending environment.
For example, affirmative "selling" of loans is now going on at a level
below that of previous decades, resulting in a trend toward "critical
evaluation of certain types of loans: . . .”824 For another, the im-
portance of loan quality increases as the bank's loan to deposit ratio
increasesm (as well as with fluctuations in the bank's cost of money).
With that ratio now near sixty percent nationwide,"" loan quality has
become extremely important.
position of a general creditor is clearly adequate, while secured loans are often extended
to marginal credits . . .." Hayes, supra note 310, at 128-29.
823
 Id. at 165 (emphasis added). Of the 62 banks responding to our own survey, 27
(or roughly 43.5%) reported that they make no loans to contractors. Thirteen of the
twenty-seven explained their policy. Seven of the thirteen responses were from banks in
suburban areas who had no contractors among their clientele. The other six explanations
are quite interesting:
(1) "This is a highly skilled, specialized field of lending and entails substantial
risk. Therefore, we do not make this type of loan."
(2) "We have a well diversified clientele, including some small contractors, but
our experience with them has made us extremely cautious."
(3) "No loans (to contractors) as a matter of policy."
(4) "Banks furnishing the money have no protection of lien losses. High risk
loans, Contractors have poor accounting practices." [Note: the accounting prac-
tices referred to vary from the normal methods. Because of the length of time
most projects require, contractors work on a "percentage completion" accounting
system.]
(5) "Requires specialist—not equipped."
(6) "No comment."
One other response was, "We do not have any contractors in our trade area; last one
liquidated two years ago."
824 Hayes, supra note 310, at 41.
820
 Gee, Constructive Lending in Constrictive Times, 53 J. Com . Bank Lending 9,
10-11 (Mar. 1971).
828
 See, e.g., Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Functional Cost Analysis Pro-
gram—Statistical Summary and Chart Book of Data Reported by 98 Ninth District
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"	 While bank'i reserve for bad loans ("charge-offs") are typically
rather small, and actual charge-offs even smaller,"" the contributions
made by contractors to these losses have been outstanding."' Thus
again, any contraction in general lending will be magnified for the
contracting industry. But of even greater importance. is the fact that
all of -these difficulties will tend to magnify the adverse effect a "bad"
legal position can have. Subordinating the bank to a secondary priority
in the only collateral that may be available, on a loan made to a small
firm in a high-risk industry, cannot help but constrict the availability
of credit much more than if the firm and the industry did not suffer
from such severe infelicities.
All of this, and more,"" tends to support the conclusion that the
Member Banks, at Al (1971): The district average of loans to "assets" was 55.18%.
Funds available for loans were 97.65% of "assets," thus loans outstanding were nearly
58% of total available funds.
327 See, e.g., Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1971 Operating Ratios of Second
District Member Banks; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Member Bank Operating
Ratios-1970. Provisions for Ioan losses average at approximately 1.5% of total assets;
charge-offs in 1970 and 1971 in these representative districts were consistently below
an average of 0.29%, and ranged from 0.48% to as low as 0.09%. In both reports, see
lines 26 and 40.
328 Robert Morris Associates annually surveys its members to gather their charge-off
experience. The following data are taken from these surveys, reported for 1970 in 54
J. Com. Bank Lending 34, 36 (Sept. 1971), and for 1969 in 53 J. Corn. Bank Lending
34, 36 (Sept. 1970):
LOANS TO CONTRACTORS CHARGED OFF COMPARED TO TOTAL Loam CHARGED Orr
Percent of
	
Percent of
Total Number	 Total Amount
Bank's Loan Size	 Charged Off
	
Charged Off
(in millions)	 Low	 Median	 High	 Low Median	 High
Under $100M
	
0	 0	 66.7	 0	 0	 96.5
1969	 $I00-500M	 0	 8.0	 20.0	 0	 6.8	 86.5
Over $500M	 5.0	 7.2	 13.7	 3.8	 8.5	 15.3
Under $100M	 0	 0	 37.5	 0	 0	 56.2
1970	 $100-500M	 0	 6.6	 14.8	 0	 7.0	 36.0
Over $500M	 1.0	 7.6	 13.4	 1.6	 6.1	 14.4
While bankers are thus aware of the costs involved in making loans to contractors, they
are generally not aware of the gains they make. In the course of the present survey we
contacted each of the twelve Federal Reserve District Banks, inquiring as to gains and
losses reported by type of loan. Each of the districts responded, and all reported that no
figures for losses and gains by loan type or "industry" were available. See letters in the
author's files. The same answer was received from the Robert Morris Associates (a com-
mercial bankers' organization), and from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Even
apart from these regulatory agencies, very few banks themselves have any idea about
their returns from even "construction" loans. As evidence of this fact, see the concern
reflected by the authors of the following two articles: Schulkin, Construction Lending
REITS are Giving Banks a Run for their Money, 53 J. Com . Bank Lending 23, 26 (June
1971) ; Solomon, The Determination of Yields on Real Estate Construction Loans, 52
J. Com. Bank Lending 5 (Oct. 1969).
328 Monitoring loan proceeds in the case of contractors is also more difficult (hence,
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banks' lower status in the bank-surety priority disputes is having, and
will continue to have, an inhibitory effect on the financing of small
business contractors. A very few banks have responded to this diffi-
culty affirmatively."° An attitude of extreme caution, however, is more
common:
A favorite sport of the live-it-up loan officer is to lend against
the assignment of contract receivables or contract retainages
on uncompleted jobs as if they were money in the bank. There
is no surer way to court disaster. And to have any feeling that
the loan should be good because the contract is "bonded" is
sheer absurdity unless, as is rarely the case, a special bond
has been written for the protection of the bank.'
On the face of things the conclusion that Henningsen, Prairie
State, and Pearlman have inhibited the willingness of private com-
mercial banks to lend to small business contractors appears to be
justified. In so doing, those decisions have unknowingly interfered
with established and clearly identifiable matters of federal policy.
Thus far, however, this conclusion is based on a synthesis of data
and assertions not all of which were collected for the sole purpose of
inquiring into the instant problem. In the interests of making such
an inquiry, and to confirm or refute the above conclusions, the author
has conducted a Miller Act survey, the results of which are reported
in the following section.
IV. AN
 EMPIRICAL SURVEY
A. Hypotheses and Methods
The hypothesis which was developed by the preceding analyses
is that the priority position of Miller Act bond sureties has inhibited
the availability of financing to small business public works contractors.
The validity of this hypothesis as a place to begin had been prima
facie established by traditional research into both publicm and pri-
expensive) than for other types of loans. See, e.g., Cerny, Construction Industry Finances
—Musical Chairs with Money, 52 J. Com. Bank Lending 29, 34 (Jhn. 1970): "There
is no orderly way in which the cash flow on a project may be monitored."
830
 The United California Bank, e.g., has inaugurated a Specialty Contractors Financ-
ing Program, described in Bristow, Specialty Contractors Financing Program, 52 J. Corn.
Bank Lending 28 (June 1970). The design is complicated, and its start-up costs are
relatively high. It requires an expertise not always within the purchasing power of
smaller banks. Its current feasibility for these smaller institutions is probabilistic, al-
though further experience may tend to lower its initial costs, and although it should be
economically feasible for all but the very smallest of banking institutions. In any event,
it is not a panacea for the bank-surety problem, absent judicial recognition of the equi-
table position it establishes for the bank.
881
 Gee, supra note 325, at 17-18.
882
 See, e.g., ASPR App. E-312 to 312.4, 4 Gov't Cont. Rep. ¶ 35,645 (1972), demon-
strafing government procurement officers' reactions, discussed in text at note 262 supra.
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vate"a lending operations. Correspondence with private lenders pro-
duced, for example, statements such as this:
In answer to your specific question, first "Does the current
legal trend in fact inhibit commercial lenders from undertak-
ing the financial support of marginal contractors?", the an-
swer is definitely yes! ... Mil my own opinion a large
proportion of small contractors are precluded from participat-
ing in U.S. government projects due to a lack of financing!'"
To verify such assertions a "pre-test" of bankers was conducted
in the late spring of 1972. Twenty-one banks in Ohio responded to
the questionnaire with ten reporting by letter that they had no credit
commitments to contractors.'" One additional letter added, "[T]his
institution is not in the business of making loans to contractors for
government or similar type projects."' Of the remaining ten banks,
five responded on the questionnaire that the entire credit commitment
was devoted to private projects. Two of these five indicated that their
policy was dictated, at least in part, by the difficulty of attaining a
secure position in progress payments and retainages: Of the five banks
which were extending some loans for public projects, only one re-
sponded "no" to the question of whether their lending restrictions
would be eased if the bank's claim to these funds were to be by law
prior to that of the surety. Two made no response to this question,
and two answered "yes." Thus, four of the ten banks which were in
the business of loaning to contractors (40%) supported the initial
hypothesis; only one refuted it.
Although the results of this pre-test could not be considered con-
clusive, it did establish the general validity of both the hypothesis that
bank lending was being inhibited by the pro-surety legal climate, and
888 The concern of the commercial banking industry is demonstrated by the ac-
tivities of the Robert Morris Associates. See, e.g., Robert Morris Associates, Bank-Surety
Relationships: An Impasse? (RMA Occasional Paper 1971), a paper designed to explore
the legal aspects of the problem, and to appraise RMA member banks of the substantial
risks involved.
RMA established a "Committee on Cooperation with the Surety Industry," see 50
J. Com. Bank Lending '4 (Jan. 1968). The efforts of the committee to reach some ac-
commodation with the representatives of the surety industry failed, principally because of
the sureties' solid legal position. Consequently, the RMA group was restyled "Com-
mittee for Cooperation with the Construction Industry."
884 Letter from Mr. Frank Bristow, Vice President, Construction Industries Division,
United California Bank, to the author, April 28, 1972, at 1. Mr. Bristow had originally
been contacted as a me ber of the RMA Committee, supra note 333, and has since
provided additional assist nce to the research here reported.
835 Letters are in e author's files at the University of Southern California Law
Center.
838 Id.
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of the interview/mail-survey method of investigating that hypothesis!"
On the basis of this initial experience a second questionnaire was pre-
pared, and was distributed nationally to a random sample of commer-
cial banks. In an attempt to attain a higher validity level than this
second bankers' survey alone could provide, the research was "tri-
angulated" by conducting both survey sampling and in-depth inter-
viewing of contractors in Los Angeles and San Francisco. These later
surveys were run in the fall and winter of 1972. The point of all of
these methods was the same: to detect what, if any, effect the surety-
bank priority decisions were having on the financing of public works
contractors.
If such an effect were to appear, it would be proper to conclude
that these same decisions were interfering with the federal policy goal
of encouraging small business firms to participate in government pro-
curement and public works. The minor premise, of course, is that
financing is often a prerequisite to participation in that market. That
point had been established by the prior research,838
 and by some inci-
dental results of the present survey.'" Thus if financing was either
unavailable, or more difficult in terms of cost,'" the existence of the
unwanted interference could be established.
837 Of much greater concern was the response rate. These twenty-one responses were
received from seventy-seven mailed inquiries, for a rate of less than 28%.
838 See note 250 supra.
880 Reported in text at notes 249 and 310 supra.
84° The cost factor is particularly significant in fixed-price bid projects, where a con-
tractor with higher costs of capital is at a competitive disadvantage. In this respect the
impact of loan costs on federal projects should not vary significantly from the following
data derived from private projects:
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES OF THE IMPACT OP THE CONSTRUCTION LOAN
CHARGES ON CONSTRUCTION COSTS*
Effective
Construction	 The
Loan Cost to	 Construction	 Impact on
the Builder	 Loan Cost as	 Column (4)
(As a	 a Percentage	 of a One
	
Time	 Percentage	 of Total
	 Percentage
Construction	 of Borrowed	 Construction	 Point Change
Type of	 Loan is	 Funds)	 Costs	 in Column (3)
Construction	 Outstanding	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)(1)	 ( 2 )	 Percent	 Percent	 Percent
Single-family
borne 3 months 15 1.500 0,100
Apartment
building 1 year 15 6.000 0.400
Office
building 2 years 15 12.000 0.800
* Major assumptions:
1) That the average balance of the construction loan during the period it is out-
standing is one-half the lace amount.
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The survey instruments employed in the study are reproduced in
full in the Appendix."'
Fifty contractors in the Los Angeles area were personally inter-
viewed, out of a total sample attempted of less than sixty. Ten of the
fifty had been chosen on the basis of federal records as being among
"repeat bidders"—contractors who did a substantial amount of the
local federal public projects work. The other forty were selected on
the basis of personal contacts, referrals from previous interviewees,
and some random calls. Data obtained from these fifty personal inter-
views were recorded on the same instruments as were used in the mail
survey, except for additional remarks not solicited by that form.
Three hundred and twenty-seven contractors in the San Francisco
area were surveyed by mail. Their names were chosen at random from
telephone directories, but within certain numerical constraints: an at-
tempt was made to have each of the subtrades represented in the
sample, in a proportion close to that which each represented in the
contracting industry as a whole. One hundred and four (31.8%) re-
sponded; an appropriate distribution of the subtrades was, by and
large, achieved."'
Our sample did not, however, accurately reflect the real distribu-
tion of firms by size. A disproportionately small number of responses
2) That the face amount of the construction loan is equal to 80 percent of all con-
struction costs, including land.
Schulkin, Construction Lending at Large Commercial Banks, New England Economic
Review 2 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, July/Aug. 1970).
841
 See pages 1031-48 infra.
892 Our sample of responding contractors included the following:
Classification of Business:
Inter-
view
Question-
naire
Public
Works Total
General Building Contractor 	 19 26 7 52
Heavy Construction Contractor:
Highway 	 1 7 0 8
Non-Highway 	 2 12 0 14
Specialty Contractor:	 t .
Electrical Work 	 2 9 0 11
Plumbing, Heating,
Air Conditioning 	 5 6 1 12
Painting, Paper Hanging, Decorating 	 1 9 2 12
Masonry, Stonework, Plastering 	 3 3 o 6
Carpentering 	 0 4 0 4
Concrete Work 	 2 3 0 5
Roofing & Sheet Metal Work 	 2 10 0 12
Structural Steel Erection 	 0 2 0 2
Other 	 2 10 0 12
Subdividers, Developers,
Operative Builders 	 0 3 0 3
Totals 39 104 10 153
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Interview Questionnaire
Public
Works Total
0 0 0 0
0 2 0 2
0 2 0 2
2 18 2 22
5 21 3 29
21 22 4 47
10 16 1 27
— —
_ —
38 81 10 129
a. Under $ 10,000
b. $ 10,000-$ 24,999
c. $ 25,000-$ 49,999
d. $ 50,000-$249,999
e. $250,000-$999,999
f. $1 million-$5 million
g. Over $5 million
Totals
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were received from the smaller firms. 848
 Furthermore, our fifty personal
interviews were among, generally, even larger firms than were the mail
questionnaires. However, neither of these perturbations in what might
have been the ideal distribution by size of firm are significant: in scor-
ing and interpreting the results all of the responses were stratified by
size of firm. Thus the only effect of the deviation was to have higher or
lower numbers of responses than we might have expected in the various
stratifications.
A further concern was that the method of selecting the firms to be
personally interviewed—being for the most part non-random—would
skew the results obtained. This fear turned out to be insignificant when
the results of the questionnaire sample were compared to the results
of the interview sample. The interviewed subjects were generally
larger firms, which again is irrelevant for the reason first noted; how-
The distribution in the industry as a whole is:
% of	 Receipts
# of	 Total	 (thousands
Industry Group	 Estab.	 Firms	 of $)	 Receipts
Construction Ind.
Totals 794,838 100% 101,735,392 100%
General Building
Contractors 156,400 20% 35,457,912 35%
Heavy Const,
Contractors 42,839 5% 24,648,649 24%
Special Trade
Contractors 563,028 71% 34,830,297 34%
Subdividers,
Developers &
Operative
Builders 32,541 4% 6,796,208 7%
Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Summary Statistics for Establishments With
and Without Payroll, for Industry Groups and Industries 1A-2, A-i (1967).
843 Our sample, stratified into gross revenue ranges, was as follows:
Figures for the industry as a whole are reprinted in text at note 247 supra.
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ever, they had roughly the same level of participation in federal works
projects.'"
The Commercial Lenders' Questionnaire was sent to 400 commer-
cial banks throughout the United States."' Concentration in the larger
commercial cities was attempted,' but within each locality the selec-
tion was random. The form was eight pages in length, and comprised
thirty-five questions and subquestions. Such bulk was the least that
could be used to obtain sufficient data, but was still too much to obtain
a high response rate. In fact, only sixty-three (16%) banks responded:
eleven did so by letter, and fifty-two (13% of the total) completed the
questionnaire entirely or in (usable) part. A low response rate was
predictable from the earlier pre-test."' The decision was made, how-
ever, not to risk contaminating the data by sending a covering letter
explaining that the research might be of significance to the bank."
The distribution of those banks completing the form, by size and
locality, was:
SIZE (POPULATION) OF METROPOLITAN Aim nr Wm= THE BANK IS LOCATED
Under	 50,000 	 16
50,000-	 100,000 
	 8
100,000- 300,000 	 4
300,000- 600,000 	 5
600,000-1,000,000 	 7
1,000,000-3,000,000 	 5
Over 3,000,000 	 7
844
 The obvious exceptions to this are the ten "repeaters." The following were the
responses to the question, "Have you bid on any federal construction contracts in the
past two years?"
Interview Questionnaire Public Works Total
Yes 23 46 10 79
No 14 20 0 34
Totals 37 66 10 113
846
 In all, 500 questionnaires were distributed. Through an error in the selection and
addressing processes, approximately 100 of the questionnaires were not counted: some
were addressed to "Edge Act" banks which do no domestic commercial finance (12
C.F.R. 211,1-.51 (1972)); a few others to branch agents of foreign banks; and the
balance of the 100 to suburban branches of banks whose commercial departments had
also been surveyed.
846 The distribution of mailed questionnaires was:
California 	
 100
New York City 	
 50
New York (other
than N.Y.C.) 	
 50
Bostin area 	  50
Massachusetts
(other than
Boston area)	 50
Tampa 	
Miami 	
Jacksonville 	
Florida (other than
Tampa, Miami,
and
Jacksonville) 	
Chicago 	
12 Illinois (other than
12	 Chicago)  	 25
12 Detroit  	 50
New Jersey  	 9
One each to
forty-one other
14	 states  	 41
25	 Total:
	 500
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TOTAL DEPOSITS Or ME BANK
Under $50 million 	 29
$ 50- 100million 	 11
$100- 200million 	 2
$200- 500 million 	 7
$500-1000 million 	 0
Over	 $1 billion 	 3
B. Responses and Interpretations
The results of the contractors' survey generally support the stated
hypothesis, although at a level of persuasiveness below what was orig-
inally anticipated.
First, it was confirmed that small contractors participate less
frequently in federal public works projects than do larger contractors.
Of all reporting firms, 41% derived no part of their gross revenues
from federal public works projects. Stratifying by firm size, the data
shows that of the contractors earning less than $250,000 annually
59% did no federal work; for those in the $250,000 to $1 million range
the figure was 48%; from $1 to 5 million, 34%; and of the largest
contracting firms, only 27% had no revenues from federal projects."'
Of equal importance is the frequency of bidding, as compared to
the figures above which represent actual earned receipts. Of the small-
est contractors, 63% had not bid on federal contracts at all in the two
years immediately preceding this survey while only 19% of the largest
firms had not done any bidding. The overall average was 36% not
bidding!"
On the question of the ease of procuring financing, the results of
the survey are as follows:a"
Gross	 Under $2501(	 $250K-1M	 $1-5M	 Over SM
Receipts Easy	 Diff.	 Easy	 Diff.	 Easy	 Diff.	 Easy	 Diff.
Private Proj. 71% 29% 71% 29% 90% 10% 90% 10%
Federal Proj. 60% 40% 73% 27% 86% 14% 87% 13%
841 See note 337 supra.
848 Two letters we received are instructive; one responding party indicated that a
complete answer to the questionnaire would take substantial effort, and there would be
little of value to the bank in doing it. The other respondent indicated that the question-
naire would be completed if we would explain bow the study would operate to their ad-
vantage. Obviously, we did not respond.
849 See Contractors' Questionnaire, Question 4, in Appendix infra. A similar computa-
tion, showing that proportion of reporting contractors whose gross revenues were from
67% to 100% derived from private contracts, supports this result. The ratios here arc: all
contractors, 60%; under $250,000, 78%; $250,000-$1 million, 70%; $1-5 million, 64%;
and over $5 million, 27%.
880 See Contractors' Questionnaire, Question Sa, in Appendix infra.
861 Id. at Question 6.
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Thus the ease of procuring financing increases with the size of the
firm. That alone proves nothing remarkable. But what is important
here is that for three of the four groups, financing is easier for private
projects than for federal projects, and further that this divergence is
greatest for the smaller firms. Since banks are on occasion the bene-
ficiaries of construction bonds in private projects,'" but are never the
beneficiaries in cases of federal public works, it is possible to explain
this divergence by the existence of the pro-surety legal environment.
Another effect one would expect to see as a result of the bankers'
occasional advantage in private projects is that some individual con-
tractors would have greater difficulty financing federal work than pri-
vate. In addition one would expect that this difficulty would be more
prevalent among the smaller firms. That, in fact, is what the data
shows:
DIFFICULTY FOR A GIVEN FIRM IN SECURING FINANCING WHILE WORKINO
ON FEDERAL CONTRACTS, AS COMPARED TO PRIVATE JOBS
Annual Gross
Revenues $0-250K $250K-1M $1M-5M
Over
$5M All
Federal more difficult
than private 3 2 4 — 9
Private more difficult
than federal 1 1 1 1 4
Private and federal equal 5 10 20 14 49
Total 9 13 25 15 62
Because the numbers within each size group are so small,'" stat-
ing these initially in percentage terms could be misleading. But sample
size aside, the results tend to support the hypothesis. For the smallest
firms, 33% found it more difficult to finance federal projects than
832
 The frequency of bonding contractors on private projects, and of having the
bond run not to the owner but to the bank, is as follows:
Usually Asked
For Bonds
Occasionally
Asked For
Bonds
Rarely Asked
For Bonds
Large Volume
Banks 2 3 3
Intermediate
Volume Banks 7 5 2
Small Volume
Banks 11 5 6
P. Schulkin, Commercial Bank Construction Lending, Research Rep. No. 47 to the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston 72, Table 8 (1970).
Bela These are the contractors who have participated in financing both private and
federal projects.
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private. The percentage drops to 16% for middle-sized firms, and to
0% for the largest. These results are nearly exactly what would have
been predicted. Furthermore, it is reasonable to suggest that the dif-
ferences would be greater had the data included all the responding
firms, rather than primarily only those who bad actually participated
in financing on both types of projects.'"
Although the "population" of this survey is decidedly not high
enough to "prove" my conclusions,"" I would like to point out two
things in defense of the conclusions. First, more contractors found
"federal more difficult than private" to be the case than vice versa in
each of the first three groups. If the effect were indeed random, one
would not expect to see this consistency. Second, the effect demon-
strated declines from the smallest firms to the largest. This too was
predicted by the original hypothesis, and militates against the pos-
sibility that these results are the product of chance. These two points
may not enhance the credibility of the magnitude of the expected
effect, but they do support its existence. Thus although generally not
conclusive, the above data does tend to show that financing is less
readily available to contractors working on public projects than to
those working on private projects; and further, that this differential in
the ease of procuring the necessary financing is greater for small firms
(who most need financing) than for large.
The next step, which was an attempt to link the fact of difficulty
in financing with the fact of nonparticipation by small contractors,
was impeded by the appearance of suppressor variables"' at unpre-
dicted intensities."' Nevertheless, the fact is that contractors have a
more difficult time being financed for federal works than for private.
And financing is very often necessary for a small business firm to
undertake federal works.'" Therefore, difficulties in obtaining the
necessary financing logically should tend to cause a lower level of
participation by smaller firms than might otherwise be the case. This
is not to say that this factor explains all of the non-participation;
854 The data does not include all of the contractors surveyed who, for reasons of
difficulty in finance, may have never obtained a federal project for which actual cash was
needed.
855 The relatively low size of this sample is the result of the "masking" effects dis-
cussed in text at note 373 infra. Sample size, population, is vital in social science research
primarily because within large groups random or chance variations tend to be minimized.
In small groups, this possibility of random effects makes the data less reliable. That is, the
probability that the results observed are due to the variable being tested, rather than to
mere chance, is lower in a small sample than in a larger one. Certainly the data printed
above can be criticized from this point of view.
850 "A suppressor variable is one which weakens a relationship, which conceals its
true strength." M. Rosenberg, The Logic of Survey Analysis 85 (1968).
857 These factors are discussed in text at notes 373-75 infra.
as See discussion in text at notes 249-50, 310 supra.
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rather, it may be one among several causes. Nevertheless, it is a
cause; and one which could be removed at virtually no cost.
There is a second relationship being asserted here which the
contractors' survey also does not "establish." 88' That is that the dis-
suasion of commercial lenders from financing public works contractors
is the result of the legal status of bank-surety priorities. These data
tend to show the validity of this causal link, however, by demonstrating
the existence of a differential lending policy between private and fed-
eral works. Since the bonding practices are different, the bank-surety
relationship is, at a minimum, a probable cause."' It may perhaps
be enough that it is a cause, if not the cause. But the argument can go
well beyond that. First, our pre-test of the commercial lender's ques-
tionnaire indicated a causal connection,' at least for some of the
banks surveyed. Other interviews and correspondence corroborated
this." Second, to demonstrate that there is no causal relationship, one
would have to account for the private/federal differential on other
plausible grounds. With one possible exception, there are no explana-
tions which I have come across that could entirely block the operation
of the priority-in-retainages variable. The exception is that some
lenders may make loans to contractors only because they are interested
in permanent or "take-out" financing 9 88 Since that is by definition not
available on federal projects, the difference may be entirely explain-
able on this alternative ground. This possibility was explored in the
Commercial Lenders' Questionnaire.
In that form, the banks were asked to rank in order of preference
the types of collateral they would require of contractors. The responses
for those banks which were not then financing anything other than
private construction are as follows: 8"
1st 2nd 3rd Total
a.	 capital assets 2 1 1 4
b.	 mortgage interest in the
completed project 3 3 1 7
c.	 progress payments and
retainages 1 2 2 5
8" The survey was not designed to establish this relationship, simply because it
would have been logically impossible. Contractors are not reliable sources of information
about the reasons for bank lending policies.
800 See note 352 supra and accompanying text.
881 See text at notes 335-37 supra.
882 See, e.g., note 359 and text at note 360 supra.
888 "A take-out commitment is a contractual commitment of the permanent lender,
in consideration of a fee, to become the permanent mortgagee on the property in ques-
tion . . . ." P. Schulkin, Commercial Bank Construction Lending, Research Rep. No. 47
to the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 35 (1970). "(Me contractor-developer generally
pays off the construction loan with the proceeds of his permanent mortgage." Id. at 13.
804 Complete data is available in Appendix, infra.
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On the basis of these figures, there is little doubt that the desire
for "take-out" financing is a strong competing factor. However, the
data also shows that such a desire is not of sufficient intensity that
it could completely block the operation of the priority factor.
In short, I believe this survey indicates that the bank-surety
priority cases are a substantial contributing cause of the commercial
bankers' reluctance to finance contractors who are working on federal
projects; and that that reluctance is one cause of the small business
contractor's relative nonparticipation in the federal public works
market.
Other results of the survey of commercial lenders add support
to this conclusion. For one, the assertion that banks tend to look at
credits for public works contractors as "unsecured" was borne out.
Those banks which were making loans for both private and public
works projects reported, on the average, that only 28% of the "pri-
vate" loans were unsecured, while the same ratio for "public" loans
was 42%."'
The questionnaire contained three items which probed directly
into the existence of differential lending policies toward federal
vis-à-vis private construction projects. The questions and the responses
were as follows:
10) For a contractor who requires financing to perform a
public project, does the bank undertake any investiga-
tions into creditworthiness, feasibility, or job details
which are different from those investigations it would
undertake if the job were for a private owner?
Yes: 5.	 No: 14.	 No Response: 15.
16) For a contractor who requires financing to undertake a
public construction project, does the bank request secu-
rity of a different type, or of a different loan-to-collateral
885 The nine banks in this group reported the actual percentages as follows:
PERCENT UNSECURED
No. Public Private
1. 70 20
2. 100 70
3. 70 30
4. 10 5
5. 100 50
6. 0 0
7. 0 0
8. 0 0
9. 25 75
For a discussion of the importance of this finding, see the discussion of bank lending
policies in text at note 322 supra.
1019
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
ratio, than that which it requires on a private job?
Yes: 5.
	 No: 16.	 No Response: 13.
18) Would a "small" (i.e. less than $100,000 in owned as-
sets) contractor have a greater chance of being denied
a loan if the job in question were a public project, rather
than one for a private owner?
Yes: 8.
	 No: 18.	 No Response: 8.
A "yes" response to any one of these questions indicates, that for the
responding bank, the loan policies toward public works contractors
are more severe than for private!" As percentages of total responses,
the "yes" count was 26.3% for question 10; 23.8% for question 16;
and 30.7% for question 18." 7 Fourteen banks had answered "yes" to
one or more of the three questions, for a rate of 41%. 333 Clearly then,
a substantial portion of the banks surveyed reported that contractors
employed on public works might find it more difficult to secure financ-
ing, than if they were doing only private projects.
The fourteen banks referred to above were then compared to the
others in terms of their awareness of the legal bases of the bank-surety
priority dispute." 3 If they were graded on their awareness of these
matters of law in the way we law professors are prone to grade, the
fourteen banks which did prefer "private" to "public" projects would
as a group be in the upper half of the class (2.63), while those banks
which reported no such differences would not quite meet the graduation
standard (1.92) 870
866 Questions 10 and 16 ask only for differences. However, the answers to Questions
11 and 17 indicate that all of the differences operate in one direction, i.e., "public" is more
difficult than "private." See notes 371-75 infra.
881 These results are drawn only from the 34 banks which reported some credit
commitment to contractors. Banks which did not make loans to any contractors uniformly
left Questions 10, 16 and 18 unanswered.
8" See note 367 supra. There were 34 responses.
"9 The four legal points so tested were "The Miller Act"; "The Assignment of
Claims Act"; "The Surety's Right to Equitable Subrogation"; and the "Priority Rights
Among Lenders and Sureties on Bonded Public Construction Jobs."
670 Obviously I mean no evaluative statement by this; it is used here only to provide
a familiar comparative scale. The actual responses to this "awareness" question are as
follows:
Acutely	 Vaguely	 Not
Aware
	
Aware	 Aware .	 Aware
14	 14	 14	 14
Banks Others	 Banks Others	 Banks Others	 Banks Others
Miller Act
	 —	
—	 6	 —	 5	 5	 3	 5
Assignment	 —	 —	 11	 4	 1	 3	 2	 3
of Claims
Act
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The natural inference from this disparity is that a differential
lending policy is causally related to the awareness of the law of bank-
surety relationships. To test that inference, each of the fourteen banks
was asked to explain their responses!" On balance the answers sup-
ported the more clearly stated pre-test results, 872 i.e., that the surety's
priority is most probably one among other contributing factors to the
observed differentials.
Although the results of the survey are not unassailably conclusive
on the validity of the hypothesis with which this study began, it does
tend to support these original suppositions. Most important however,
it makes a decent case for some very hard rethinking of the entire
bank-surety priority problem, and—I personally feel—for a partial
reversal of the now nearly ubiquitous surety's victory.
C. Surprises
There are three possible explanations for the fact that the quan-
tum of support lent to the initial hypothesis by the reported data is
somewhat lower than what was originally anticipated. First, the hy-
pothesis may have been false. The intensity of proof which was ob-
served indicates that this possibility can be ruled out. Second, the
methodology may have been imperfectly conceived and imperfectly
executed. I am certain that this is true to some extent; just how true
Acutely	 Vaguely	 Not
Aware
	
Aware	 Aware	 Aware
14	 14	 14	 14
Banks Others	 Banks Others	 Banks Others	 Banks Others
Equitable	 2	 —	 6	 3	 5	 4	 1	 3
Subrogation
Bank-Surety	 4	 1	 6	 2	 4	 4	 —	 3
Priorities
To "score" this awareness, I have applied the following scale: "Acutely Aware" =
4.0; "Aware" = 3.0; "Vaguely Aware" = 2.0; and "Not Aware" = 1.0. [No one really
gives "F" (0.0) grades in law school any more.]
- For banks which make credit available to contractors, but who make "so public
loans, the differential is even higher. On the same scoring basis, those who answered "yes"
to questions 10, 16, or 18 earned a collegiate grade of 2.69. Those who answered "no"
or "no response" earned 1.58.
sn Of the five hanks which responded "yes" to question 10, one did not explain its
answer. Of the four that did, three indicated that they were having some difficulty with
bonding matters. Five banks answered question 16 affirmatively. In their explanations,
two supported the inference, and two suggested other causes. The fifth explained, mys-
teriously, "We do not anticipate lending for public construction purposes." Finally, of
the eight "yes" answers to question 18, two gave no indications of their reasoning, and
Mx suggested five different reasons.
572 See discussion in text at notes 334-36 supra.
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it is I leave to my critics. The third possibility is that there are in the
field suppressor variables which "masked" our ability to observe the
effects of the variable being tested, and which reduced the intensity
of the evidence of its existence. Of the existence of this third possi-
bility, I am virtually certain.
On the basis of the responses to some "shots in the dark," which
had been incorporated into the survey instruments, it was discovered
that there were some threshold difficulties faced by contractors who
contemplate getting involved with federal public works. These diffi-
culties were present at such high levels that the difficulty of securing
financing would not even be noticed in a measurable number of cases.
After all, why bother negotiating with the bank, when for other rea-
sons you do not want the work. The contractors' questionnaire asked,
essentially, "If you have not bid on any federal construction projects
in the last two years, would you indicate why not?" In the covering
letter the respondents were instructed to answer this question even if
they had done some bidding, but to indicate why they had not bid
more frequently. Six factors were specifically set out for comment, and
opportunity was provided for the insertion of "Other.' 378 Each re-
spondent was asked to indicate whether each of the six (or seven)
factors individually was "Determinative," "Important," "Marginally
Important," or "Irrelevant" to his , decision not to bid or to bid less
frequently than would otherwise have been the case. In summary
form,814 the results for each of the six factors are as follows: 875
Det. Imp. M.I. Irr.
1) Lower profitability on
public projects: 25 18 4 18
2) Cost of preparing a bid: 6 I0 12 27
3) Cost of submitting a bid: 5 7 11 36
4) Lack of experience with
public projects: 9 3 4 39
5) Impenetrable paper work: 38 15 6 18
6) Difficulty in securing
required bonds: 4 2 4 46
In a way, the results speak for themselves: federal projects are
not very profitable, but to get them requires an immense amount of
paper pushing. In fact over 40% of the responding firms found this
latter factor to be at least "important," while over 29% found it to be
"determinative."
878
 The items listed under "Other" are discussed in text at notes 376-77 infra, and
are reproduced in full in Appendix, Results, Contractors' Questionnaire, infra.
874 These data were stratified by firm size, and are reported thus in Appendix, infra.
878 A total of 130 firms completed this question in whole or in (usable) part.
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To explore the possibility that the "paper work" responses were
based on groundless fears rather than actual knowledge, they were
again stratified, this time holding constant the level of each firm's ac-
tual participation in federal work. The result was as follows:
Percent of Gross
Revenue Earned
from Private
Construction 
"Paperwork" Responses
% Det. Imp.	 M. Imp.	 Irr.
100% 54.5% 18 5 3 7
91-99% 54.5% 6 1 1 3
71-90% 50.0% 9 5 1 3
51-70% 66.7% 2 — — 1
0-50% 21A% 3 4 1 6
Thus—with the exception of those who are primarily public works
contractors, and who may through experience and personal contact
have been able to "routinize" their operations—roughly the same
level of inhibition appears at every level of participation. It can be
safely concluded, therefore, that the claim of "impenetrable paper
work" is not a frivolous one. Furthermore, the impact of this factor
was fairly constant for all firms surveyed, regardless of size. The pro-
portion of "determinative" responses to the paperwork question were,
by firm size:
Annual Gross	 Percent
Receipts	 "Determinative"
Under $250K  	 68.7%
$250K-1M  	 45.0%
$1M-5M  	 50.0%
Over $5M  	 27.3%
All Firms  	 49.4%
To explore the other large inhibiting factor, that of "lower profit-
ability on public projects," two other questions were included in the
survey instrument. The contractors were asked (question 8) whether
it was ever appropriate for them to engage in "low profit" contracts
to cover irreducible fixed costs; and if so (question 9), whether they
ever used public works projects for that purpose:
AliNTIAL GROSS RECEIPTS
Under $250K $250K-1M $1-5M Over $5M
Q. 8: Yes 11 13 25 10
No 13 11 25 16
Q. 9: Yes 5 8 14 6
No 7 8 10 3
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The next item on the form asked of those who answered "yes" to
number 8, but "no" to number 9, the question, "why not?" 8" Chief
among the reasons listed were the difficulties caused by arbitrary and
inexperienced inspectors, unqualified and unscrupulous competition,
and inflexibility of the Government as an "owner." These responses,
coupled with the "paperwork" responses yield a brilliant and unmis-
takable attitude on the part of contractors: doing business with the
United States is an obnoxious process.
There are two principal observations to be made about this. First,
in deterring competition through sheer bureaucratic inefficiency, the
United States may be operating contrary to its own best interests as
a buyer of contracting services."' Second, and for the same reason,
it may be interfering with the contracting industry to those firms'
detriment.
Since the difficulties noted in this section are operating at such
high levels, and are operating as threshold barriers to the participa-
tion of many firms in the federal public works market, it is not at all
surprising that the observed intensities of the effects of the one vari-
able we set out to study—i.e., the surety's prior legal position—would
be severely attenuated. However, these suppressor variables do not
detract from the validity of the hypothesis; they simply make it far
more difficult to "prove."
V. CONCLUSION
At several points throughout this discussion this article has indi-
cated the conclusions to which each of the major themes has led. To
reiterate would be superfluous. It may be worthwhile, however, to at-
tempt to collect the themes together, and to see where such an amalgam
may ultimately lead.
A. General Conclusions
When a contractor on a public works project defaults, he often
leaves behind a Miller Act bond surety and a financing bank. Both of
these unfortunates have typically made cash outlays on the contrac-
tor's behalf, and both have thereby benefitted the project. In a dispute
between them, over which has the prior right to reimbursement from
870
 The responses, predictably, corresponded closely to the factors listed in the
"Other" category of Question 5 of the Contractors' Questionnaire. These factors are de-
tailed at Question 5 in Appendix, infra.
877 A study of the need for the bureaucratic protections in relation to their spur-
ious costs is now being planned by the author. It will appear in a future issue of the
Boston College Industrial & Commercial Law Review.
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the withheld funds, with one minor exception378
 the surety will always
be preferred by the law. How the surety's priority position came to
be law is in itself a fascinating piece of history.
The development in this area has, from 1896 until today, been
more marked by accident than by sound and rigorous analysis. When
the Supreme Court first characterized the parties into different legal
camps, the die was cast. The status of "subrogee" carried with it a
great deal of doctrinal baggage; the status of "assignee," likewise.
But, unfortunately, little of the legal structure of either had been con-
cerned with the interactive effects one could have on the other. Con-
sequently, there were few clear guidelines by which the collision could
be untangled or avoided. Exacerbating that difficulty was the fact that
the bank-surety disputes arose in a number of diverse factual con-
texts: some combination of performance vs. payment bond, retainages
vs. progress payments, and so on was presented in each case; but no
case presented the entire panoply of permutations. Each of the pos-
sible factual distinctions could be logically related to an outcome—
many of them independently so. The decisional environment was
therefore less than perfect for the development of a comprehensive
scheme of analysis.
To make things even more confusing, sureties were simulta-
neously litigating similar (but not identical) matters with bankruptcy
trustees. Holdings—and even worse, dicta—generated by these col-
lateral cases were adopted eagerly by later courts as being relevant to
the financing bank situation. Few questions were raised whether such
adoptions were well founded. It is, in short, fair to characterize the
entire patch-work process as having been in part almost accidental—
maybe unavoidably so.
But there is an even more telling criticism to be made. Perhaps
distracted by the wealth of seeming distinctions that were available,
the courts by and large ignored some doctrinal difficulties that inhered
in even the seminal cases. First off, the surety's right of subrogation is
itself not free from difficulty. But beyond that, the priority of subro-
gative rights is—as a purely legal matter—open to serious question.
There is little in the law of suretyship, or in the relevant statutes or
contract documents, which forecloses the bankers' claims quite so
quickly as the courts seem to have allowed in these recent days. Thus
on several grounds the sureties' position is subject to serious doubt.
What all of these doctrinal matters boil down to is that the cur-
rent shape of the law was far from inevitably mandated by the
relevant legal sources. At several junctures it could be shown that the
878 That situation is where earned progress payments have been paid over prior to
default.
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bankers had the better of it. The sureties' position at its best is far
from impervious.
Legal vacuums are not rare. This is not the first time, nor will it
be the last, when the wisdom of the past fails to solve the problems of
the present. There is neither reason nor excuse for timidity on such
occasions. Unless one is to be satisfied with logic alone (and question-
able logic at that) as the font of distributive justice, legal vacuums
must be filled with policy. Nothing but bad decisions would be en-
dangered by explicit recognition of that fact.
In the dispute between banker and surety, the policy referents
are obvious. They have been declared by Congress, they require no
manipulation in order to be ferreted out, and they are patently wise.
They are: to protect laborers and materialmen, to protect the United
States as a purchaser of services and materials, and to foster a com-
petitive economy by encouraging the growth and proliferation of small
business enterprise.
As I have attempted to show, it is quite unlikely that a partial
reversal of the surety's now unassailably prior status will have any
adverse effects on any one of these three goals. The surety's valuable
functions should be and would be retained despite some erosion of
their legal rights. The functions of commercial lenders, however, being
far more sensitive to the legal environment than those of the surety,
would almost definitely be enhanced. This in turn would result in a
greater fulfillment of the declared federal policy objectives. The pres-
ent nature of the contracting industry and the pressures of commercial
finance in general have all operated to magnify the ill effects of the
bank-surety priority decisions. These effects have inhibited the ac-
complishment of two of the goals of federal contracting policy. A re-
versal of this trend is, I believe, therefore necessary.
B, Specific Recommendations
Having thus considered both doctrine and fact, I believe a per-
suasive case can be made for a change in the law of bank-surety pri-
ority. Doctrinal considerations do not conclusively support the claims
of either party, although at several points the banks seem to have the
better of it. Implementation of established policy, however, does tend
to dictate a pro-bank result. As I have tried to show, such a reversal
of what is now the law will have no deleterious effects, but will in all
probability have an impact consistent with established federal policy.
Yet, a blanket validation of the banks' position would be uncalled for.
There are, I think, some necessary limitations.
At various times during the evolution of the priority cases, deci-
sions had been premised upon a variety of factual matters. Their ap-
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pearance has been discussed,'" and their disappearance has been
noted. Despite the fact that they are no longer deemed relevant, be-
cause a change is now being advocated they should be exhumed just
long enough to be properly reinterred.
One such distinction was that between payment bond obligations
and performance bond obligations. Prior to Pearlman it was possible
to have differential results for cases involving the one or the other.
Munsey Trust, in fact, dealt with precisely this factor. Two points
should be made about this. First, for either of the bonds there are
legal arguments both ways. Doctrine alone is hardly conclusive here,
as elsewhere. Second, there should be no distinction made between
the two as a matter of policy. The Miller Act requires both. So long
as it does so, the laborers and materialmen will be paid and the Gov-
ernment will be held harmless from breach by the contractor. So far
as the legitimate functions of the surety are concerned, there is
nothing to indicate that its willingness to bond contractors is now or
will under any circumstances ever be different for one bond or the
other. Similarly, the bank is not concerned with exactly how its rival
became its rival. Finally, so far as the question of the bank's contribu-
tion to the project may be relevant, funds used to pay for labor, or to
buy materials, or to provide any other of the requisites for a com-
pleted project are all of equal value to the Government. In short,
neither doctrine nor policy requires a resuscitation of the payment
bond versus performance bond distinction.
The same can be said for the two "different" types of withheld
funds: retainages and progress payments. The various "legal" conse-
quences that arguably result from this classification of withheld funds
have been discussed above. Suffice it at this point to say that there is
nothing in the several policy referents which would support any con-
tinuing distinctions. For the same reasons the location of the disputed
fund should be irrelevant. When the United States withholds a pay-
ment, either by contract (retainages) or informally (progress pay-
ments "earned" by performance), it does so for its own protection. It
should not be permitted to determine the outcome of what is in every
way a private dispute by its decision to pay over or to retain any given
sum.
At present, the banks have priority as to progress payments
which have been earned and paid over prior to default. This rule, in
my opinion, should be amended by the addition of a requirement that
the lender must have exercised some amount of policing over the ap-
plication of its loan. If the bank has failed to make certain that its
loans were not dissipated, and that failure has caused a loss to the
879 See text at notes 74-75 supra.
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surety, there is little reason for the bank to be immune from recoup-
ment in an action by way of restitution, or by a constructive trust. If
the bank does wish to be able to rely on payments once made, it
should be left to do so by contract with the surety, perhaps in return
for a binding commitment to finance the contractor through to
completion.
.	 The matter of the "timing" of the rival interests, which had been
considered to be determinative in Prairie State and in certain of the
later cases, is also quite irrelevant. Banks are on constructive notice
of the existence of the Miller Act, and thus of the existence of the
surety's interest. Likewise, sureties should also be held to know that
many of their assureds will eventually need to obtain financing, and
will have to encumber their progress payments to do so. The policy
referents which have been previously discussed should not be sullied
by the terribly fortuitous circumstance of who gets the contractor's
signature first. Both sureties and banks should be encouraged to par-
ticipate; there is no reason to favor the swift. This point is especially
important in light of actual practice. Contractors often arrange with
their sureties not just for one bond at a time, but for a bonding
"limit." So long as work in progress does not exceed that limit,
issuance of a bond for a particular job is nearly automatic. Thus
typically the relationship significantly predates any given bond. The
same is true of banks; few loans are "one-shot." 38° Much more typical
are lines of credit which allow drawings without regard to the particu-
lar project. In short, actual timing of the contractual relationships
normally has nothing to do with the particular job in question, for the
bank as well as for the surety.
The remaining factual distinction, which once briefly flickered in
the reports but which has now been snuffed out, is that of the applica-
tion of loan proceeds. This point, I think, should be infused with new
life. As I have indicated earlier, 881
 a commercial lender who fails to
even inquire about the use of his loan has a very flimsy legal basis for
his claim to priority. Subrogation and priority of subrogees are equi-
table matters. As between a surety whose advances have gone to help
generate the fund in question, and a bank whose advances have not,
there should be little doubt that the surety has a more compelling
equitable position. As a matter of government contracts policy, a live-
it-up lender who fails to assist his borrower on the project in question
is not doing the job which he should be encouraged to do. Such a
lender adds little to the interests of the United States, and is not par-
380
 See Appendix, Commercial Lenders' Questionnaire, Question 8, infra.
881
 See text at notes 379-80 supra.
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ticipating in the financing of contractors in a way which will neces-
sarily promote competition within the public contracts market.
It is quite a different matter, however, if the proceeds of the loan
have been used in furthering the project. If such is the case, not only
has the Government been benefited and the lender's assistance been
"properly" (i.e. within the relevant policy framework) applied, but
beyond even these, the maximum exposure of the surety on his bonds
has been reduced. The equitable positions are thus quite distinct from
the case of dissipated proceeds. If only those lenders who will do such
"policing" of their loans are protected, the encouragement which Con-
gress has often wished for, would in fact come about. The costs of
policing are not excessive.882 In fact, a large number of banks are cur-
rently policing their loan funds to ensure that they are properly
applied 888
If the surety's claim were to be subordinated to that of the lender
who has benefited the project (and thereby benefited the surety),
there would be a measurable inducement for commercial banks to
assist small business contractors in undertaking public works projects.
The results would be salutary: one barrier to entry would be
lowered, and in all probability the beneficial services now provided
by contract bond sureties would not abate. In fact, as suggested pre-
viously,'" there is some chance that sureties would react by screening
bond applicants more for quality than for financial marginality. On
the matter of capability and credit-worthiness, banks are at least as
adept assessors as are the surety companies. Within the limitations
above noted, both doctrinal and empirical analyses support turning
back the clock to 1945, and recognizing the wisdom of the "policing"
criterion relied on by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in its decision
in Coconut Grove.
C. Proposals for Further Study
The proposal just made is hardly the end of the matter. Rather,
there are at least three distinct items which merit further work. The
first is the question of implementation.
Cash paid directly to materialmen and laborers should not be the
only application of loan proceeds which will support a banker's pri-
ority in the retained funds. It may be, for example, that loan proceeds
used to satisfy some other demand of the contractor will directly re-
suit in the release of other funds which can then be used on the
882
 See Appendix, Commercial Lenders' Questionnaire, Question 5, infra.
883 Id.
884
 See text at notes 308-09 supra.
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project. Clarifying circumstances such as that, and developing stan-
dards for deciding concrete cases is a matter best left to the courts.
There are certainly now clear enough policy limits to guide that de-
cisional process. Similarly, standards for the level of "policing" will
have to be developed. These I would not leave entirely to the process
of judicial rule-making. I would rather see some factual studies made
of industry practices, and of the costs and feasibility of various
policing techniques. After that is done the courts may more perfectly
balance the competing interests without imposing unrealistic burdens.
The second matter that invites further work is the study which
has been reported in this essay. I have reached my conclusions, and
offered my proposal, with an acute awareness of the existence of some
deficiencies in the proof. Obviously, in my judgment the evidence is
adequate. I would nevertheless think that replication is in order, as
well as rigorous criticism. At this point I believe my conclusions and
proposal to be sound. I do not, however, think them to be "proven"
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The third proposal for further study is prompted by the data
which was uncovered, and which demonstrated the intense level of
operation of threshhold barriers to entry to the federal public works
market. The results of Henningsen and Pearlman are only a part of
the reason for the difficulty faced by the small business contractor,
and are only a part of the cause of the relative lack of competition
in this market. The federal contracting processes themselves are sig-
nificantly inhibiting. This is a matter eminently worth being explored.
Examining and curing its defects are at least as important as is the
need to reverse the current state of the law of banker-surety priority
disputes.
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A. CONTRACTORS' QUESTIONNAIRE
Miller Act Survey
Contractors' Questionnaire
Rev. October 11, 1972
All Replies Must Be Kept in the Strictest Confidence; Do Not Record the Contractor's
Firm Name on This Sheet.
1. Classification of Business:
General Building
Contractor
Heavy Construction
Contractor:
Highway
Non-Highway
Specialty Contractor:
Electrical Work
Plumbing, Heating,
Air Conditioning
Painting, Paper
Hanging, Decorating 	
Masonry, Stonework,
Plastering
Carpentering
Concrete Work
Roofing & Sheet
Metal Work
'Structural Steel
Erection
Other, specify
Subdividers, Developers,
Operative Builders
2. Principal place of business (city and state) 	
3. In order to locate your firm's position within the Bureau of Census statistics, would
you categorize your firm's gross receipts into one of the following dollar ranges:
a. Under $10,000
b. $ 10,0004 24,999
c. $ 25,0004 49,999
d. $ 50,0004249,999
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e. $250,0004999,999
f. $1 million-$5 million
g. Over $5 million
4. Could you estimate the % of your annual gross receipts derived from:
a. Private construction
b. Federal construction
c. State construction
d. Municipal construction
5. (a) Have you bid on any federal construction contracts in the past two years
(b) If not, would you indicate which, if any, of the following factors may have
influenced your decision not to bid?
%
Determinative
Lower profitability on
public projects
Cost of preparing a bid 	
Cost of submitting a bid 	
Lack of experience with
public projects
Impenetrable paper work 	
Difficulty in securing
required bonds
Other
Marginally
Important	 Important	 Irrelevant
6. How have you found the ease of procuring the
the following types of contracts:
Always	 Usually
Easy	 Easy
financing necessary to begin each of
	Occasionally U ually	 Always
Difficult	 Difficult	 Difficult 
a. Private Construction
b. Federal Construction
C. State Construction
d. Municipal
Construction                                                  
7. How have you found the ease of procuring bonds as required on the following
types of contracts:
Always	 Usually Occasionally Usually 	 Always
Easy	 Easy	 Difficult	 Difficult	 Difficult
a. Private Construction
b. Federal Construction
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c, State Construction
d. Municipal
Construction
8. Has it been appropriate in recent years for you to engage in a low profit contract to
cover irreducible fixed costs? 	
9. If the answer to #8 Is yes, have you considered using public contracts for this
purpose? 	
10. If answer to #9 is no, could you briefly explain why?
B. RESULTS: CONTRACTORS' QUESTIONNAIRE
Question 1:
Classification of Business: Interview
Question-
noire
Public
Works Total
General Building Contractor 	 19 26 7 52
Heavy Construction Contractor:
Highway 	 1 7 0 8
Non-Highway 	 2 12 0 14
Specialty Contractor:
Electrical Work 	 2 9 0 11
Plumbing, Heating, Air
Conditioning 	 5 6 1 12
Painting, Paper Hanging,
Decorating 	 1 9 2 12
Masonry, Stonework, Plastering 
	 3 3 0 6
Carpentering 	 0 4 0 4
Concrete Work 	 2 3 0 5
Roofing & Sheet Metal Work 	 2 10 0 12
Structural Steel Erection 
	 0 2 0 2
Other, specify 	 2 10 0 12
Subdividers, Developers, Operative
Builders 	 0 3 0 3
Totals 	 39 	 -
  104 10 153
Question 3:
In order to locate your firm's position within the Bureau of Census statistics,
would you categorize your firm's gross receipts into one of the following dollar
ranges:
Question-	 Public
Interview	 noire	 Works	 Total
a. Under $10,000 0 0 0 0
b. $ 10,0004 24,999 0 2 0 2
c,	 $ 25,000-$ 49,999 0 2 0 2
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Question-	 Public
Interview	 noire	 Works	 Total
d. $ 50,000-$249,999	 2	 18	 2	 22
e. $250,000-$999,999	 5	 21	 3	 29
f. $1 million-$5 million	 21	 22	 4	 47
g. Over $5 million	 10	 16	 1	 27
Totals	 38	 81	 10	 129
Question 4:
Could you estimate the percentage of your annual gross receipts derived from;
(Public Works "Repeaters" Only)
76-
Type of Work
	 0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 100%
	
Numbers of
	
a. Private Construction 	 6	 1	 2	 1
	
Responses	 b. Federal Construction	 5	 4	 0	 1
c. State Construction	 8	 1	 1	 0
d. Municipal Construction 	 8	 2	 0	 0
Ranges: a. —0 to 91%; b. —3 to 80%; c. —0 to 60%; d. —0 to 35%.
Question 4:
Could you estimate the percentage of your annual gross receipts derived from:
Annual
Gross
Receipts
(%)
Private
Construction
Federal
Construction
State
Construction
Municipal
Construction
$0-250K
0
1-10
11-25
26-40
41-67
67+
—
—
1
1
4
21
16
4
. 4
—
3
—
17
8
1
—
1
—
15
8
3
1
_
—
$250K-1M
0 1 13 12 14
1-10 2 10 10 6
11-25 1 1 2 4
26-40 — 2 2 2
41-67 4 — 1 1
67+ 19 1 — —
$1M-5M
0 2 17 18 18
1-10 5 21 18 18
11-25 3 7 9 7
26-40 3 2 2 4
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Annual
Gross
Receipts
(%)
Private
Construction
Federal
Construction
State
Construction
Municipal
Construction
41-67 5 2 2 3
67+ 32 1 1 —
Over $5M
0 2 7 6 s
1-10 4 7 10 7
11-25 4 5 6 6
26-40 3 3 3 4
41-67 6 2 1 2
67+ 7 2 — 2
Question 5a:
Have you bid on any federal construction contracts in the past two years?
1) Stratified by data "source."
Question-	 Public
Interview	 naire	 Works	 Total
Yes 23 46 10 79
No 14 20 0 34
Totals 37 66 10 113
2) Stratified by gross revenues.
$0-$2501(	 WOK-1M	 $1M-5M	 Over SM
Yes 10 19 27 21
No 17 4 17 5
Question 5b:	 • •
[If you have not bid on any federal construction contracts in the past two years]
. . indicate which, if any, of the following factors may have influenced your
decision not to bid. [From covering letter: If you have bid, please indicate
which factors, if any, may have deterred you from bidding more frequently.]
= Determinative
Imp. Important
MI = Marginally Important
Irr. = Irrelevant
a. Lower profitability on public projects
Number
Rcsp.
Annual
Gross R. D Imp MI Irr
27 $0-250K 7 3 — 1
27 $250K-1M 9 4 1 2
50 $1M-5M 6 9 2 10
26 Over $53/1 3 2 1 5
130 Totals 25 18 4 18
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b. Cost of preparing a bid:
Number
Resp.
Annual
Gross R. D Imp MI Irr
27 $0-250K 2 5 I —
27 $250K-1M 1 — 4 7
50 $1M-5M 2 5 6 13
26 Over $5M 1 — I 7
130 Totals 6 10 12 27
c. Cost of submitting a bid:
Number Annual
Resp. Gross R. D Imp MI Irr
27 $0-250K 3 4 1 2
27 $250K-1M 1 1 5 6
50 $1M-5M 1 2 5 19
26 Over $5M — — — 9
130 Totals 5 7 11 36
d. Lack of experience with public projects:
Number
Resp.
Annual
Gross R. Imp MI Irr
27 $0-250K 4 1 1 4
27 $250K-1M 0 2 1 8
50 $1M-5M 4 0 2 20
26 Over $5M 1 0 0 7
130 Totals 9 3 4 39
e. Impenetrable paper work:
Number
Resp.
Annual
Gross R. I) Imp MI Irr
27 $0-250K 11 3 1 1
27 $250K-1M 9 4 4 3
50 $1M-5111 15 6 1 8
26 Over $5M 3 2  0 6
130 Totals 38 15 6 18
f. Difficulty in Securing Required Bond:
Number	 Annual
Resp.	 Gross R.	 D	 Imp	 MI	 Irr
27	 $0-250K	 4	 2	 —	 6
27	 $250K-1M	 —	 —	 3	 7
50 -	 $1M-5M	 —	 —	 1 .	 24
26	 Over $5M	 —	 —	 —	 9
130	 Totals	 4	 2	 4	 46
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Question 6:
How have you found the ease of procuring the financing necessary to begin each
of the following types of contracts:
Annual
Gross
Receipts
Private
Construction
Federal
Construction
State
Construction
Municipal
Construction
$0-250K
AE 7 2 1 2
UE 8 4 2 3
OD 3 2 1 1
LID 2 2 1 —
AD 1 — 1 —
$2501CIM
AE 6 4 4 4
UE 9 7 6 5
OD 3 2 2 2
UD 1 1 1 1
Al) 2 1 1 1
$1M-5M
AE 15 12 12 12
UE 21 12 11 11
OD 4 4 5 5
UD — — — —
AD — — — —
Over $5M
AE 9 8 5 5
UE 9 5 6 6
OD 1 1 1 1
UD 1 1 1 2
AD —
—
— —
AE = "always easy"
UE = "usually easy"
OD = "occasionally difficult"
UD = "usually difficult"
AD = "always difficult"
Question 7:
How have you found the ease of procuring bonds as required on the following
types of contracts:
Annual
Gross
Receipts
Private
Construction
Federal
Construction
State
Construction
Municipal
Construction
$0-250K
AB 9 5 4 5
UE 10 4 3 5
OD 3 1 1 —
VD 1 3 I 1
AD 1 — — —
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Annual
Gross
Receipts
Private
Construction
Federal
Construction
State
Construction
Municipal
Construction
$250K-1M
AE 10 7 6 7
UE 13 9 8 7
OD 3 1 I
UD 1 1 2 2
AD
—
—
—
—
$1M-5M
AE 19 16 15 15
UE 22 16 18 17
OD 5 3 2 2
UD — — — —
AD — — — —
Over $5M
AE 17 17 15 15
UE 7 3 4 4
OD — — — —
UD 1 1 1 2
AD — — — —
AE = "always easy"
UE = "usually easy"
OD = "occasionally difficult"
UD = "usually difficult"
AD = "always difficult"
Question 8:
Has it been appropriate in recent years for you to engage in a low profit con-
tract to cover irreducible fixed costs?
$042501( $250K-1M $1M-5M Over SM
Yes
No
11
13
13
11
25
25
10
16
Question 9:
If your answer to no. 8 is "yes," have you considered using public contracts
for this purpose?
$0-$250K	 $250K-1M	 $1M-SM	 Over SM
Yes 5 8 14 6
No 7 8 10 3
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["Paperwork" Responses]
Percentage of Gross Revenue Derived from Private Construction
100%
38*
91-99%
11*
71-90%
24*
51-70%
13*
0-50%
43*
Determinative 18 6 9 2 3
Important 5 1 5 -- 4
Marginally
Important 3 1 1 — 1
Irrelevant 7 3 3 1 6
Number
Responding 33 11 18 3 14
* Number Surveyed in Each Group
For purposes of sampling the internal consistency of the responses, Question 7
(difficulty in bonding) was cross-checked against Question 5(f) (difficulty In bonding as
a reason for infrequent bidding on public works). For example, contractors who cited
bonding problems as the reason for not bidding should also have had difficulty in securing
bonds. Those who found bonding problems "Irrelevant" to their decision not to bid,
should have had little difficulty in securing bonds.
As the following table indicates, this cross-tabulation evidences a rather high degree
of internal consistency:
Question 7 Response*
Marginal
Determinative	 Important
	
Importance	 Irrelevant	 No Resp.
P.	 F.	 P.	 F.	 P.	 F.	 P.	 F.	 P.	 F.
AE	 — — — — — 23 16 34 29
UE	 2  	 2 2	 20 8 28 22
OD	 — —	 — —	 1 —	 1	 1	 5	 5
UD	 I	 3	 — —	 — —	 2	 2	 --
 — — — 1 — — — — 1 —
[*Question 7: Reasons for Infrequent Bidding on Federal Contracts.]
AE = Always Easy
UE = Usually Easy
OD = Occasionally Difficult
UD = Usually Difficult
AD = Always Difficult
P. = Private Contracts
F. = Federal Contracts
Question 5: "Other" Factors Indicated as Determinative
1. Unreasonable and/or inexperienced inspectors. (Three responses.)
2. Unscrupulous competition engaging in bid shopping, or in corner cutting. (Six re-
sponses.)
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3. Lack of information that work is available.
4. Not oriented to federal bidding.
S. Impossible specifications.
6. Unavailability of Iarge jobs.
7. Too many unqualified bidders; probability of getting a job therefore too low. (Two
responses.)
Question 10: Explanation for a "NO" response to Q. 9.
1. Bond requirements, paper work and generally low profit in jobs are for the most
part the reason for not bidding federal, state and municipal jobs.
2. Because of the difficulty in federal work other than the job itself.
3. Bidding on public contracts with a low profit margin going in is likely to result in
a net toss at end of job.
4. Because public pay is slow, paperwork tedious and increase (sic) overhead costs.
5. We have tried but were discouraged after talking to Federal personel (sic).
6. Unreasonable regulatory conditions in all phases of operations.
7. Incompetent government inspectors could turn your low profit contract into a loss.
8. To (sic) many details.
9. Excessive paperwork, unreasonable inspections by arbitrary and sometimes poorly
qualified personnel, slow response to payment requests and excessively long reten-
tion periods. In a phrase: there is a lot of easier and more profitable work around.
10. Absolutely must have a profit on public work.
11. Overhead too high due to excessive paperwork; inspections performed by inefficient
penonnel who know nothing about construction industry and constantly interfere
with progress of the project.
12. Specifications are too inflexible on public jobs.
13. Too great a risk.
14. We do our own designing. Such work is only available in the private sector.
15. Jobs often run too much over (time) schedule and margin is too low with ir-
responsible competition.
16. Low profit margin—difficulty in getting jobs completed and accepted-- excess "paper-
work."
Additional (Unsolicited) Comments on Contractors' Questionnaires
I. "Financing is necessary due to the large amount of money tied up in contract reten-
tions and the slow pay of most municipal, state and federal agencies."
2. "More money is lost on public building projects than is made because they take too
many bids and the inspection is usually unfair and arbitrary, and all errors, mistakes,
etc. are thrown on the contractor. Check bow many (and what %) of contractors
go broke on public jobs!! I"
3. "Federal work is the most difficult on which to make a profit because of-1) poorly
trained inspectors; 2) red tape; 3) lack of established command; 4) the man in charge
frequently is so far up the line that we cannot find out who he is."
4. "Too many bidders—chance of getting work only if one makes an error and is too
low in price. Our firm, about twenty years old, did considerable public work early
in its life. We were frustrated often by being unable to affect (sic) savings (which
were justified) because 1. Many field inspectors were incompetent and therefore in-
sisted on the letter of the specification even though our experience showed a better way.
2. If you bid an alternate at the outset, the public agency takes your idea gratis and
puts it out to bid for your competitors to rebid. So why bother to suggest improve-
ments? 3. We tried to do the best job we could and found our costs higher than the
very sharp plan and spec contractors who hangs tough on every point."
Additional Comments from Personal Interviews with Contractors
1. The sureties will not bond when the firm's volume to net worth exceeds 10 to 1.
2. The probability of submitting a bid and getting the job are much too low in public
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works. A firm must be specially set-up to handle the large volume of paper work.
All of the above requires additional investment with little expectation of an at-
tractive return.
3. The cost of preparing a bid for a public project is four times greater than on
private projects.
4. The level of competence of government inspectors was so low that they could
cause the firm's low profit contract to turn into a loss. The inspector is able to stop
the job with very little, if any, provocation.
5. The element of personal contact is missing on public jobs. This firm bases much of
its business on repeat referral jobs.
6. The probability of getting a job was too low, since there are usually large number
of bidders.
7. Prefer not to bid on public contracts due to bid auctioning.
8. Here again, bonding capacity is the magic word; if we stay within our limit the
procuring of the bond was very easy.
9. On several occasions in the past this firm had closely approached its bonding capacity,
and when that point was reached it became much more difficult to procure the
necessary bonds.
10. Getting bonds is dependent upon whether you can get financing. (Most firms felt
that the opposite was true. You could only get financing if you could first get the
bond.)
11. Surety audits the firm's books annually to insure financial stability and to discover
any volume (gross receipts) totals which exceed the firm's bonding capacity.
12. Choice to self-finance all government work was not based on difficulty in procuring
the financing, but was based on the erratic receipt of progress payments from the
government.
13. It takes a much larger quick cash reserve for a firm to operate in the public con-
tract section.
14. Public jobs are less profitable.
15. The firm is very conscious of contractors who bid auction their subcontractor bids.
The firm wishes to stay out of federal jobs because there is no statutory restriction
on such practice. They cannot compete with firms who do bid auctioning.
16. Although the firm will undertake low profit contracts, they will not do so on
government jobs. There is "no latitude to move." You are tied too closely to
specifications. The government is too inflexible.
17. Lack of licensing allowed anyone to bid and therefore kept reputable firms out of
the government contract area.
18. By severely limiting their bidding so as not to exceed their bonding capacity, the
firm finds it always easy to procure its bonds.
19. Profitability is lower on public jobs, mostly because anyone can get a bid bond and
then bid the project.
20. Most important complaint about operating in the public construction market was
the vast amount of paper work that was required to bid the job. The paper work
problem was going to get much worse in the future and is actually bad now "due
to the minority problems." Large amounts of paper work are required by the Equal
Opportunity Program just to insure that the appropriate percentage of minorities
are being employed on the job. If the appropriate percentage is not met, the agency
may stop production.
The effect of this increase in paper work will be to significantly lower com-
petition. Since most contractors are currently burdened with heavy loads of paper
work, the added load will force them to abandon public works.
The contractor must be specialized into public jobs in order for him to be
efficient, competitive and profitable. The handling of the paper work must be
highly routinized to minimize its vastness. Once, however, the contractor is very
familiar with the paper work, he will know several ways by which to eliminate
certain amounts of the materials. Also, by being a repetitive government bidder
and if you can establish a good rapport with the heads of the contract awarding
agency, he may direct you into eliminating certain paper work.
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21. Bonding companies are never concerned with who the owner of the project is;
they are only concerned with your volume and net worth.
22. No quick cash and therefore unable to get a bond.
23. Getting a bond Is totally dependent upon either having surplus funds in the firm
or first being able to borrow from the bank.
C. COMMERCIAL LENDERS' Quzanomtsutz WITH REstivrs
Miller Act Survey
Commercial Lenders' Questionnaire
Rev. December 4, 1972
All Replies Will Be Kept in the Strictest Confidence.
1. Bank's name and address
[See note 346 supra.]
2. Title of bank officer completing this questionnaire (optional)
3. Size (population) of metropolitan area in which the bank is located:
Under	 50,000 	 16
50,000- 	100,000 	 8
100,000- 300,000 	 4
300,000- 600,000 	 5
600,000-1,000,000 	 7
1,000,000-3,000,000 	 5
Over 3,000,000 	 7
4.	 Total deposits of the bank:
Under	 $50 million 	 29
$ 50- 100 million 	 11
$100- 200 million 	 2
$200- 500 million 	 7
$500-1000 million 	 0
Over	 $ 1 billion 	 3
5A. What is your estimate of the bank's total credit commitment to the contracting
industry?
$0 	  29 Banks
Under $500,000 	  16 Banks
$500,000-$2,000,000 	  8 Banks
$2,000,000-$6,000,000 	  4 Banks
Over $6,000,000 	  6 Banks
Total Responses 	  63 Banks
5B. If the bank does not extend loans to contractors, could you explain briefly the policy?
[Responses listed in note 323 supra.]
6. What is your estimate of the current distribution of the commitment to public
vis-a-vis private construction projects? (For purposes of this survey, a "public"
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project is one the ultimate owner of which is the federal, state, or municipal
government or government agency.)
Public:	 12%
(Mean)
Private:
	 88%
Total: 100%
7.	 Are loans to contractors handled by:
Regular loan officers 	 32
A construction industries loan officer 	 5
A contractors' loan group 	 0
Other (please specify) 	 1
8. How are these loans distributed by type:
Transaction
(one-shot, or job loans)—Private proj.-26%; Public-8%.
Term and/or
installment loans—Private proj.-11%; Public-3%.
Interim construction
mortgage lines—Private proj.-52%.
9. What proportion, if any, of your loans to contractors are made on an unsecured
basis?
Public projects-42%
Private projects-28%
[See note 365 supra for individual responses.]
10. For a contractor who requires financing to perform a public project, does the bank
undertake any investigations into creditworthiness, feasibility, or job details, which
are different from those investigations it would undertake if the job were for a
private owner?
Yes: 5
	
No: 14	 No Response: 15
H. If number 10 is answered "yes," could you describe briefly what those additional
procedures would be?
(1) "Determine bonding history."
(2) "Contractor must have previous track record acceptable to us. Must be
bondable."
(3) "Documentation reflecting the evidence that public funds are authorized
for subject project and evaluate what restrictions may prohibit payment
under the public work contract."
(4) "—Architect—Payment schedules—Fed. or State, etc."
[See note 371 supra.]
12. To what extent are the following factors important to your loan officers in their
decisions to extend a loan to a contractor on an unsecured basis:
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Very	 Not very
Impor-	 Impor-	 Impor-
tant	 tant	 tant	 Irrelevant
Borrower's total capitalization
Borrower's average deposit balance
Borrower's experience in the trade
Borrower's net unencumbered asset value
Ultimate "owner" of the project
23
6
28
16
7
8
20
3
14
14
—
4
—
1
8 2
13. To what extent are these same factors important in the making of a secured loan to
a contractor:
Very	 Not very
Impor-	 Impor-	 Impor-
tant	 tant	 tant	 Irrelevant
Borrower's total capitalization
Borrower's average deposit balance
Borrower's experience in the trade
Borrower's net unencumbered asset value
Ultimate "owner" of the project
15
2
24
9
6
15
21
7
18
12
—
9
—
4
11 2
14. For a secured loan to a contractor, what would be your preferences among the fol-
lowing types of collateral, assuming them to be equally available: (Indicate 1st, 2d,
etc.)
	
1st	 2d	 3d	 4th	 5th
— —
a. capital assets (equipment)	 5	 7	 12	 3	 2
b. lien or mortgage interest in
the completed project	 21	 5	 4	 —	 1
c, progress payment and retained
percentages	 3	 14	 9	 4	 —
d. other (specify)	 2	 3	 3	 1	 —
e. other (specify)	 —	 1	 1	 1	 2
15. Could you rank the above (a through c, d, or e) in the usual order of availability?
	Ist 	 2d	 3d	 4th	 5th
— —
a. capital assets (equipment)
b. lien or mortgage interest in
the completed project
c, progress payment and retained
percentages
d, other (specify)
e. other (specify)
8 10 6 3 2
17 3 6 1 2
5 13 10 1 —
—
1 4 3 —
—
1 2 1 1
16. For a contractor who requires financing to undertake a public construction project,
does the bank request security of a different type, or of a different loan-to-collateral
ratio, than that which it requires on a private job ?
Yes: 5	 No: 16
	
No Response: 13
17. If the answer to number 16 is "yes," could you describe the differences, and briefly
explain why?
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(1) "Public projects will not allow liens or mortgage interest on projects.
Public projects require bond."
(2) "Sometimes, assignment of payment checks."
(3) "As a general rule the contractor's performance on a public job often must
meet higher standards and there is more chance of work not being accept-
able."
(4) "90% financing available on Turnkey projects underwritten by HUD pro-
vided contract between local housing authority, contractor and HUD is
assigned to bank prior to closing construction mortgage." (Emphasis in
original.)
18. Would a "small" (i.e., less than $100,000 in owned assets) contractor have a greater
chance of being denied a loan if the job in question were a public project, rather
than one for a private owner?
Yes: 8	 No: • 18
	 No Response: 8
19. If the answer to number 18 was "yes," would you briefly describe why?
(1) "Greater chance of serious delays in payouts—and less flexibility of owner
in general—specifically with reference to federally funded/financed projects."
(2) "Primarily because of the cost of the project, and lour] lack of experience
in such projects."
(3) (See Response 17(3) above.)
(4) "Small contractors cannot handle the cash flow required in large public
projects."
(5) "Depending on size of job of course. Public projects are slow pay and
sometimes held up because of someone's decision."
(6) "Too small to carry most public projects working capital wise."
20. In your state, must contractors bidding on public projects be "prequalified" by some
state agency?
Yes: 13	 No: 8
21. If your answer to number 20 was "yes," to what extent do your loan officers rely
on such screening?
Not at all; we think the reports given the agency are unreliable. (0)
Not at all; we think the standards set by the state are too low. (0)
The screening criteria are not germane to the loan decision. (4)
The screening is one factor among many others to be considered. (9)
The prequaliflcation creates a presumption of creditworthiness. (1)
22. In those few situations in which a loan threatens to become a "workout," and the
bank is in the position of having to compete with a payment or performance bond
surety for the retained funds and the unpaid progress payments,
a. how often does the bank have a higher priority than the surety, legally
speaking?
Responses (in %): 100
100
100
90
90
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50
50
20
10
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
Average: 39%
b. how often are the funds shared by the bank and the surety?
Responses (in To): 90
40
30
10
10
10
10
0
0
0
0
Average: 18%
23. Has your bank ever attempted to negotiate subordination or sharing agreements with
payment and performance bond sureties?
Yes: 4	 No: 28
If so, how often are such contracts entered into?
Four Responses: 0%; 0%; 0%; 1%
At what point in the dealing with the contractor are such agreements made with
the surety? [No responses.]
What are the typical subordination terms or sharing ratios?
Two responses, both reporting "100% to surety."
24. Briefly, what system (if any) does the bank use to "police" or control the con-
tractor's application of the disbursed loan funds during the period of construction?
a. No Response: 22
b. Lien Waivers From Subcontractors, or Title Clearance From Title Co.: 6
c. "Active" Policing (Disbursements Only Against Suppliers' Bills; On-Site
Review; Spot Checks With Materialmen and Laborers; etc.): 25
25. What is your estimate of the cost of this "policing," in dollars per $10,000 of loan
amount?
Mean: $ 91.43
Median: $100.00
Mode: $100.00
Range: $ 15.00 to $400.00
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Would this system of "policing" be different for a public project than for a private
one?
Yes: 5
	 No: 10
If so, how?
Two Responses:
(1) "Public projects are inspected by public engineers."
(2) "Many more regulatory bodies would have to be consulted and satisfied.
Result: additional expense."
26. Would the cost of such differences (or the savings) be of significance?
Yes: 3	 No: 0
	
No Response: 2
27. To what extent do you think that most commercial loan officers in your city are
aware of the following legal points;
Acutely
Aware Aware
Vaguely
Aware
Not
Aware
The Miller Act 1 3 13 11
The Assignment of Claims Act 1 14 7 6
The sureties' rights to "equitable
subrogation" 2 12 9 5
Priority rights among lenders and
sureties on bonded public
construction jobs 6 10 8 4
28A. If the bank has had experience with guaranteed loans ("V"-loans, or SBA guaran-
tees) to small contractors, was the bank in those cases more willing to make loans
for public works construction?
Yes: 2
	 No: 9	 No Response: 21
28B. Could you explain briefly why (or why not) ?
[See note 274 supra.]
29. What is your estimate of the percentage of loans made to "small business contractors"
(less than $5,000,000 annual gross receipts) which have been guaranteed?
Unguaranteed:	 92%)
SBA guaranteed:	 6%)	 (Mean)
"V-Loan":	 2%)
Total
	
100%
Additional Data: Commercial Lenders' Questionnaire
1. Credit commitment to the contracting industry, by size (total deposits) of bank:
a. Under $50 million: None, 11 banks.
b. $50 to 100 million: None, 5 banks.
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Others:	 $100,000
500,00()
2,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
50,000,000
c. $100 to 500 million: None, 2 banks.
Others:	 2,000,000
3,000,000
6,000,000
10,000,000
15,000,000
30,000,000
d. Over $500 million: None, 0 banks.
Others:	 50,000,000
100,000,000
2. Responses to question 27 from banks which have no credit commitment available to
contractors:
To what extent do you think that most commercial loan officers in your city are
aware of the following legal points:
The Miller Act
The Assignment of Claims Act
The sureties' rights to
"equitable subrogation"
Priority rights among lenders and
sureties on bonded public
construction jobs
Acutely
Aware
Vaguely
Aware	 Aware
Not
Aware
1
2
4
3
2
4
1
3
3
3. Collateral preferences, of banks loaning to contractors only for private projects,
vis-a-vis banks loaning to contractors for both public and private projects:
Private Construction Loans Only
1st	 2d	 3d	 Total
Capital assets	 13%	 6%	 6%	 25%
Lien or mortgage in
completed work	 19%	 19%	 6%	 44%
Progress payments and
retained percentages 	 6%	 13%	 13%	 31%
[100% = 16 responses.]
Public and Private Construction Loans
1st	 2d	 3d	 Total
— — —
Capital assets	 6%	 9%	 15%	 30%
Lien or mortgage in
completed work	 26%	 6%	 S%	 38%
Progress payments and
retained percentages	 4%	 18%	 11%	 32%
[100% = 80 responses.]
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